Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

2021

Hemingway, Sartre, and Secularization: Finding Religion Without
God
Marcos Antonio Norris

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Environmental Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Norris, Marcos Antonio, "Hemingway, Sartre, and Secularization: Finding Religion Without God" (2021).
Dissertations. 3940.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3940

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 2021 Marcos Antonio Norris

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

HEMINGWAY, SARTRE, AND SECULARIZATION:
FINDING RELIGION WITHOUT GOD

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN ENGLISH

BY
MARCOS ANTONIO NORRIS
CHICAGO, IL
DECEMBER 2021

Copyright by Marcos Antonio Norris, 2021
All rights reserved.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful for my dissertation committee and owe many thanks to each of you. Jack
Kerkering, you have been an involved reader, pouring yourself over my drafts and responding
with more detail than I ever would have expected. You have challenged my ideas, introduced me
to new ones, and contributed significantly to the development of this project. (This may reveal
how behind the curve I am, but you also taught me about split infinitives, an issue that I am still
working to correct in my writing). Paul Eggert, studying under your guidance has been a
privilege. This is not overstated. After receiving a B+ from you on an assignment, I knew you
were someone I needed to learn from, and I have learned a great deal since then. I am charmed
by your ability to say so much with so few words. I will remember your influence in the years to
come. Finally, Colby. You were not my first choice for an independent study. I was tossed
around between faculty members and finally between departments. But, man, did I luck out in
the end—the crossing of our paths has been truly fortuitous, and the truth is, I would have
accomplished much less in this program without the opportunities you have afforded me. Your
friendship is a blessing. I hope to follow your example as a scholar, a teacher, and a person.
I would like to thank my friends in the graduate program, especially Andrew Welch, Will
Farina, and Rick Gilbert. Our many conversations enriched my graduate school experience and,
more importantly, they were very, very fun. You guys are the best. I would also like to express
my gratitude for the faculty of English at Loyola. It has been a pleasure learning from all of you.
And, of course, I would like to thank Loyola’s Graduate School for funding my education.
iii

It feels like a duty but also an honor to thank Doug Schaak. You showed me what was
possible, you believed in me, and you supported me when I most needed it. There are few people
who have had the impact in my life that you have. Maybe it goes without saying, but I think of
you as an usually good person, and I will never forget what you’ve done for me. Finally, thank
you Sarah. Without you, none of this would be possible. Sometimes I think you’ve worked
harder for this degree than I have. Thank you for your courage, your persistence, and your faith. I
love you.
My PhD has taken longer than expected, and after fourteen years of study, I may come
out the other end of this thing as a jobless 35 year old—in fact, it’s quite likely. But these have
been the best years of my life, and I sincerely don’t think I would trade them for anything. I
mean, what else compares? Fingers crossed for the journey ahead.

iv

Is not the multitude of this deed too great for us? Shall we not ourselves
have to become Gods, merely to seem worthy of it?
--Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

iii

ABSTRACT

vii

CHAPTER ONE: HEMINGWAY, SARTRE, AND SECULARIZATION
An Introduction
A Word on Secularization
Hemingway as Religious Believer
Sartre as Religious Believer
Returning to Hemingway
Dissertation Summary

1
1
14
22
28
34
43

CHAPTER TWO: SOVEREIGN DECISIONISM AND THE IMAGO DEI
The Failed Atheism of Jean-Paul Sartre
The Biographical Origins of Sartre’s Failed Atheism
Agamben and the Creation of Mankind
Looking at Sartre Through Agamben’s Eyes
Hemingway’s Youth as an Oak Park Congregationalist
A Change in Hemingway’s Religious Temperament
Hemingway the Existentialist
Hemingway the Catholic
Hemingway the Un/Believer

48
48
53
60
72
83
89
100
104
110

CHAPTER THREE: THE PROBLEM WITH HUMAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Approaching the Masculine in Hemingway’s Fiction
On the Quai at Smyrna
Death in the Afternoon
Hemingway’s Stance on Animal Equality

113
113
118
126
136

CHAPTER FOUR: HEMINGWAY’S MASCULINE HERO
There Are No Happy Endings
On the Use of Ritual
Suicide as Cowardice
The Faena, Or Becoming Like God
The Masculine, Existential Hero
Finding Religion Without God
Conclusion: The Death of God, the Death of Man

153
153
164
175
194
201
215
223

BIBLIOGRAPHY

228

VITA

236

vi

ABSTRACT
This dissertation intervenes in the critical debate over Ernest Hemingway’s religious
orientation. One camp of Hemingway scholars argues that he was a practicing Catholic, while
the other camp argues that Hemingway was an existential atheist. Rather than side with either
camp in this binary debate, my research offers a third option that bridges the gap between these
opposing positions. Examining Hemingway’s life and works through the eyes of contemporary
political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, I argue that Hemingway is, properly speaking, neither a
secularist nor a theist, but a secularized theist, whose “religion” takes the form of masculine
volition, or sovereign, self-originating choice. As Agamben does well to demonstrate, sovereign
choice secularizes the imago Dei, a Christian concept for human exceptionalism, or the belief
that human beings are metaphysically superior to the rest of nature. Under the parameters of this
philosophical framework, I then compare Hemingway with the 20 th century French philosopher
Jean-Paul Sartre to illustrate how sovereign choice unites Catholicism with existential atheism,
both of which discover humanity’s capacity for absolute freedom in nothingness, or the negative
ontology of God’s absence. My study of Agamben offers a critical reading of Sartre, which then
provides an interpretive lens through which to consider Hemingway’s literary works. I conclude
that Hemingway’s masculine volition—the practice of sovereign, self-originating choice—
secularizes the imago Dei in the form human exceptionalism. My conclusion resolves the critical
disagreement surrounding Hemingway’s religious orientation and offers a novel reading of the
author’s works.
vii

CHAPTER ONE
HEMINGWAY, SARTRE, AND SECULARIZATION
An Introduction
Ernest Hemingway has long been considered either a nihilist or an existentialist. “A vast
number of critics,” writes Joseph Prud’homme, “have deemed Ernest Hemingway a nihilist. As
an individual, they contend, Hemingway spurned religious truth and espoused absurdist nihilism.
… The art and artist express the same worldview.”1 Robert Penn Warren writes that
Hemingway’s protagonist in the 1933 short story “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place” is “obsessed by
… the meaninglessness of the world, by nothingness, by nada.” 2 William Bache likewise asserts
that the story’s protagonist represents a “nihilistic way of life.” 3 And Judith P. Saunders argues
that the story’s protagonist experiences “existential panic” in the face of his mortality when
confronted with the old man’s suicide. She says that his “cynical parody” of two Roman Catholic
prayers—the Hail Mary and the paternoster—is “insistently blasphemous.” 4 But existentialist
interpretations of Hemingway’s fiction extend far beyond “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place.” One
can look to a handful of his better-known short stories—like “The Killers,” “The Snows of
Kilimanjaro,” and “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber”—to see that Hemingway at the
1

Joseph Prud’homme, “Hemingway, Religion, and Masculine Virtue,” in Hemingway on Politics and Rebellion, ed.
Lauretta Conklin Frederking (New York: Routledge, 2010), 104.
2

Robert Penn Warren, “Hemingway’s World” in Readings on Ernest Hemingway, ed. Katie De Koster (San Diego,
CA: Greenhaven Press, 1997), 38.
3

William B. Bache, “Craftsmanship in “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place,” Personalist 37 (Winter 1956): 60-64.

4

Judith P. Saunders, American Classics: Evolutionary Perspectives (Boston: American Studies Press, 2018), 209,
208, 208.

1
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very least sympathized with an existentialist worldview. As Warren states elsewhere, “The typical Hemingway hero is the man aware, or in the process of becoming aware, of nada.” 5 Hemingway’s own confrontation with mortality, meaninglessness, and the freedom to make of this life
whatever one chooses profoundly shaped his worldview; you can see this influence, critics say,
throughout his body of work.
Writing decades apart, Ben Stoltzfus and John Killinger take an existentialist
interpretation of Hemingway’s fiction a step further. As an unbeliever, Hemingway was not a
Kierkegaardian existentialist, which, if taken literally, would mean that Hemingway was a
Christian, but neither would he align himself with Nietzsche, despite the overlap in their views. 6
Rather, Hemingway’s own brand of existentialism resembled that of his contemporary, the 20th
century French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Like Sartre, Hemingway did not believe in God or
a spiritual afterlife. This meant that one’s death resulted in everlasting nonexistence, and that,
consequently, one’s life was devoid of lasting significance. Both Sartre and Hemingway
believed, in light of these realities, that each person is free to create the meaning and value of
their own life. What makes Hemingway particularly Sartrean, for both Killinger and Stoltzfus, is
his belief that individual choice is the locus of both meaning and metaphysical value. Stoltzfus
elaborates on this point in a 2005 article:
Sartre views death—his own, as well as God’s—as the essential clue to facing life and
living it authentically. It is this one “capital” possibility, always in view from the outset,
from which all other possibilities derive their status of radical contingency. What dread,
or despair, or alienation reveal to every man is that he is cast into the world in order to die
there. To live with death as the supreme and normative possibility of existence is not to
5

6

Robert Penn Warren, “Hemingway,” The Kenyan Review 9.1 (Winter 1947): 7.

And there is considerable overlap. Nietzsche’s ideas about master morality and the will to power would seem to inform Sartre’s notion of sovereign freedom, which is central to my study of Hemingway. Nevertheless, I have chosen
to focus on Sartre over Nietzsche as one of Hemingway’s influences for reasons that will be outlined in the coming
pages.

3
reject the world or to refuse participation in daily events. On the contrary, it is a refusal to
be deceived. To accept death is to heighten the capacity for living, and that in turn leads
to a heightened sense of authentic personal existence. 7
Killinger made the same point forty years earlier in Hemingway and the Dead Gods: A Study in
Existentialism, writing that “God is dead in our time and the traditional ethic is invalid. Hence
every man is directed to himself for the formation of a new ethic which will stand in an intimate
relation to him alone.”8 Without a “God in heaven,” life loses its metaphysical purpose, and each
person is left, Killinger observes, to be “his own creator, giving form to his own life.” 9 So it is
not that Hemingway was an atheist whose nihilism ruled out the possibility of transcendent
moral values. It is that, for Hemingway, every individual possessed the radical freedom to
fashion their own identity, create their own moral values, and ascribe a temporary meaning to
their ephemeral existence. It is that Hemingway wrote specifically from a Sartrean point of view
and believed, in unison with Sartre, that existence precedes essence, that one’s human nature, to
paraphrase the famous dictum, is determined by the inherently free choices of the individual
themself.
Killinger wrote in 1960 that “there has been no liaison between [Hemingway] and the
existentialists, either personally or intellectually, and neither has ever formally recognized a
kinship to the other.”10 For Killinger, the Sartrean point of view reflected in Hemingway’s fiction
is not the result of Sartre’s influence on Hemingway or even the outcome of their professional
collaboration because the two of them, Killinger says, never met and never claimed to be
7

Ben Stoltzfus, “Sartre, Nada, and Hemingway’s African Stories,” Comparative Literature Studies 42.3 (2005):
211.
8

John Killinger, Hemingway and the Dead Gods: A Study in Existentialism (New York: The Citadel Press, 1960),
98.
9

Ibid., 99.

10

Ibid., vii
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influenced by the other’s work. But Killinger is simply wrong on this account, and how he brings
himself to make such a sweeping claim is not entirely clear. It may be that in 1960 Killinger did
not have access to the biographical material that is available today; it may also be that he was
simply unaware of Sartre’s 1946 publication in the Atlantic Monthly, “American Novelists in
French Eyes,” which speaks directly about Hemingway’s influence on French existentialist
writers. As Sartre explains in the article, Albert Camus made use of Hemingway’s innovative
writing techniques to “express his philosophical experience of the absurdity of the world,”
techniques that draw our attention, Sartre says, to a character’s freedom of choice over against a
deterministic view of the character’s inner psychology. 11 Sartre claims that he, Simone de
Beauvoir, and Albert Camus were all influenced by Hemingway, so it is at least possible that
Sartre, who was publishing as early as 1936 (when Hemingway was less than mid-way through
his writing career), had likewise influenced the American Francophile, who lived in Paris
throughout the 1920s and would later celebrate the experience in his memoir, A Moveable Feast.
But Hemingway’s relationship with Sartre was not merely one of literary influence.
Hemingway’s fourth wife, Mary Welsh, records in her 1976 autobiography that Sartre and de
Beauvoir made a personal visit to Hemingway in December 1944 when Mary and Ernest were
working in Paris as war correspondents. Sartre would visit Hemingway again in Cuba in 1949,
by Mary’s account, and though these are the only two meetings on record, the accounts show that
Sartre and Hemingway knew each other personally. The night of Sartre’s 1949 visit, he brought a
female companion to dine with him and the Hemingways at their home, Finca Vigía, but, as
Mary confesses, “the evening was a disappointment for me. I had hoped for surveys and reviews

11

Jean-Paul Sartre, “American Novelists in French Eyes,” www.sartre.ch/American%20Novelists.pdf, Accessed 26
August 2019, 5.

5
of the ‘inside gen’ of the French existentialist movement. But our two conversationalists, the
men, passed it by lightly.”12 Instead, Sartre and Hemingway “talked like businessmen,”
discussing “percentages” and how the American and French publishing markets differed from
each other.13 The dinner came to an end and Mary recalls that, “for once, Ernest made no offer to
introduce Sartre to the sea.”14 She obviously emphasizes “for once” because Ernest had made
Sartre the same offer multiple times before. So it would appear that, by 1944, the two were
friends as well as professional acquaintances. They dined with each other, they talked shop, and
both men, in their own ways, fervently pursued in their writings the pressing existential questions
of the age.
But there remains the question of who influenced whom. Hemingway had already
published three novels, two books of nonfiction, and multiple short story collections before
Sartre published The Transcendence of the Ego in 1936. It would be another two years before
Sartre’s famous novel Nausea would appear, and another seven years before the publication of
Being and Nothingness, his philosophical magnum opus. One might reasonably assume, on these
grounds, that it was Hemingway who influenced French existentialist writers like Sartre, and not
the other way around. “Sartre was right to salute the influence of the American author,” Stoltzfus
writes, because Hemingway’s “preoccupation with death and with the consequences of
inauthentic behavior adumbrate many of Sartre’s preoccupations.” 15 The popular stereotype of

12

Mary Welsh Hemingway, How It Was (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 244.

13

Ibid.

14

Ibid.
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Stoltzfus, “Sartre, Nada, and Hemingway’s African Stories,” 224.
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Hemingway as anti-intellectual is challenged by critics Phillip Young and Robert Evans, 16 but
the fact remains that Hemingway was not a trained philosopher, so the extent to which his fiction
may have influenced Sartre’s philosophical development is questionable. We can at least
speculate that Sartre’s key philosophical ideas were inspired by Hemingway’s fiction, which
appears to model these concepts, but it seems more likely that both Sartre and Hemingway were
socialized in a burgeoning existentialist culture, Hemingway during his expatriate years in Paris,
Sartre while he was studying at the École Normale Supérieure, and this is partly the reason we
see significant overlap in their works. “It is entirely possible,” Killinger writes, “that the young
American who lived in an attic where [Paul] Verlaine had once lived, and who always loved
Paris more than any other city in the world, imbibed the spirit of existentialism in the bars and
bistros of that city in the nineteen-twenties.”17 During this time, Sartre was “frequenting the same
cabarets as Hemingway,” so “the similarities in their worldviews are due not to collaboration,”
Killinger proposes, “but to living in the same milieu,” a milieu comprised of disillusioned young
artists and intellectuals who, in the aftermath of an unprecedented war, were attempting to break
loose from the heavy chains of tradition.18
Literary modernism shared an important overlap with 20th century French existentialism,
in this regard. Both cohorts imagined the individual subject born anew, thrown into the world as
a kind of orphan who, bereft of a Father in Heaven, was left to recreate existence in his own
image, according to his own liking. This so-called lost generation—an appellation coined by
16

See Phillip Young’s Ernest Hemingway (New York: Rinehart, 1952) and Robert Evans’s “Hemingway and the
Pale Cast of Thought,” American Literature 38.2 (1966): 161-76. While Young zeroes in on the personal psychology of Hemingway, Evans focuses on Hemingway’s literary works; both seek to undermine the stereotype that
Hemingway was anti-intellectual.
17

Killinger, Hemingway and the Dead Gods, vii.

18

Ibid.

7
Hemingway’s mentor and patron Gertrude Stein and thereafter popularized by Hemingway’s
novel The Sun Also Rises—was a group of disillusioned artists whose faith in the religious,
cultural, and political institutions of Western society was, along with their faith in God, torn
away from them after witnessing the brutalities of World War I, or so the narrative goes. This
all-too-familiar rendering of the lost generation appears afresh when viewed through the lens of
French existentialism; indeed, we do not often associate Sartre’s radical freedom with the
Poundian maxim to make it new. But the similarities between the two are nevertheless striking,
and as George Cotkin writes in his 2003 study Existential America, we should perhaps think of
the modernist avant-garde as existentialist in its philosophical orientation. Cotkin writes:
the Lost Generation of the 1920s had declared, in the words of F. Scott Fitzgerald, that
they had “grown up to find all Gods dead, all wars fought, all faiths in man shaken.”
Ernest Hemingway, armed with these assumptions, depicted a generation often stunted by
boredom and impotency, captured most fully in the characters of Jake Barnes and his
drifting friends in The Sun Also Rises (1926). At its best, the work of the Lost Generation
enunciated a metaphysical condition of despair and alienation. But all too often there is
more than a hint of ennui in such renderings, a feeling that the important questions have
been decided once and for all. As Jake announces, “I only wished I felt religious.” But he
doesn’t and that is that. Thus Lost Generation writers and intellectuals embraced an
essentially existential perspective. And the problems they confronted were the stuff that
defined much of the existential style of thinking.19
Reflecting on the American drama critic Joseph Krutch, who, in the 1920s, was among only a
handful of Americans to espouse an existentialist worldview, Cotkin says that Krutch’s esthetic
was “as barren and impotent as the world inhabited by many of Hemingway’s characters,” for,
much like Hemingway, Krutch recognized that “man was alone” in a world that had been “shorn
of meaning and certitude.”20 Alongside of both American and French existentialists, the
modernist avant-garde was cultivating a view of radical freedom that had likewise, according to
19

George Cotkin, Existential America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins UP, 2003), 24.

20

Ibid., 26.

8
Cotkin, grown out of their confrontation with nothingness. “To be existential is, ultimately, to
join with Camus’s Sisyphus in a tragic acceptance of the limitations of existence while exulting
in each affirmative breath of life, in each push of the stone up the mountain.” 21
In their brazen rejection of history, tradition, and cultural convention—at its heart a
disavowal of God, the afterlife, and metaphysical transcendence—both existentialism and
literary modernism lionized individuality, originality, and thinking for oneself. In the modernist
spirit, James Joyce, at University College Dublin, famously renounced the Roman Catholic faith
of his youth, while Virginia Woolf, herself a committed atheist, was outraged to learn in 1927 of
T.S. Eliot’s shocking conversion to Anglicanism. The lost generation, from which Hemingway
would emerge as one of the most important literary voices of the 20th century, was existentialist
in its philosophical orientation before the term became associated with Sartre and his coterie of
followers. It should therefore come as little surprise that Hemingway too, as a modernist convert,
had renounced his childhood religion. As critics have argued, the adult Hemingway would come
to believe in nothingness, or nada, a world that he evacuated of predetermined meanings.
Significantly, 20th century French existentialism was atheistic on principle, and, as
Catholic scholar Una M. Cadegan shows in her 2002 article “Modernisms Theological and
Literary,” so was the philosophical perspective of the modernist avant-garde. Cadegan advances
this argument, first, by describing the basic tenets of literary modernism. She then contrasts these
tenets against the theological commitments of Roman Catholicism to pinpoint where exactly
their incompatibility lies. She writes that:
literary modernists saw in world events a radical break from history, tradition, and
convention, which on the one hand could lead to despair but on the other offered
significant opportunities for the liberation of humanity from political and social
21

Ibid., 3.

9
constraints. Formally, this resulted in the need for a new language and style to express a
new way of perceiving the world, to express the alienation, dissociation, and
fragmentation believed unique to post-Great War Western society. … In many if not most
of its defining elements, literary modernism seemed tailor-made to alienate Catholics.
Philosophically it at least toyed with and at worst entirely rejected all the propositions
neoscholasticism depended on to exist. Socially it mocked and flouted, in the name of
self-expression and human freedom, conventions that for many Catholic observers were
grounded in timeless moral law.22
The modernist rejection of history was also a rejection of God, his worldly institutions, and the
Christian metanarrative largely responsible for suffusing the Western tradition with metaphysical
authority. Foisting a blank slate over the linear progression of Christian history, literary
modernists imagined for themselves a new beginning, fraught with creative potential. There was
no longer a transcendent purpose to life, essential human nature, or God-given morality to guide
our creative choices, so “Catholic writers and critics opposed literary modernism to the extent
that it seemed to embrace meaninglessness, fragmentation, and nihilism.” 23 Cadegan argues over
a decade later in All Good Books Are Catholic Books: Print Culture, Censorship, and Modernity
in Twentieth-Century America that the Roman Catholic Church privileged community over the
individual, orthodoxy over iconoclasm, repetition over innovation, and closure over openness;
literary modernism was, in principle, irreconcilable with Catholic belief. 24
This is why Hemingway’s conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1927 has been cast by
critics and Hemingway scholars as nominal at best and, at worst, a total sham. Hemingway’s first
biographer, Carlos Baker, dismissed the author’s religious conversion as a matter of mere
ceremony, writing that Hemingway’s marriage to Pauline Pfeiffer was indeed “nominal” and
22

Una M. Cadegan, “Modernisms Theological and Literary,” U.S. Catholic Historian 20.3 (2002): 106.

23

Ibid., 108.
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Una M. Cadegan, All Good Books Are Catholic Books: Print Culture, Censorship, and Modernity in TwentiethCentury America (London: Cornell UP, 2013), 62.
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even required that Hemingway act with “duplicity” to convince the Church that his religious
confession was sincere.25 According to Baker, a close acquaintance of the writer and a friend to
Pauline, Ada MacLeishes, “tried her best to swallow the disgust she felt over Ernest’s efforts to
persuade the Catholic Church” that he was a true believer. 26 Evidence would show that, after
being injured during the war, Hemingway was in fact baptized at a field hospital in Fornaci,
Italy, but, in Baker’s account, there is even more evidence to suggest that, following the war,
Hemingway’s attitude toward life and death took an atheistic and, one might even say, a
nihilistic shift, as Ada seems to have understood at the time. By most accounts, Hemingway
converted to Catholicism in 1927 not because he was moved to religious belief but because his
marriage to the devoutly Catholic Pauline Pfeiffer in large part depended on his religious
conversion. God’s death was a central part of Hemingway’s philosophical worldview; as both an
existentialist and a literary modernist, he recognized the cultural bankruptcy of our religious
institutions. Therefore, it would only make sense that scholars would question the legitimacy of
Hemingway's Catholic conversion, which seems to have resulted from his ulterior motive to
marry Pauline Pfeiffer.
But critical changes have taken place in both Sartre and Hemingway scholarship that
bring into question traditional, atheistic depictions of their work. Challenging the status quo,
some scholars now argue that Hemingway’s Catholic conversion was authentic and profoundly
impacted the author’s fiction. Hemingway was raised Protestant as an active member of the First
Congregational Church of Oak Park. He would distance himself from Protestantism, however,
after he graduated from high school and moved to Kansas City for his first professional job as a
25

Carlos Baker, Ernest Hemingway: A Life Story (New York: Avon Books, 1968), 238.

26
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newspaper reporter. It was only years later as a young adult living overseas that he would
convert to Roman Catholicism. But a number of Hemingway scholars now contend that his faith
in the gospel message remained consistent throughout this transitional period. Existentialist
readings of Hemingway are inaccurate, they maintain, because Hemingway never lost his faith in
the gospel message; he simply switched denominations, giving up Protestantism for Catholicism.
In similar fashion, recent scholarship in Sartre studies has demonstrated that the
philosopher was not himself atheological, despite the important role that atheism plays in his
philosophy. According to some scholars, 27 Sartre does not entirely eradicate God from the
picture, but instead replaces the deity with a secular form that fulfills, what I am calling, the
“God-function”—a univocal master-narrative that organizes human affairs and delegitimizes
competing narratives. Egyptologist Jan Assman famously refers to this God-function in his 2009
study, The Price of Monotheism, as the “Mosaic distinction,” a command given by Moses to the
Israelites that they only worship the one true God.28 According to Assman, the historical
development of monotheistic religions introduced a metaphysical preoccupation with
exclusionary truth, marking a theretofore unseen distinction between true and false religions,
legitimate and illegitimate belief systems. Insofar as they deal with metaphysics—a “worldordering” devotion to absolute truth—as Adam Kotsko describes it, 29 the secular philosopher is,
what Paul Tillich calls, a “non-intentional theologian.” 30 Tillich writes that “[n]o philosophy is
without an ultimate concern in its background, whether this is acknowledged or denied. This
27

These scholars and their contributions to the study of Sartre’s theological tendencies will be discussed later in
Chapter One under the section “Sartre and Secularization.”
28

Jan Assman, The Price of Monotheism, trans. Robert Savage (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2009), 2.
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Adam Kotsko, Neoliberalism’s Demons: On the Political Theology of Late Capital (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP,
2018), 7.
30

Paul Tillich, “Relation of Metaphysics and Theology,” The Review of Metaphysics 10.1 (1956): 60.
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makes the philosopher a theologian, always implicitly and sometimes explicitly.” 31 For Kotsko as
well, theology is concerned with “systems of legitimacy, [or] the ways that political, social,
economic, and religious orders maintain their explanatory power and justify the loyalty of their
adherents.”32 In this sense, theology is not concerned with God as a living being but with the
transcendent, metaphysically authorized “realities” that, after being legitimized in the eyes of
their adherents, exert their organizing power over their lives. Building on this tradition of
political theological thinkers, I argue that Sartrean existentialism is not properly atheistic—
which, as a matter of principle, should move beyond metaphysics—but is rather a secularization
of theism, an atheistic worldview, in other words, that remains committed to the world-ordering
operations of univocal, exclusionary truth.
Theism and atheism are not, by logical necessity, mutually exclusive in our study of
Hemingway because the latter refashions the former into a secular version of itself. It is therefore
possible, in light of this reasoning, that both schools of Hemingway scholarship, which at first
appear fundamentally at odds, are correct—Hemingway was a Catholic but he was also, and at
the very same time, an existential atheist. Attempting to reconcile the irreconcilable, mediating
between seemingly exclusive claims, I argue that Hemingway’s and Sartre’s shared existential
worldview secularizes theological transcendence and, in this way, builds a bridge between
otherwise unbridgeable positions. Like Sartre, Hemingway replaced divinity with a secular form
that enacts the same God-function. An exhaustive account of what this means, what makes it
possible, and why it matters to Hemingway studies will be charted in the following section.

31
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Before moving on with this task, however, I would like to address one possible objection
to my approach. Scholars of American literature may question my decision to read Hemingway
as part of the French existentialist tradition rather than as part of an American tradition rooted in
19th century transcendentalism given Ralph Waldo Emerson’s promotion of self-reliance,
individuality, and masculine autonomy over against the institutional pressures of cultural
conformity—a question that stems, I think, from a literary critical perspective that, by default,
reads authors in terms of their national identities. Such a perspective wrongly assumes, however,
that Hemingway should be read as an American author, steeped in national tradition, when in
fact we know, by contrast, that Hemingway moved to Paris and immersed himself in the literary
avant-garde precisely in order to break free from the traditions of his youth. Like Ezra Pound,
Hemingway wanted to create a novel art form, so he looked outside of the U.S. for personal,
intellectual, and artistic fulfillment. If we perceive in Hemingway’s secularized theism
something akin to Emersonian self-reliance, we should not take this as proof that Hemingway
was influenced by Emerson, or, at the very least, we should not take this as proof that
Hemingway was influenced by Emerson alone, or, alternatively, that Hemingway was
consciously influenced by Emerson.33 Indeed, Hemingway’s influences are wide and varied, and,
33
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as I will attempt to show at various times in this dissertation, what contributed the most to
Hemingway’s secularized theological views, in my reading, were the muscular theology of Oak
Park Congregationalism, the innovative spirit of the modernist avant-garde, Roman Catholicism,
and 20th century French existentialism. There is certainly value in considering an author’s
national identity, and, to this end, it is clearly worth deliberating over Hemingway’s place in “the
American literary canon,” but the author was himself an international citizen with global
concerns. For these reasons, I have chosen to read Hemingway in terms of his international
belonging and the traditions with which he was most directly engaged.
A Word on Secularization
I employ the word secularization throughout this project to describe the process whereby
avowed atheists unwittingly replace God with moral absolutes, a secular version of
transcendence that retains the world-ordering operations of theology. In my view, there is no
logical way to eliminate God from a given belief system without also eliminating moral
absolutes, which can only be guaranteed by a deity. Atheists may object that moral absolutes are
part of the metaphysical nature of reality, with or without God, but this is a profoundly
consequential claim that demands verification. Were it possible to verify moral absolutes there
would be no ground for moral disagreement. But proving that one person’s moral values are
metaphysically superior to another person’s moral values is impossible, and, what is more, doing
so fails to justify our decision, as a society, to privilege human values over animal values, or
even to pay attention to value systems at all. It follows a circular logic that verifies moral
absolutes on the basis of human values and that justifies human values on the basis of moral
Poetry, 2nd edition (New York/Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), 5. Read from Bloom’s perspective, it may be that Hemingway disavowed Emerson in order to establish his own reputation as the great American author, but this query is
well outside the scope of the current project.
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absolutes. If we distance ourselves from the anthropocentric assumptions of monotheism—in
particular, the assumption that mankind was created with moral purpose by a loving God who
determines the metaphysical nature of being—then holding up as our moral standard an infant
species on an obscure planet hidden among trillions of galaxies in a vast and timeless universe
may be seen as not only absurd but desperately egocentric—what Nietzsche calls “the most
arrogant and mendacious minute of ‘world history.’” 34
Modern-day secular society continues to live under God’s shadow, failing to eradicate the
divine, which lives on in secular dogma like absolute morality and its corollary, the legal
protection of human rights. In other words, secular society still organizes around a belief in
divine transcendence, which has changed its form but not its function—the difference is that we
no longer recognize it as divine. In my view, the ostensible disagreement here between form and
function is what characterizes secularization today. That being said, because my definition of
secularization is not one that everyone is familiar with, and because many people will disagree
with my claim that secular society disguises religious authority in the form of non-religious
sources, a discussion of the very term secularization is first necessary to clarify my position.
First of all, let us make no mistake: my definition of secularization does not represent
how the term is generally understood. The secular has been offset by the sacred in the modern
imagination as this-worldly, immanent, and as limited to all matters non-religious. Indeed,
secularization is commonly understood as a general decline in religious practice, as the
institutional separation of church and state, and as a demystification of religious superstition by
advancements in science and technology. “[T]he general sentiment that science has caused, is

34

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism
Ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York/ London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 874.

16
causing, and will cause, a decline in the power of religious faith is relatively common in works
of popular science, in the polemical writings of the ‘new atheists’ and, indeed, in the apologetic
writings of some conservative Christians,” Peter Harrison writes in a 2017 issue of Intellectual
History Review; “The idea that the forces of science and modernity have inexorably pushed the
gods into an involuntary redundancy … and the notion of a fundamental opposition between
science and religion is often thought to be characteristic of Western modernity.” 35 Indeed, the
prevailing view since the Enlightenment is that science has rendered God unnecessary, and that,
eventually, secularization will eliminate the deity from an intelligible universe. But not everyone
agrees with this view.
Among the scholarship challenging the standard secularization narrative is Charles
Taylor’s watershed tome A Secular Age (2007), around which critical debates of secularization
now pivot. According to Taylor, declining religious belief in the modern age is not the result of
scientific advancements, but of ideological shifts that, in the last 500 years, have taken place
within Christianity itself. Taylor argues that, among a host of other influences, the economic
theories of John Locke and Adam Smith transformed Christianity into a Deistic worldview that
reimagined a personal, loving God as a distant, impersonal first cause who no longer intervened
in human lives. Therefore, it was on theological grounds rather than scientific grounds that
Western culture first transitioned from an enchanted world haunted everywhere by transcendence
to a completely immanent world bereft of transcendence, from a culture that regarded atheism as
virtually unthinkable to one where theism is now the more difficult concept to swallow. This
transformation was accomplished, Taylor says, through an anthropocentric shift that rendered
human significance this-worldly, when in the past, human significance was regarded as other35
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worldly by people who lived in anticipation of the afterlife. “A race of humans has arisen,”
Taylor observes, “which has managed to experience its world entirely as immanent.” 36 Belief in
the transcendent has diminished not because of scientific advancements, but because of
theological shifts within Christianity itself. Taylor does not argue that secularization has failed to
take place, then; he simply argues that its causes were religious rather than scientific. Today,
even Christian believers are, at their hearts, secularists, according to Taylor, because religion has
been reduced to a fashionable interest in spirituality that lacks any real investment in theological
transcendence.
Taylor’s work is revered within the academic community but, like any scholar of note, he
has his detractors.37 Additionally, there are alternate theories of secularization that have gained
just as much notoriety in recent decades, including the theory advanced by contemporary
political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, who describes secularization not as a widespread
cultural shift toward the immanent frame, as Taylor describes it, but as the reformulation of
theological transcendence. Taylor argues that modern Western society has emptied religion of its
transcendent theological elements, but Agamben argues, in keeping with the position advanced
in this dissertation, that these elements have merely been disguised as secular. The philosophers
therefore adopt opposing positions: according to Taylor, no one takes the transcendent seriously
anymore; according to Agamben, however, we regard the transcendent as seriously as ever, but
we no longer recognize it as God. Building on the assertion of the Nazi legal theorist Carl
36
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Schmitt in Political Theology (1922) that “[a]ll significant concepts of the modern theory of the
state are secularized theological concepts,”38 Agamben writes in his 2007 Profanations that:
Secularization is a form of repression. It leaves in tact the forces it deals with by simply
moving them from one place to another. Thus the political secularization of theological
concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) does nothing but
displace the heavenly monarchy into an earthly monarchy, leaving its power in tact.
Profanation, however, neutralizes what it profanes. Once profaned, that which was
unavailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to use. Both are political
operations: the first guarantees the exercise of power by carrying it back to a sacred
model; the second deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to common use the
spaces that power had seized.39
Agamben’s treatment of secularization is diametrically opposed to the model of secularization
advanced by Taylor. In his philosophical effort to decrease political violence and encourage
social reform, Agamben urges his readers to embrace a world bereft of transcendental political
structures, which he perceives at work in the dictatorial emergency powers of modern democratic
nations.40 Functionally, secularization does not extinguish theocratic rule through the institutional
separation of church and state. Rather, it “leaves in tact the forces it deals with by simply moving
them from one place to another,” bestowing sacred authority upon dictatorial state actions. In this
way, secularization removes God from the picture but retains the metaphysical division between
transcendence and immanence. Only after “profaning” the sacred—or that which has been set
38
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apart as transcendent—does there emerge a truly immanent realm with no relationship to
transcendence whatsoever. Agamben’s “profanation” evacuates the world of metaphysical
authority, instating, for Agamben, what true secularization should look like. So it is not that a
“race of humans has arisen which has managed to experience its world entirely as immanent,” 41
as Taylor argues, but that the human race, against all logic, no longer identifies the transcendent
with God.
Agamben develops Schmitt’s notion of secularization to critique the tacit theological
structures of dictatorial power. But, as Agamben himself demonstrates, this notion of secularized
theism, as he calls it, extends beyond forms of state governance to the freely made choices of
every individual in a world without God, choices that, in Agamben’s critique of sovereignty, take
on the metaphysical authority of divine law. Dictatorial power reflects the metaphysics of
absolute freedom referred to by Schmitt as sovereign decisionism. As Schmitt writes, “[a]ll law
is ‘situational law.’ The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality. He has the
monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the state’s sovereignty, … not as
the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide.” 42 Zeroing in on this
secularized theological notion of sovereign decisionism—where human choices are afforded the
creative power of God’s divine will—Agamben will argue, in a seeming reversal of the argument
advanced by Taylor, that even atheists in the secular age retain a tacit, unconscious belief in
theological transcendence. Secularization only appears to eliminate divinity from the world by
effectively transferring its metaphysical authority to non-religious sources, but this, for
Agamben, simply disguises the theological, which maintains its operative presence in the world.
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For this reason, secularism should instead be described as secularized theism, a point of
view that hollows out the transcendent metaphysical structure of, say, Christianity, to eliminate
or significantly transform its ideational content. In effect, theological notions like the imago Dei,
virtue, and sin may be transformed, respectively, into secular notions like human worth, good,
and evil, which are then subsequently ascribed an a priori, metaphysical value. For Taylor,
Christianity is reformulated within the immanent frame, but, for Agamben, the secular is
reformulated as transcendent. The difference is that Taylor is concerned with the ideational
content of Christianity while Agamben is concerned with its theological structures. So even
though religious believers themselves may no longer take God seriously, as in Taylor’s account
of secularization, they will nevertheless worship “gods” that have been disguised in secular
costumes, which carry the theological force of metaphysical transcendence. In certain respects,
Taylor’s watershed study is a force to be reckoned with, but, as Agamben’s work reveals,
Taylor’s representation of immanence ignores the deification of secular forms. For Taylor,
human significance was first rendered this-worldly within the confines of Christianity itself, but
it is precisely this kind of anthropocentric gesture that reaches beyond immanence to the
transcendent realm by transferring metaphysical authority from God to humanity. Taylor
understands the secularization of Christianity as the reconfiguration of theological concepts
within the immanent frame, but Agamben shows that even this immanent frame, in the modern
age, retains a commitment to juridical authority through transcendent metaphysical notions like
truth, morality, and human worth—all of which play an operative role in Sartrean existentialism,
as my argument will show.
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In particular, I seek to demonstrate that Sartre’s understanding of human freedom
parallels Schmitt’s portrayal of sovereign decision making. Schmitt’s assertion, for example, that
“[a]ll law is situational law” mirrors Sartre’s assertion that morality is “an absolute in the midst
of the relative.”43 It is absolute because moral decisions presuppose their metaphysical authority;
it is relative because all such decisions are made in accordance with the individual’s freewill,
which can change at any time. Under Sartre’s philosophical worldview, individual choice is the
ontological origin of moral law. This is why Sartre identifies the sovereign subject as a
“legislator” in his famous 1946 lecture Existentialism is a Humanism.44 The sovereign subject
enacts the metaphysical authority of their every decision by presupposing its absolute moral
value. It is the sovereign leader of the state, however, who, backed by brute military force, is
most able to materialize the effects of their decisions, asserting their legal authority over state
citizens. The lawmaking decisions of a sovereign political leader are relative insofar as they are
freely chosen; they are absolute because, under the ideological presuppositions of the state, they
are afforded metaphysical authority. Sartre and Schmitt have a shared understanding of
sovereign freedom, but the latter applies its legislative power to political leadership while the
former applies it to every conscious individual.
Nevertheless, both models of secularization, or secularized theism, are, at their core,
manifestations of the same basic phenomenon. They broadly fall under what Terry Eagleton calls
culture, a human collective that, since the Enlightenment, has produced countless God
surrogates, all of which prop up humanity in God’s place as a transcendental, organizing value.
Eagleton argues in his 2014 monograph Culture and the Death of God that religion since the
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Enlightenment has assumed a number of cunning, secularized disguises that have prevented
people from developing an “authentic [form of] atheism.”45 According to Eagleton, Friedrich
Nietzsche is an outstanding exception to this rule whose Übermensch marks the death not only of
God but also of humanity as a transcendent source of absolute moral value. Eagleton writes:
Perhaps it is with Nietzsche that the decisive break comes. He has a strong claim to being
the first real atheist. Of course there had been unbelievers in abundance before him, but it
is Nietzsche above all who confronts the terrifying, exhilarating consequences of the
death of God. As long as God’s shoes have been filled by Reason, art, culture, Geist,
imagination, the nation, humanity, the state, the people, society, morality or some other
such specious surrogate, the Supreme Being is not quite dead. … Man is a fetish filling
the frightful abyss which is himself. He is a true image of the God he denies, so that only
with his own disappearance from the earth can the Almighty truly be laid to rest. Only
then can timorous, idolatrous Man pass beyond himself into that avatar of the future
which is the Übermensch. Only somewhere on the other side of Man can authentic
humanity be born.46
For Eagleton as for Agamben, true secularization exerts the death of God by moving forever
beyond humanism, a secularized theological form that disguises the imago Dei as intrinsic
human value, around which modern culture is now organized. I explore this concept in greater
detail in Chapter Two of this dissertation, discussing how the existential beliefs of Hemingway
and Sartre lead, in their metaphysical presuppositions, to a deification of human nature. For the
time being, I turn to the scholarship surrounding Hemingway’s and Sartre’s own secularized
theism, which has garnered scholarly attention in recent years and deserves our attention as well.
Hemingway as Religious Believer
The research surrounding Hemingway’s religious orientation is rather limited. To my
knowledge, Larry Grimes, H.R. Stoneback, and Matthew Nickel are the only scholars to have
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conducted serious research on this neglected topic.47 In the foreword to Nickel’s 2013
Hemingway’s Dark Night: Catholic Influences and Intertextualities in the Work of Ernest
Hemingway, Nickel’s mentor and scholarly predecessor H.R. Stoneback observes that his career
as a Hemingway scholar has been “a lonesome business.”48 This is because Hemingway scholars
have traditionally viewed the author as an existential atheist, as we discussed in the opening
pages of this dissertation. “This was especially true in the 1970s,” Stoneback observes, when
“the Papa Myth generally held … that he was some kind of atheist or agnostic or secular
existentialist, a man and writer who wanted nothing to do with religion, organized or
disorganized.”49 So the scholarship of Grimes, Stoneback, and Nickel is like a voice crying in the
wilderness, a body of dissenting literature that reimagines Hemingway—the existential atheist—
as a devout Christian believer.
In contrast with Stoneback and Nickel, who concern themselves primarily with the
Catholic influences on Hemingway’s life and work, Grimes focuses on the author’s Protestant
upbringing. He agrees with Stoneback and Nickel that Hemingway’s conversion to the Catholic
faith was sincere, acknowledging that a Catholic presence can be seen in The Sun Also Rises and
47
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A Farewell to Arms, but he insists that a Protestant ethos, instilled in Ernest as a child, permeates
the entire Hemingway canon. This influence can be seen most strikingly in his early works but
also in the works that follow his divorce from Pauline, a period that resulted for Hemingway in a
loss of faith. He argues in The Religious Design of Hemingway’s Early Fiction that the author
grew up under a liberal form of Congregationalism. While the denomination was historically
Calvinistic, Congregationalism lacked a central authority, leaving every church body to govern
itself independently. Many Congregationalist churches fell under a Unitarian influence as a result
of this, and they succumbed to liberal views of “the social gospel, the perfectibility of human
life, the higher criticism of the Bible, and the convergence of the American Dream and the
Kingdom of God.”50 For Grimes, this particular brand of Protestantism had an indelible impact
on Hemingway that would show up in various ways for the rest of the author’s life.
Stoneback, however, believes that Hemingway’s fiction reflects far more of his Catholic
conversion than it does his Protestant upbringing. “[F]rom the earliest short stories” to The Old
Man and the Sea “and on through all the posthumously published work to True at First Light,”
Hemingway’s fiction “is rooted in his religious sensibility, and the work is most deeply
accessible,” Stoneback asserts, “through an understanding of his Catholic vision.” 51 Stoneback
questions the biographical accounts advanced by Carlos Baker, Kenneth Lynn, and Jeffrey
Meyers that present Hemingway’s Catholic conversion as merely nominal. For Stoneback, the
biographical evidence shows that Hemingway converted to Catholicism “long before” 52 his
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marriage to Pauline Pfeiffer; and his fiction from the period bears out deeply Catholic structures
through the use of symbols, subtexts, rituals, and landscapes. “The ever-recurring center of
Hemingway’s work,” Stoneback writes, “is the notion of pilgrimage,” a spiritual quest to sacred
places “rendered numinous by the millennial motions of millions of pilgrims who have traveled
that way before.”53 According to Stoneback, Jake Barnes of The Sun Also Rises walks the paths
of these symbolic landscapes for the purposes of “renewal and redemption” in a novel written
before Hemingway’s purportedly nominal conversion to Roman Catholicism. 54 Stoneback
proposes that from 1925 to 1937 Hemingway was devoutly Catholic, that from 1937 to 1947 he
endured a period of “spiritual dryness” and “confusion,” which led him to question his faith in
Catholicism, and that from 1947 to 1960 the author underwent a period of “resurgent belief,”
only to lose his faith completely, Stoneback asserts, in the years leading up to his suicide. 55
Using as his scaffold the biographical research conducted by Stoneback, Nickel performs
a literary analysis of Hemingway’s major works of fiction to prove that the author was more than
just a nominal Catholic. According to Nickel, a close reading of his novels confirms, first, that
Hemingway converted to Catholicism after being injured in the war (nearly a decade before his
marriage to Pauline), and, second, that his devotion to the Catholic faith was continuous and
conscientious from this time on throughout his marriage to Pauline, their divorce, and the
remainder of his life. Una M. Cadegan, however, is critical of Nickel’s literary analysis, writing
that
Nickel reiterates key concepts, themes, and images to the point that there seem to be no
references to fish in the novels that are not invoking the ichthys symbol of the early
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Christians, no references to darkness or night or nada that are not explicitly to Juan de la
Cruz and the dark night of the soul. The analysis strikes the same limited notes again and
again, rather than exploring how Hemingway's sharply honed sense of irony interacted
with the culturally multifaceted and historically tumultuous nature of Catholicism. 56
However limited his study may be, Nickel’s emphasis on Hemingway’s mystical affinities
provides an entry point for further analysis that will prove important to the current study. Honing
in on one element of an otherwise complex issue has its merits, and while Nickel’s approach may
be reductive, as Cadegan argues, his single-minded focus nevertheless draws our attention to
elements of Hemingway’s fiction that should not be lightly discarded.
According to Nickel, Hemingway’s Catholic faith was profoundly informed by the
mystic tradition, as represented by Saint Teresa of Ávila, Juan de la Cruz, and Saint John of the
Cross, with whose teachings Hemingway was well acquainted. The mystic’s apophatic approach
to God via negativa is a passage toward divine mysteriousness, Nickel says, that is represented
as nada in Hemingway’s fiction. By making this claim, Nickel elaborates upon the arguments
already advanced by Stoneback, who writes that nada is Hemingway’s “path to the Allness of
God and owes nothing to fashionable secular existentialist notions about nothingness.” 57 Nickel
himself writes that “nada is more dark night of the soul—that passage toward mystery—than
death.”58 Hemingway’s relationship to Catholic mysticism is a point of interest for the current
study because recent scholarship maintains that Sartre’s existential atheism was itself a
secularized version of Catholic mysticism. It may be that Hemingway’s existentialism, which is
characteristically Sartrean, according to scholars, shares the same elements of Catholic
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mysticism that Sartre is believed to have secularized. If this proves to be the case, then binary
debates over Hemingway’s religious orientation miss the point, as Hemingway might be best
understood as neither an atheist nor a theist, strictly speaking, but as a secularized theist, which is
a combination of the two.
Scholars on both sides of the debate have provided substantial evidence to prove, on the
one hand, that Hemingway was an existential atheist, and, conversely, to prove on the other
hand, that Hemingway was a religious believer. Rather than become immobilized by this binary
division, which offers up compelling evidence on both sides of the aisle, I offer an alternate
route, an interpretation of the existing literature that aims to makes sense of this critical deadlock
rather than exacerbate it, resolving the conflict between these seemingly irreconcilable positions.
I argue that Hemingway secularizes the Oak Park Congregationalism of his youth into a
metaphysical view of free will that prepares the writer—as an existential atheist—to embrace the
mystical elements of Roman Catholicism. Hemingway scholars have regarded theism and
atheism as mutually exclusive for obvious reasons, but the secularized version of theism adopted
by Hemingway complements Sartrean existentialism, with which it shares important theological
structures: specifically, both resort to a transcendent view of freewill, both rely on nothingness as
an ontological category, and both operate under the anthropocentric assumption that humanity is
inherently superior to the rest of nature (a belief that I will frame later as the imago Dei, or the
sacred image of God). Following the model of secularization outlined in the previous section,
Sartrean existentialism claims to rid itself of God but the philosophy is nevertheless founded
upon tacit theological elements. Because Hemingway’s existentialism was characteristically
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Sartrean, we can harness a reading of the philosopher to understand Hemingway’s relationship to
both Catholic and Protestant Christianity.
Sartre as Religious Believer
Jerome Gellman begins his 2009 article “Jean-Paul Sartre: The Mystical Atheist” with an
account of the philosopher’s materialistic approach to religious disbelief. According to Gellman,
God’s nonexistence is first intuited by Sartre as a boy, long before the philosopher sought to
vindicate atheism in Being and Nothingness, his philosophical magnum opus. There, Sartre
argues that no creaturely being—not even God—can simultaneously exist as being-in-itself and
being-for-itself, 59 which, to translate these Sartrean terms, means that no creaturely being can
exist at once as both ontologically fixed and yet totally free. Building on the childhood account
depicted in his autobiography The Words, Sartre recounts this early experience in a late interview
with his life-long romantic partner and philosophical colleague Simone de Beauvoir:
When I was about twelve ... in the morning I used to take the tram with the girls next
door ... One day I was walking up and down outside their house for a few minutes
waiting for them to get ready. I don’t know where the thought came from or how it struck
me, yet all at once I said to myself, “But God doesn’t exist!” It’s quite certain that before
this I must have had new ideas about God and that I had begun solving the problem for
myself. But still, as I remember very well, it was on that day and in the form of a
momentary intuition, that I said to myself, “God doesn’t exist.” 60
At the time, Sartre “looked upon” the revelation of God’s non-existence “as a manifest truth that
had come to [him] without any foregoing thought;” it was “an intuition,” he says, “that rose up
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and … determined [his] life.”61 But, as Gellman points out, the Christian mystic intuits God’s
existence in the same way that Sartre intuited the deity’s non-existence. Moreover, both Sartre
and the Christian mystic realize that, in God’s absence, human beings lack a fixed ontological
nature. The mystic goes on to conclude that their true essence as being-in-itself is attained by
uniting with the deity who created them, while Sartre is forced to conclude in light of God’s nonexistence that human beings altogether lack a fixed ontological identity. Gellman writes that
“Sartre is seeing through a glass darkly what the Christian mystic has discovered—that a person
has no distinct self-being, because he exists only in the encompassing being of God.” 62 Like the
mystic, Sartre will argue that there is no predetermined meaning to human life without God, and
that, in absence of the deity, we are totally free to create its meaning for ourselves.
According to Gellman, “Sartre interprets the emptiness of self-being as the exclusionary
category of the for-itself, and misses the true import of his insight”—namely, that he unwittingly
derives from Christian theology his ontological view of human nature. 63 Gellman charges Sartre
with advancing a theological system that has been emptied of its deity and central organizing
figure. If God is the source of humanity’s ontological nature, as the Christian mystic believes,
then humanity lacks an ontological nature without him. Following this line of reasoning, this
complete lack of being, which Sartre refers to as nothingness, would in turn be the source of
humanity’s radical freedom. But Sartre’s conclusion that human beings are radically free begins
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with the theological presupposition that human ontology is derived from God. As Gellman
argues, materialistic atheism is Sartre’s “own brand of mystical experience.” 64
In her 2017 monograph Sartre on Sin: Between Being and Nothingness, Kate Kirkpatrick
argues in agreement with Gellman that Sartre is a secularized theist. According to Kirkpatrick,
Sartre’s atheism took shape under a literary tradition largely influenced by the Catholic mystic of
nothingness Pierre de Bérulle, whose Augustinian view of sin profoundly shaped the intellectual
landscape of 17th century France. Sartre’s philosophical predecessors from the era—René
Descartes, Blaise Pascal, and François Fénelon—followed in Bérulle’s footsteps to argue, in line
with Saint Augustine, that sin is the privation of being. Kirkpatrick affirms that, under the rubric
of Christian mysticism, all being-in-itself is contingent upon God, who “perpetually wills being
into being.”65 Kirkpatrick therefore agrees with Gellman that, in the mystic tradition as well as
the orthodox Augustinian tradition, God is the source from which all other essences derive their
being. Sartre professes God’s death at the same time that he advances a Christian hamartiology, 66
reformatting an Augustinian view of sin to fit his atheistic worldview. For Augustine, any
violation of God’s will reduces the sinner quite literally to nothingness, or the negative ontology
of being-for-itself. This is why Sartre writes in Being and Nothingness that “[f]reedom is
precisely the being which makes itself a lack of being.” 67 Sartre evacuates the Augustinian
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system of its divine center to reveal the absolute freedom of every individual in a world without
God. Therefore, Sartre is not simply a mystical atheist who intuits the deity’s non-existence, but
is rather, as Kirkpatrick proposes, a secularized theist, or theologically informed unbeliever, who
adapts theological structures to frame his metaphysical view of humanity’s nothingness.
One year earlier, in a 2016 article, John Gillespie argues (in concert with the thesis
advanced in this dissertation) that secularization merely transfers metaphysical transcendence
from God to mankind. For Sartre, the death of God as a working concept in society predates
Friedrich Nietzsche’s sociological study of secularization, but, according to Gillespie, Sartre was
nevertheless “stimulated by Nietzsche’s idea,” so he “extends it” with the goal of accelerating
“its long-drawn out effects.”68 Sartre sought to accelerate the process because, as Nietzsche
argues in The Gay Science, humanity has murdered God but continues to live under his shadow.
Nietzsche says that the full realization of God’s death is “on its way … [but] has not yet reached
men’s ears. Lightning and thunder need time, the light of the stars needs time, deeds need time,
even after they are done, to be seen and heard. This deed is as yet further from them than the
furthest star,—and yet they have done it,” Nietzsche writes, mankind has murdered their God.69
God’s death should result in the deauthorization of morality as such in what Nietzsche calls the
transvaluation of values, but people continue believing in moral absolutes despite the fact that
they no longer possess the conceptual grounding to do so. Ironically, Sartre counts himself
among the secularized theists whose belief in moral absolutes contradicts their atheism,
confessing to de Beauvoir that, throughout his long philosophical career, he “retained one single
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thing to do with the existence of God, and that is Good and Evil as absolutes.” 70 As Gillespie
notes, “[t]he Death of God leads [Sartre] to the secularisation of God in the person of the
absolute free individual” who “is now God to himself, taking on a God-like mission of creative
moral choice, asserting freedom and autonomy, not trying to become God but functioning as God
for himself.”71
As far as metaphysical absolutes are concerned, a godless universe is a morally neutral
universe, so the death of God should bring with it the end of moral authority per se, but even
modern-day secularists continue to believe in moral absolutes, around which they organize their
personal ethics and to which they hold other people accountable. And yet, without a divine
creator of moral values to sustain a univocal master-narrative—legitimizing the exclusionary
truth that Jan Assman described in his discussion of the Mosaic distinction—there is no way,
metaphysically speaking, to authorize your personal ethics over against competing ethical
systems, which are not, as Christianity teaches, divinely instituted within nature itself but are,
rather, culturally constructed and individually acquired in accordance with the ruling values of
the day. So when Sartre confesses to de Beauvoir that his belief in moral absolutes logically
implies that he must also believe in God, he is candidly recognizing a logical inconsistency in his
thought. As Gillespie explains, Sartre takes on the God-function by asserting his personal values
as moral absolutes.
It will be argued in Chapter Two of this dissertation that the lawmaking authority of God
is tacitly transferred by Sartre to mankind, who, in the aftermath of God’s death, takes over the
deity’s role as the ontological origin of moral value. Gillespie is right that the secularization of
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morality as a metaphysical absolute contradicts Sartre’s assertion that nothing can be both initself and for-itself, ontologically fixed and yet totally free. As Sartre confesses to de Beauvoir, it
is precisely in regard to morality that his atheism has failed. At the end of his long philosophical
career, Sartre finally takes ownership of a persistent, underlying contradiction in his thought: his
belief in moral absolutes is incompatible with his assertion that being-in-itself-for-itself is
impossible. And yet, all throughout Sartre’s philosophical project, we see moral absolutes that
derive their authority solely from the individual who ascribes to them. It would appear that, for
Sartre, the sovereign decision alone is the metaphysical origin of moral law.
I introduce these claims in preparation for Chapter Two of this dissertation, where they
will be elaborated upon, clarified, and supported through exegesis. Chapter Two of this
dissertation will also explore these claims in relationship to Hemingway, who explores a number
of key existential themes, the combination of which expose Hemingway’s tacit commitment to
theological transcendence. To better understand my methods, readers should note the distinction
I draw here between implicit and explicit beliefs. On the one hand, I make arguments about what
Sartre and Hemingway state explicitly—take, for example, Sartre’s repudiation of being-initself-for-itself in Being and Nothingness—but, on the other hand, I make arguments about the
logical consequences of their statements, consequences that the authors were not themselves
always aware of. We know in terms of the historical archive that Sartre denies the existence of
theological transcendence (this is an example of what Sartre states explicitly), but we also know
that Sartre’s belief in moral absolutism logically requires that he also believe in theological
transcendence (this is the logical consequence of Sartre’s stated positions). I prioritize a logical
analysis of the historical archive over Sartre’s and Hemingway’s “official” positions in order to
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expose a contradiction of which the authors were not themselves entirely aware: Sartre denies the
existence of theological transcendence at the same time that he tacitly bows to its authority,
replacing God with a divine surrogate that, until the final years of his life, remained hidden to the
philosopher in a secular disguise. It is my belief that Hemingway enacts some version of this as
well.
Returning to Hemingway
Critics are right, in my view, to read Hemingway as a Sartrean existentialist, but if this is
the case—and we can say with confidence that Hemingway’s fictional characters discover their
metaphysical authority through an atheistic confrontation with nothingness—then we should
consider Hemingway’s existentialism in light of the philosophical discussion laid out in the
previous section. In Sartre’s tacit theological view, mankind is reduced to nothingness in God’s
absence, but God’s removal from the Catholic theological system lays open a vacancy which is
thereafter taken up by the sovereign individual. As an existential atheist, Hemingway would
similarly equate the loss of God with humanity’s newfound freedom and, like Sartre, he would
unwittingly supplant the missing deity with a deified individual who, in this exalted state, would
come to regard himself as the ontological origin of moral value. Of course, Nickel will argue that
Hemingway’s “passion for the Christian mystics” leads to a confrontation with nothingness that
his fictional characters encounter in the form of death, “either their own death or the death of
someone close to them,” but facing mortality eventually leads them to God, according to Nickel,
who reduces their moments of religious doubt to a temporary dark night of the soul.72 In my
view, Hemingway never achieves this kind of religious resolve, despite his genuine interest in
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Catholicism. Perplexed by the unknowability of God, he is condemned to work out these moral
decisions for himself.
But Hemingway’s secularized theological view of moral decision making does not begin
with Catholic mysticism or even with existential atheism; it begins with the Protestant
Congregationalism of his youth. In this section, I turn from the philosophical focus of the
previous sections to conduct a biographical examination of Hemingway. Doing so will help
demonstrate how the complex philosophical problems surrounding Hemingway’s worldview
grew out of the concrete conditions of his religious upbringing. I pursue this line of thinking in
preparation for Chapter Two of this dissertation, which will provide an in-depth analysis of key
events in Hemingway’s life, including his near-death experience during the war and his Catholic
marriage to Pauline Pfeiffer.
Raised in the staunchly religious town of Oak Park, Illinois by a family of devout
Congregationalists, Hemingway was socialized under a strict moral code that conflated
masculinity with spiritual devotion. Under the combined efforts of Hemingway’s father,
Clarence, who would train the boy in traditional forms of masculine expression (hunting, fishing,
camping and the like), and Oak Park’s spiritual leader, the Reverend William E. Barton, whose
muscular theology presented autonomy, self-determination, and thinking for oneself as the
greatest of all spiritual virtues, Hemingway would come to regard free will—and the sovereign
determination of one’s own identity—as a theological truism that would help legitimize his
manhood. Of course, Hemingway’s masculine training eventually culminated in a macho
reputation of godlike proportions, and, as critics will note, the author’s mid-century celebrity
amplified “Papa” Hemingway’s hypermasculine portrayal in popular society to the point of
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caricature. David M. Earle, for one, comments on just how pervasive an impact Hemingway’s
macho reputation had on print media, its depiction of gender stereotypes, and the collective
imagination of mid-century America. He writes in his 2009 study All Man! Hemingway, 1950s
Men’s Magazines, and the Masculine Persona:
Not only did Modern Man tout [Hemingway] as “America’s No. 1 He-Man,” but Focus
labeled him one of the ten sexiest men alive (as did Zsa Zsa Gabor in Show), and Rogue
gave him the honor of being a “Rogue of Distinction.” Again and again Hemingway was
held up as an example of manliness, a role model and tonic for the American male who
was having trouble adjusting to a postwar suburbanization with its stress on domestic
consumption. A Man’s Illustrated article entitled “Ernest Hemingway’s 5-War Saga”
went so far as to state that “there aren’t many men like Hemingway left in this softbellied world of ours. You may be one of them. If you are, then you belong to the select
few who, along with Hemingway, are members of a vanishing breed of giants in a society
dominated by women and women’s ways.” 73
Known the world over for his manly endeavors—as bullfighter, boxer, big-game hunter, deepsea fisher, womanizer, and war hero—Hemingway far exceeded the masculine goals instilled in
him as a child by his father and Reverend Barton, two representatives of a highly gendered
religious order that conflated sovereign decision making with traditional masculinity. Under the
bravado of Hemingway’s masculine exploits was always the deeper religious conviction that
autonomy, self-determination, and thinking for oneself lay at the heart of masculine identity. The
secularization of theological transcendence as sovereign moral decision making was also
therefore a secularization of Hemingway’s ever-inflating masculine authority.
Of course, Hemingway’s reputation as the manliest of men is largely based on overblown
stereotypes. The hyper-masculine Papa myth with which so many of us are familiar has been
dismantled through the years by feminist and queer scholars who uncovered in Hemingway’s
fiction complicated and, one might even say, progressive views of gender and sexuality. As early
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as 1977, Aaron Latham would question Hemingway’s “exaggerated masculinity,” writing that “a
‘new’ Hemingway may reclaim a lost generation of readers” who have become disenchanted
with the Papa myth.74 Likewise, in 1983, Bernice Kert challenged a misogynistic understanding
of Hemingway in her biography on The Hemingway Women.75 It has been argued, she writes,
that Hemingway’s “lifelong assertion of masculine power grew out of his emotional need to
exorcise the painful memory of his mother asserting her superiority over his father, that his
personal difficulties with women … originated with his determination never to knuckle under, as
his father had done.”76 Kert decenters hyper-masculine portrayals of Hemingway by focusing on
the various women in Hemingway’s life who tended to view him through a very different lens.
Understanding Hemingway through their eyes has a subversive effect because, as we know,
Hemingway’s masculine reputation was in large part manufactured by the author himself.
According to Kennedy, Hemingway depicts himself in A Moveable Feast as an “orthodox
heterosexual” who “ridicules an effeminate homosexual named Hal, satirizes Fitzgerald’s sexual
uncertainties, and professes disgust at the lesbian practices of Stein and Toklas.” 77 Kenneth Lynn
similarly asserts that Hemingway “presented himself to the world as a man’s man, and in both
his published work and his very public behavior … his self-dramatizations hardened into
myth.”78
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But, as critics have noted, there is a counter-masculine undercurrent in Hemingway’s
fiction that boils over in his posthumously published, unfinished novel The Garden of Eden. The
novel deconstructs gender binaries by exploring Hemingway’s “preoccupation with androgyny
and the persistence of his fantasies about crossing the gender line,” Kennedy observes. 79 Thus, at
work in Hemingway’s life and fiction are conflicting currents—one that seeks to prove the
author’s masculinity through a preservation of rigid gender binaries, and another that seeks, in
the words of Mauricio D. Aguilera Linde, to “unmask the arbitrariness, contradictions, and
contingency of cultural conventions” that helped bolster Hemingway’s macho reputation in the
first place.80 These revisionist approaches to Hemingway’s oeuvre helped to demonstrate beyond
the obvious deconstructive play of gender categories in The Garden of Eden that Hemingway’s
fiction is plagued by gender trouble, despite the heterosexual, gender normative matrix that
others perceive in his work.
What comes to the fore throughout his short stories and novels is a gallery of characters
whose behavior blurs, transforms, questions, or puts a new perspective on gender: overtly
gay (the bartender in “The Light of the World”) and lesbian characters, closeted
homosexuals (“Out of Season,” “The Battler”), transvestites (The Garden of Eden),
dephallused males (Jake Barnes in The Sun Also Rises), women dressed as men and guys
adopting feminine features, men without sexual appetite and, in contrast, man-eaters
(Brett in The Sun), perpetually unsatisfied in the quest for a non-existent macho male.
The multitude of possibilities opened up by “gender-bending” analysis of Hemingway’s
life and works turns this traditionally most “misogynist” of men into a decidedly postmodern modernist writer.81
The purpose of revisionist scholarship of this kind is “not to destroy [Hemingway’s] mythical
status” as Papa, Linde writes, but to use the masculinist figure as “a case study in order to revise
dogmatic principles and unexamined values, and to denaturalize” the gender categories to which
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Hemingway himself may at times have felt like a prisoner. 82 In a similar vein, Carl P. Eby argues
in Hemingway’s Fetishism: Psychoanalysis and the Mirror of Manhood that Hemingway
experienced gender dysphoria, castration anxiety, and latent homosexuality in spite of—and
indeed because of—the macho cultural scripts that imprisoned him. “Insofar as Hemingway was,
and in some quarters still is, an icon of American masculinity, any revelation about the process
by which he constructed his personal masculinity—and femininity—suggests something about
how a multitude of men in our culture may have done the same,” Eby writes; “if the ideal of the
‘Hemingway man’ struck a chord with many American men, it did so … in part because many of
his personal concerns reflected, in an exaggerated form, wider cultural concerns of his day.”83
My purpose in presenting Hemingway’s masculinist upbringing is therefore not to
challenge this body of revisionist scholarship; a biographical study of Hemingway’s life and
fiction clearly lends itself to a deconstructive analysis of gender categories. My purpose, by
contrast, is to draw attention to the formative role that gender scripts—especially as they took
shape under Reverend Barton’s muscular Christianity—must have played in Hemingway’s life.
Not only was the boy raised to make morally righteous decisions; he was expected to do so in a
way that proved his masculinity. The failure to self-determine reflected a constitutional
weakness. Under Oak Park’s gendered theological strictures, becoming a man was a moral
pursuit.
The lasting impact of Reverend Barton’s gendered theological teachings can be seen
throughout Hemingway’s life, even in his final years. Hemingway’s close friend and biographer,
A.E. Hotchner, recounts the first time he met Hemingway for an interview with Cosmopolitan
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magazine in 1948. Hotchner is dazzled by a man whose macho reputation precedes him, and at
times he even appears intimidated, not by Hemingway’s celebrity but by his masculine
superiority. Upon their first encounter, Hotchner notes that:
His hair was dark with gray highlights, flecked white at the temples, and he had a heavy
mustache that ran past the corners of his mouth, but no beard. He was massive. Not in
height, for he was only an inch over six feet, nor in weight, but in impact. Most of his two
hundred pounds was concentrated above his waist: he had square heavy shoulders, long
hugely muscled arms (the left one jaggedly scarred and a bit misshapen at the elbow), a
deep chest, a belly-rise but no hips or thighs. Something played off him—he was intense,
electrokinetic, but in control, a race horse reined in. … He had so much more in his face
than I had expected to find from seeing his photographs. 84
However scripted or artificial, Hemingway’s embodied performance of the masculine ideal
impresses Hotchner, who appears taken with the author’s dominant energy and brute physical
appearance. The old man oozes masculine bravado and Hotchner, who describes himself by
contrast as a coward and “Horse’s ass,” 85 seems to envy Hemingway as the superior male
specimen. Undoubtedly, the popular and much-publicized image of Hemingway had a part in
Hotchner’s perception of the man, but the cultural narrative surrounding Hemingway appears to
inform the author’s self-perception as well. In the very first words he utters to Hotchner,
Hemingway brags that he holds the local record for most daiquiris drunk in a single evening. The
feat proves the author’s male superiority under a traditional gender script that prizes heavy
drinking as prototypical manly behavior; the fact that he brings up the accomplishment so
quickly, however, demonstrates just how concerned he is with proving his manhood, even to a
stranger.
Beneath this surface play of masculine signifiers is a deeper principle guiding
Hemingway’s choices that reflects the author’s masculine training as an Oak Park
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Congregationalist. When the Hollywood starlet Marlene Dietrich confided to Hemingway in a
phone conversation that she was debating whether to take a nightclub job in Miami, Hemingway
replied to her in the following way: “Don’t do what you sincerely don’t want to do. Never
confuse movement with action.”86 “In those five words,” Dietrich says to Hotchner, Ernest “gave
me a whole philosophy.”87 Making choices that are contrary to one’s truest desires out of a sense
of obligation or duty is to confuse movement with action, compelled choice with sovereign
choice. The details of one’s life ought to be deliberately chosen because the individual alone,
Hemingway was taught to believe from a very young age, is morally responsible for the outcome
of their life. Over time, this theological teaching of manly self-assertion would come into conflict
with the expectations and moral standards of Hemingway’s Oak Park community. But rather
than abandon his quest for masculine self-realization, Hemingway would replace the moral
standards of Oak Park Congregationalism with the principle of masculine autonomy, a
secularized theological view of sovereign moral will that transfers metaphysical authority from
God to mankind.
This “assertive manliness,” as Harvey Mansfield calls it, is best exemplified by
Hemingway’s masculine characters, who insist upon themselves, Mansfield argues, in an attempt
to establish their moral worth.88 As Mansfield explains, there is something at the heart of
masculine superiority that extends beyond questions of gender binarism and patriarchal
domination to larger queries about mankind’s place in the universe. “Manliness is an assertion of
man’s worth because his worth does not go without saying. So too, because worth needs to be
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asserted it needs to be proved; in asserting, one must make good the assertion.” 89 This is why
masculinity inveterately attempts to prove itself through demonstrations of its superiority; the
tendency to insist upon oneself—a well-known masculine stereotype—grows out of the need to
establish value where it does not naturally exist. This need among humans to establish their
lasting, metaphysical importance is a deeply religious impulse, as Mansfield explains:
survival is not enough; it no longer holds in the leisurely ease of our civilization, and in
any case, it never was enough. Human beings want quality time in their sojourn on the
planet; they want more than self-sacrifice for the sake of keeping the species going. They
are interested in why the species should be preserved—the point overlooked by Darwin.
Why did primitive peoples, desperately poor by our standards, living on the margin of
existence, and subject to daily risks we can hardly imagine, waste their time and
substance on religion? They wanted to know that they matter, that’s why; and they were
willing to spend heavily for the answer to that question from time and resources they
might have saved for their material well-being. Other animal species seek to survive;
humans want to survive with honor. It is through manliness that humans insist that they
are worthy of the attention of the gods and have an honored place in the scheme of
things.90
Masculine virtues like autonomy, self-determination, and self-mastery are all manifestations of
this religious self-assertion, the theological insistence that human life matters. That Hemingway
exhibits an investment in self-determination is perhaps evidence that masculinity was itself a
kind of religion for the writer. After all, self-determination was first taught to Hemingway by
Reverend Barton, whose theological view of free will was entangled with the concepts of
masculinity, moral goodness, and human worth. Given his religious training as an Oak Park
Congregationalist, it makes sense that Hemingway would later find homes with Roman
Catholicism, which upholds the imago Dei as theological dogma, and with existentialism, which
secularizes the imago Dei as a belief in superior human worth, what I refer to as human
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exceptionalism. Our lives must matter, the masculine will asserts. The imago Dei and manliness
are theological bedfellows.
Dissertation Summary
In this first part of this dissertation, I proposed a new understanding of literary
modernism, of which Hemingway was an important mouthpiece and exemplar. I suggested that
the lost generation was existentialist in its philosophical orientation before the term became
associated with Sartre and his coterie of followers. The lost generation’s defiant rejection of
history, religious tradition, and cultural convention—in which this bohemian group of American
expatriates had lost their faith—left these individuals without a transcendent authority figure to
rely on, fatherless as newly born orphans in a world without God. Lacking a predetermined
human nature and deprived of the moral commandments formerly written on their hearts, 20 thcentury postwar writers embraced the radical freedom to create their own meaning, to construct
their own moral values, and essentially to become God unto themselves. For Hemingway, whose
masculine reputation often preceded the actual man, this sense of willful determination, of
thinking for oneself, and of crafting individual identity through the exercise of sovereign moral
choices grew out of his confrontation with nothingness, or nada, which would become the
founding concept of Sartrean existentialism. The surprising thesis advanced here, however, is
that Hemingway’s existential freedom in the face of nothingness is precisely what made the
author a secularized theist who, like Sartre, was amenable to the anthropological claims of
Roman Catholicism. This study treats Hemingway’s journey through secularization as a possible
litmus test for 20th century secularization in general. For if the modernist avant-garde was truly
existentialist in its philosophical orientation, it would behoove us to reconsider its theological
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commitments in light of Hemingway, who appears to have straddled opposing worldviews as
both an atheist and a secularized theist.
In Chapter One of this dissertation, I also summarized how competing scholarship in
Sartre and Hemingway studies aligns both authors with existentialism and Roman Catholicism.
What ties these seemingly opposing camps together, we discovered, is the belief that humanity
lacks a fixed ontological identity in God’s absence. Reconciling moral absolutes with his belief
in God’s nonexistence would prove difficult for Hemingway’s existential compatriot, Jean-Paul
Sartre, who brings these concepts together through a feat of philosophical gymnastics. Sartre
preserves a place for moral absolutes in his philosophical outlook by secularizing—in the sense
of the word elaborated by Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben—theological transcendence in the
form of sovereign decision making. It should come as little surprise, then, that Agamben and
Schmitt are, for Sartre and even for Hemingway, important interlocutors whose philosophical
conflict mirrors the inner turmoil of Sartre’s and Hemingway’s self-divided philosophies.
Schmitt’s political notion of sovereign decisionism models the decisionist metaphysics of
Sartrean existentialism, while Agamben’s critique of Schmitt—which advances the deactivation
and dismantling of theological transcendence—models the philosophical aims of materialistic
atheism, which Sartre never fully achieved. My study of Agamben will provide crucial insight
into my study of Sartre, and my study of Sartre will provide an interpretive framework for
understanding Hemingway, whose atheism was of a religious nature, and whose religious
commitments were atheistic at heart.
Chapter Two of this dissertation begins with a discussion of the incompatibility of
secularism and moral absolutes. I argue that man-made morals cannot be authorized as
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objectively valuable without the theological category of transcendence. Secular society operates
under the presupposition that human rights are themselves objectively valuable, but in actuality,
human rights secularize the theological category, replacing transcendence with a disguised
version of the imago Dei that implicitly operates—for the morally authoritarian secularist—as
the metaphysical origin of objective moral value. From here, I discuss the biographical origins of
Sartre’s failed atheism, which provides us with a clear example of how secular morality implies
but also conceals a belief in the imago Dei. In order to establish my claim that Sartrean
decisionism models the secularization of theism, I move from an analysis of Sartre’s failed
atheism to a discussion of Giorgio Agamben’s ontotheological critique of sovereign
decisionism.91
In this more developed analysis, I show how secular morality gives birth to human rights
discourse through representational divisions between humanity and the non-human other, who is
animalized or otherwise degraded and objectified by sovereign, lawmaking decisions. Having
formed the logical connections among secular morality, sovereign decisionism, and masculine
domination, I turn at this juncture to a biographical study of Hemingway’s youth as an Oak Park
Congregationalist. Hemingway was trained in macho self-determination, which he learned to
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associate with moral goodness and religious belief, but after losing his faith after a near-death
encounter in the First World War, Hemingway was forced to separate his masculinity from his
faith. The result was a secularization of the imago Dei that refashioned godly behavior as
sovereign decision making. It was this secularized theological view of freedom that prepared
Hemingway for his conversion to the Roman Catholic faith, which similarly adheres to
masculine self-determination, human exceptionalism, and nothingness as an ontological
category.
Chapter Three of this dissertation applies this theoretical framework to an exegesis of
Hemingway’s short stories, novels, and works of nonfiction. Multiple themes are developed
across the Hemingway canon that, when looked at together, support my argument that
Hemingway secularizes certain aspects of religion. First, I show that Hemingway’s works
problematize the human/animal divide, discovering in God’s death the logical end of human
exceptionalism. The dehumanizing effects of war convince Hemingway of God’s nonexistence
by reducing mankind to an animal species bereft of the imago Dei. But, as I argue in Chapter
Four of this dissertation, Hemingway reaches this conclusion only to rebel against it. He
recognizes, in other words, that human life lacks inherent value, but, in the move from nihilism
to existentialism, he seeks to reassert human value through sovereign choice, or masculine selfdetermination. The highest expression of sovereign choice, for Hemingway as for Agamben, is
killing, a gesture that separates human life from animal life, superior being from inferior being
through the ultimate act of domination. Concluding this dissertation, I then apply these findings
to Hemingway’s portrayal of religious pilgrimage, which, for Hemingway, is always a
pilgrimage toward death—first, as something that one must accept as their inevitable end, and,
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second, as something that one must rebel against through positive affirmations of life. This, I
conclude, is the two-part nature of Hemingway’s secularized theism.

CHAPTER TWO
SOVEREIGN DECISIONISM AND THE IMAGO DEI
The Failed Atheism of Jean-Paul Sartre
In the year following Sartre’s death, Simone de Beauvoir published in Adieux a series of
interviews she conducted with the philosopher in August and September of 1974. Toward the
end of the final interview, Sartre says that his career as a professional educator helped him
produce the publications through which he had hoped to achieve immortality—a kind of “quasisurvival” he imagined in the form of his literary reputation. 1 De Beauvoir uses this opportunity to
shift the conversation from the figurative immortality Sartre hoped to achieve in his writings to
the topics of religious belief, the immortality of the soul, and Sartre’s own impending death.
“[T]here is still one question that I should like to ask you,” she says; “Has the idea of the survival
of the soul, of a spiritual principle in us, a survival such as the Christians think of, for example—
has that ever crossed your mind?”2 Sartre replies to de Beauvoir that he expects there will be
“nothing after death,”3 but—intriguingly, and in spite of his atheism—he also admits that he has
retained something akin to religious belief, a commitment to moral absolutes that, in Sartre’s
opinion, can only exist in a universe created and governed by a divine being. “In the moral
field,” he states, “I’ve retained one single thing to do with the existence of God, and that is Good
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and Evil as absolutes. The usual consequence of atheism is the suppression of Good and Evil.
It’sa certain relativism.”4 In a divinely governed universe, it would appear that moral absolutes
are built into the metaphysical nature of being, not simply as axiological beliefs imposed on
creation from above, but as an essential part of material reality itself. Arguably, this is why there
are no moral absolutes in a world without God. The material nature of reality depends on a
divine creator whose absence results—according to Sartre—in a morally neutral universe.
Sartre calls this perspective materialistic atheism because it moves beyond an idealist
atheism (that rejects the mere idea of God) to reconsider the nature of material being in God’s
absence. Under this view, human beings, like all material reality, exist only by chance, rather
than by God’s design, so the unbeliever must divorce himself from the theological belief that
humanity was created with inherent value for a moral purpose. “[M]aterialistic atheism is the
world seen without God,” Sartre comments; it progresses from the mere “absence of an idea” to
a new conception of being and of the human being, in particular, who “is left among things and
is not set apart from them by a divine consciousness that contemplates them and causes them to
exist.”5 Like the rest of material reality, humanity lacks a moral purpose in the universe, so the
materialistic atheist, in light of this knowledge, will create moral value if they so choose, but
they will do so without falling into the authoritarian tendency to regard good and evil as
transcendental principles. In response to Sartre’s description of materialistic atheism, de
Beauvoir quotes the Christian existentialist, Fyodor Dostoevsky: “‘If God does not exist,
everything is allowed.’”6 Sartre responds to de Beauvoir in the affirmative, but, as he
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immediately confesses, this is an aspect of materialistic atheism that Sartre has failed to fully
embrace. “In one way I clearly see what [Dostoevsky] means, and abstractly it’s true,” Sartre
observes, “but in another [way] I clearly see that killing a man is wrong. Is directly, absolutely
wrong; is wrong for another man; is doubtless not wrong for an eagle or a lion, but is wrong for a
man.”7 Morality, it would seem, only applies to humanity.
Sartre’s embodied moral experiences are at odds with the philosopher’s description of
materialistic atheism, which should divest the phenomenal experience of its moral character. By
Sartre’s own admission, his moralist tendencies stem from a kind of failed atheism, an inability
to realize fully God’s absence in the embodied experience of everyday life. Sartre describes his
morality as “an absolute in the midst of the relative,” 8 as if our moral actions could somehow
demonstrate their unconditional authority within the relative conditions of particular
circumstances. But Sartre’s deeply felt experience of moral absolutes is the result of secularized
theological views that appear to contradict the philosopher’s better judgment as an atheist. “Even
if one does not believe in God,” Sartre explains to de Beauvoir, “there are elements of the idea of
God that remain in us and that cause us to see the world with some divine aspects.” 9 This
secularized theism results in the experience of good and evil as moral absolutes, but these
absolutes are not abstract principles, for Sartre. Rather, moral actions are measured as good or
evil in light of their impact on human life, which has been given intrinsic value by a divine
creator. As Sartre explains to de Beauvoir at a deeply revealing moment during the interview: “I
don’t see myself as so much dust that has appeared in the world, but as a being that was
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expected, prefigured, called forth. In short, as a being that could … only come from a creator;
and this idea of a creating hand that created me refers back to God.” 10 At least by the time of the
interview, Sartre himself had not achieved the stated goal of materialistic atheism. Against his
own better judgment, the philosopher believed on what seems to be an intuitive, semi-conscious
level, that human beings were “set apart … by a divine consciousness that contemplates them
and causes them to exist.”11 In Sartre’s secularized theological account, the human being is made
sacred by a non-existent God.
I build on the existing literature to argue that Sartre’s theological anthropology is based
not only on God’s absence, as other scholars have argued, but on Sartre’s secularized theological
belief that humanity bears the imago Dei, or the sacred image of God. Sartre’s decisionist
metaphysics—his belief that human choice is the ontological origin of morality—authorize an
ethical paradigm that privileges human identity as “sacred,” or as metaphysically superior to the
rest of nature. But this theological view of ethics is complicated by the fact that sacred human
identity, in Sartre’s view, is not determined by God, who expressly does not exist, but by the
moral decision maker himself, who has taken God’s place as the ontological origin of moral
value. Morality is thus determined by the lawmaker who, after supplanting God as divine creator
of the universe, carves out the relative boundaries of sacred human identity. The imago Dei, in
Sartre’s secularized theological account, is, in effect, the image of God without God, the
exceptional status afforded to human identity even after the divine creator of mankind has been
removed from the picture. As Sartre writes in the War Diaries, “I imagine everyone freely
determines a kind of moral affect for himself, on the basis of which he grasps, values, and
10
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conceives his own progress. For example, from the outset I undoubtedly had a morality without a
God—without sin, but not without evil.” 12 Sartre recognizes, in other words, that he cognitively
separates moral authority from its theological source, transferring that authority from God to the
individual decision-maker.
To unpack these claims, I bring Sartre into conversation with contemporary political
philosopher Giorgio Agamben. The two thinkers are not often associated with each other and, at
first glance, they may even appear worlds apart, but Agamben’s notions of secularized theism,
anthropogenesis, and the sovereign production of bare life illuminate Sartre’s work in profound
and troubling ways. This is because Sartre’s failed atheism can be framed as the object of
Agamben’s political critique, which seeks to correct authoritarian paradigms through a so-called
profanation of secularized theological views, purging them of tacit metaphysical
presuppositions.
Agamben’s work is particularly helpful in diagnosing Sartrean existentialism as a form of
secularized theism. That said, a full account of Agamben’s philosophical solution to this problem
exceeds the scope of the current project. For this reason, I limit my analysis to aspects of
Agamben’s thought that best illuminate the theological character of Sartre’s atheism. My
purpose is not to provide a solution to what I call secularized theism, but to diagnose the problem
as an essential component of Sartre’s existentialist philosophy. It would appear that Sartre
himself attempted to correct his secularized theological view of morality by achieving the
philosophical aims of materialistic atheism, but, as he explains to de Beauvoir, he was never
entirely able to do so. Sartre retained a secularized theological belief in moral absolutism, which
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grew out of his deeply felt, semi-conscious intuition that human beings were “set apart” by God,
whose existence Sartre paradoxically denied.13 In due course, I will show how Sartre’s
secularized theological views illuminate those of Hemingway, whose own tacit belief in the
imago Dei—or human exceptionalism, as I also refer to it—is inseparable from his masculine
ideals.
The Biographical Origins of Sartre’s Failed Atheism
Tracing the exact origins of Sartre’s failed atheism may not be possible in the end, but
there are at least a few passages in his autobiographical works that help to shed light on the
philosopher’s peculiar situation. He recounts in The Words, for example, that “his whole family
believed in God, as a matter of discretion” because atheism, in the political climate of Sartre’s
childhood, was closely associated with moral fanaticism. 14 He writes in the War Diaries that
“[m]y mother made me take my first communion, but I think it was more out of respect for my
future freedom than from true conviction. Rather as certain people have their children
circumcised for reasons of hygiene,” Sartre’s family had him baptized to meet social
expectations.15 Unlike the nominal Christians he grew up around, the typical atheist was a “Godobsessed crank” who “refused the right to kneel in church, … to give his daughters a religious
wedding, [and] who took it upon himself to prove the truth of his doctrine by the purity of his
morals.”16 The atheist was someone who attempted to vindicate their radical worldview by
demonstrating its moral value to a skeptical public, whose own morals appeared superficial, by
13
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contrast, as customary behavior not genuinely felt. “For two thousand years, Christian certainties
had had time to prove their worth,” Sartre observes; “They belonged to everyone. … They were
common to the heritage. Good society believed in God in order to not speak of Him.” 17 Such was
the nature of Sartre’s religious upbringing. To believe in God was a matter of social decorum,
and, likewise, to feel moral conviction was a matter of etiquette. “My grandfather was Protestant,
my grandmother was Catholic. But so far as I could see, their religious feelings if decent were
frigid.”18 For the religious believer, morality was a social nicety and it was not ordinarily
accompanied by feelings of genuine conviction. The atheist, by contrast, felt moral conviction
without believing in God, and he sought to vindicate his unpopular worldview on the basis of
moral authority.
Yet, despite the hyper-moralism of the “God-obsessed” atheist as well as the superficial
moralism of polite Christian society, the young Sartre first experienced the pressures of moral
contrition under the semblance of religious belief. Sartre tells us in the War Diaries that “I can
still see myself at the age of seven or eight, in Rue Le Goff, burning the lace curtains on the
window with a match. … this incendiary act had no witness and yet I was thinking: ‘The Good
Lord can see me.’”19 Sartre echoes this sentiment in The Words while recounting a similar event:
“I had been playing with matches and burned a small rug,” he says; “I was in the process of
covering up my crime when suddenly God saw me. I felt His gaze inside my head and on my
hands. I whirled about in the bathroom, horribly visible, a live target.” 20 Sartre says that he “flew
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into a rage” against this “crude indiscretion” and then blasphemed the judgmental deity who, in
response, “never looked at him again.” 21 Thus, unlike the “God-obsessed crank” of Sartre’s
youth who sought to vindicate atheism through a demonstration of its moral value, Sartre
escaped the authoritarian reaches of morality by turning his back on religion. In this regard,
Sartre was a different kind of atheist and, so too, a different kind of moralist in French society.
The death of God, for Sartre, relativized morality—human behavior was no longer surveilled by
the moral authority upstairs. These biographical accounts corroborate Sartre’s broader
philosophical claim, argued elsewhere, 22 that moral authority logically originates with God.
But another passage from the philosopher’s autobiography shows that Sartre’s atheism—
rather than being an outright rejection of transcendental moral authority—was self-divided from
the beginning: on the one hand, Sartre wanted to escape the restrictions imposed on his behavior
by Christianity’s sovereign moral code but, on the other hand, Sartre longed for a creator to give
his life purpose and moral value. He admits that
God would have managed things for me. I would have been a signed masterpiece.
Assured of playing my part in the universal concert, I would have patiently waited for
Him to reveal His purposes and my necessity. I reached out for religion. I longed for it, it
was the remedy. Had it been denied me, I would have invented it myself. It was not
denied me. Raised in the Catholic faith, I learned that the Almighty had made me for His
glory. That was more than I dared dream. But later, I did not recognize in the fashionable
God in whom I was taught to believe the one whom my soul was awaiting. I needed a
Creator; I was given a Big Boss. The two were one and the same, but I didn’t realize it. I
was serving, without zeal, the Idol of the Pharisees, and the official doctrine put me off
seeking my own faith.23
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In his early youth, Sartre felt that he was created for divine glory and was certain he played an
essential role in the deity’s cosmic design. As we have already seen, Sartre would continue to
feel this way despite his atheism, confessing at a much older age that he felt “expected,
prefigured, [and] called forth … as a being that could … only come from a creator.” 24
According to the Roman Catholic tradition, mankind was made in the image of God as
superior to the rest of creation. Although this was more than Sartre dared to dream for at the
time, Catholic teachings of the imago Dei validated his religious suspicion that he was created by
God with moral purpose. But Sartre was unwilling to reconcile a belief in sacred human identity
with the moral dictates of the “Big Boss” upstairs. Instead, he jettisoned the “official doctrine” of
the Church, and replaced institutional morality with moral values of his own choosing. “I am
affected by moralism,” Sartre admits, and “moralism often has its source in religion. But with me
it was nothing of the kind. Besides, the truth is I was brought up and educated by relatives and
teachers most of whom were champions of secular morality and everywhere sought to replace
religious morality by it.”25 Sartre followed in the footsteps of his teachers and relatives as a
champion of secular morality, but, without God, he was faced with the same challenge facing all
secularists: how does one authorize moral values as inherently valuable without first establishing
an absolute, metaphysical standard against which to judge them? He says to de Beauvoir that
killing a man is “absolutely wrong,” but how can Sartre take an absolutist stance on murder if all
such ethical values are, by his own account, relative to the choices of each individual decision
maker?26 The answer, I think, can be found in Sartre’s secularized theological view of human
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identity. The atheist philosopher may certainly have turned his back on religion, but it seems
that, being driven by a peculiar need for moral certitude, Sartre retained a tacit belief in sacred
human identity, the metaphysical absolute by which the philosopher authorized his moral
choices.
Sartre himself claims to have replaced religion with a life of literary devotion. He says in
The Words that he hoped to achieve immortality by writing texts that would carry his reputation
beyond the grave. At the end of this document, Sartre admits that he finally gave up on these
comforting illusions after realizing that everyone, no matter the degree of their celebrity, is
forgotten with time; even if your reputation lives on without you, you still are not consciously
present to experience the memories that other people may have of you. He writes that
In order to assure myself that the human race would remember me forever, it was agreed
in my head that the species would never end. For me to expire in humanity’s bosom was
to be born and become infinite, but if anyone put forward, in my presence, the hypothesis
that a cataclysm might some day destroy the planet, even in fifty thousand years, I would
be panic stricken. Though I am now disillusioned, I cannot think about the cooling of the
sun without fear.27
Sartre recognizes at some point before 1963, when The Words was first published, that he
secularized religion as the study of literature to preserve a tacit, semi-conscious belief in
immortality. But Sartre, like Agamben after him, was a critic of secularized theological views.
As I have already shown, Sartre envisions materialistic atheism as a remedy that would cure
inferior, idealist forms of atheism of their unacknowledged theological errors. Sartre describes
his personal progression from theist to secularized theist in the following passage, but present in
these reflections is a tacit theological belief in the imago Dei that persists beyond his ostensible
disillusionment and gives shape to his belief in sovereign decision making, as I will demonstrate:
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I was taught Sacred History, the Gospel, and the catechism without being given the
means for believing. The result was a disorder which became my particular order. There
were twists and turns, a considerable transfer; removed from Catholicism, the sacred was
deposited in belles-lettres and the penman appeared, an ersatz of the Christian that I was
unable to be … After a while, not knowing what else to do to occupy my mind, I decided
to think of the Almighty. Immediately He tumbled into the blue and disappeared without
giving any explanation. He doesn’t exist, I said to myself with polite surprise, and I
thought the matter was settled. In a way, it was, since never have I had the slightest
temptation to bring Him back to life. But the Other One remained, the Invisible One, the
Holy Ghost, the one who guaranteed my mandate and who ran my life with his great
anonymous and sacred powers. I had all the more difficulty getting rid of him in that he
had installed himself at the back of my head in the doctored notions which I used in my
effort to understand, to situate, and to justify myself. 28
Sartre argues in Being and Nothingness that God cannot exist because no being is, at once,
ontologically fixed and yet totally free. What Sartre calls God—being-in-itself-for-itself—is
logically impossible.29 Nevertheless, Sartre retains a belief in the Holy Ghost while rejecting God
the Father and God the Son. Raised in the Catholic Church, Sartre undoubtedly knew that all
three persons of the trinity were regarded by the Augustinian tradition as consubstantial, so he
knew that it was impossible to reject one member of the godhead without rejecting all three
members. But this is precisely what Sartre does, describing the Holy Ghost as an anonymous
force in “the back of [his] head” who plays a godlike role in the philosopher’s life after being
severed from the trinity.
Especially pertinent to our study is the role attributed to the Holy Ghost by the Roman
Catholic tradition. Concerning the imago Dei,30 the Catechism of the Catholic Church says that
28
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humanity was made “‘in the image and likeness’ of the Creator. It is in Christ, Redeemer and
Savior, that the divine image, disfigured in man by the first sin, has been restored to its original
beauty and ennobled by the grace of God.” 31 Concerning the Holy Ghost, the Catechism says that
“By his Passion, Christ delivered us from Satan and from sin. He merited for us new life in the
Holy Spirit. His grace restores what sin had damaged in us.” 32 One may deduce from these
passages, first, that the imago Dei was corrupted by sin and, second, that the Holy Ghost restores
the image of God in humanity. According to the New Testament, mankind is set apart as image
bearers “by the sanctifying work of the Spirit.”33 For Christian believers, being created in the
image of God sets humanity apart as exceptional beings with superior moral value, beings whose
self-worth affords them particular rights and special treatment as God’s primary concern.
Paradoxically, Sartre retains a belief in the Holy Ghost, who restores the image of God in
quence of being created in the likeness of God is mankind’s superiority over the rest of creation, which they are expected to subdue. According to the Catholic Church, the imago Dei refers to mankind’s immortal soul, his intellectual capacity, his free will, and his unique place among creation. See Catholic Church, “The Dignity of the Human
Person,” in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed. Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana 2012. Wayne Grudem’s Systematic Theology similarly identifies the spiritual, relational, and rational ways that human beings are
thought to resemble God. See Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000). But, as Daniel P. Horan demonstrates in a 2019 article, the ways in which mankind
is said to resemble God in ancient, medieval, and modern-day Christian theology is based on characteristics that,
historically, were thought to distinguish humanity from the rest of creation as exceptional. To put this differently,
theologians identified the ways in which human beings were superior to the rest of nature, and then attributed these
characteristics to the image of God in humanity. Horan describes the imago Dei as a “placeholder for human uniqueness” that reflects Christianity’s anthropocentric belief in human superiority. See Daniel P. Horan, “Deconstructing
Anthropocentric Privilege: Imago Dei and Nonhuman Agency,” The Heythrop Journal 60 (2019): 560. The argument could be made, however, that certain lifeforms exhibit the same spiritual, relational, and rational capacities as
human beings and that these lifeforms should therefore be viewed as humanity’s equals; the argument can also be
made that all of creation bears the divine image because it was created by God with dignity and inherent worth; but
arguments of this nature miss the point. The imago Dei does not explicitly refer to a set of godlike characteristics;
the scriptures say nothing on this point. Rather, the imago Dei is a mark of superiority, indicating mankind’s unique
privilege as God’s special interest in the throes of a cosmic drama. God values humanity over the rest of creation,
which human beings as superior creatures are expected to exert their dominion over.
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humanity, but he rejects God the Father and God the Son. This secularized theological view
tacitly guides the logic of Sartre’s philosophical theories, to be illuminated in the following
pages by Agamben’s critique of anthropogenesis, what he describes as the sovereign
construction of human and nonhuman life.
Agamben and the Creation of Mankind
Central to Agamben’s critique of sovereignty is the claim that our representational
constructs are, by nature, divisive, hierarchical, and self-authorizing. Following the poststructural
theory that linguistic concepts generate their meaning through opposing contrasts—what the
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure referred to as a system of differences—Agamben argues that our
notions of humanity entail representational exclusions of the non-human other. In a very literal
sense, then, language distinguishes mankind from the rest of creation, but it does so at the
expense of non-humans, which are conceptually distinguished from humanity as inferior. What
legitimizes these representational constructs as metaphysically authoritative is not, as one might
think, the ability of language to describe the world accurately (as in a correspondence theory of
language), but, rather, the performative nature of speech, which conjures into existence the world
it describes.
Building on J.L. Austin’s well-known argument that certain utterances perform the
actions they describe (two people commit themselves to marriage, for example, by uttering the
words “I do”), Agamben argues in The Sacrament of Language that all utterances, being
differential in nature, imply the larger linguistic structures that, in turn, provide the context to
give these utterances their meaning. In the act of being spoken, the overarching linguistic
structures implied by specific utterances enforce themselves upon nature as veridical by

61
presupposing their own truthfulness. In his discussion of the oath—which, for the ancient
Greeks, Romans, and Christians, represented the whole of language in and of itself—Agamben
writes that “[e]very naming, every act of speech is, in this sense, an oath, in which the logos (the
speaker in the logos) pledges to fulfill his word, swears on its truthfulness, on the
correspondence between words and things that is realized in it.”34 In this way, a simple statement
like “the grass is green” implies the larger linguistic structures that inform the meaning of both
“grass” and “green,” but it also performs these larger linguistic structures—and so conjures their
meanings into existence—through the utterance “is,” a word that asserts its truthfulness by
pointing to the mere fact of existence.
For Agamben and other poststructuralists, however, our representational constructs do
not actually succeed in reaching outside of themselves to coincide with the natural world because
language, the poststructuralist will argue, generates its meaning through the dual process of
differentiation and deferral, as Jacques Derrida famously articulated. Because language endlessly
defers meaning through differentiation it should therefore be understood as a self-enclosed
system that never makes contact with the outside world. While today, poststructuralists recognize
linguistic speech acts as arbitrary constructs that fail to embody the metaphysical nature they
purport to describe, the classical world operated under a theological view of language that made
it “impossible to separate name and being, words and things” because, as Agamben is careful to
explain, the “verbal act br[ought] being into truth” by performing as veridical the meaning it
articulated.35 In the following passage, Agamben describes the dual function of language in the
classical world as denotative and constitutive, the latter of which is also referred to below as
34

Giorgio Agamben, The Omnibus Homo Sacer (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2017), 335.

35

Ibid., 340, 342.

62
veridiction, thus reflecting both a correspondence theory of language and its actualizing
performance, respectively:
While assertion has an essentially denotative value, meaning that its truth, in the moment
of its formulation, is independent of the subject and is measured with logical and
objective parameters (conditions of truth, non-contradiction, adequation between words
and things), in veridiction the subject constitutes itself and puts itself in play as such by
linking itself performatively to the truth of its own affirmation. For this reason the truth
and consistency of the oath coincide with its performance, and for this reason the calling
of the god as witness does not imply a factual testimony but is actualized performatively
by the very utterance of the name. What we today call a performative in the strict sense
(the speech acts “I swear,” “I promise,” “I declare,” etc., which must, significantly,
always be pronounced in the first person) are the relics in language of this constitutive
experience of speech—veridiction—that exhausts itself with its utterance, since the
speaking subject neither preexists it nor is subsequently linked to it but coincides
integrally with the act of speech.36
The act of speech constitutes subjecthood and what the subject believes to be true—i.e. what
constitutes the subject’s world—is brought into existence by its verbal performance. This, of
course, coincides with the lessons of poststructuralists who, following Louis Althusser, argue
that the subject is hailed into being by discourse, and who, with Jean Baudrillard, argue that
discourse is not a true or false representation of reality but the simulation of reality, which is
always already experienced as true. The difference is that, in the classical world, the vast
multitude of contradictory simulations were not regarded as equally valid, as they would be
under a poststructuralist worldview, because, for the ancient Greeks, Romans, and Christians,
only one of these narratives actually aligned with reality, which was spoken into existence by
God.
As Agamben notes, the name of God in the Judaic and Christian traditions as well as
among the ancient Greeks and Romans referred to a correspondence theory of language, or the
language through which God spoke reality into being. “Language is the word of God, and the
36

Ibid., 344.

63
word of God is … an oath,” writes Agamben; “it is God insofar as he reveals himself in the logos
as the ‘faithful one’ (pistos) par excellence. God is the oath-taker in the language of which man
is only the speaker, but in the oath on the name of God the language of men communicates with
divine language.”37 To take an oath, according to Agamben, is to put your faith in the ability of
language to account for the world accurately; it is to put your faith in the God who first spoke
reality into being, thus ensuring the connection between words and things. But when people lie
or fail to repeat the divine narrative verbatim, “the connection that unites language and the world
is broken,” and, consequently, “the name of God, which expressed and guaranteed this
connection based in blessing [bene-dicente], becomes the name of the curse [male-dizione], that
is, of a word that has broken its truthful relation to things.” 38 But there is an even greater
consequence at play here: the misuse of language discloses the impotence of its performative
aspect—it reveals that language is not in fact capable of conjuring metaphysical reality into
being, for, if it were truly capable of doing this, so-called liars could speak new realities into
being at will, thereby dividing reality against itself, the world of one person against the world of
another, the worlds created by mankind against the world created by God. Law and religion were
formulated in part, Agamben says, to mitigate this unwanted effect by exercising control over
liars, dissenters, and perjurers of the oath.
Stated somewhat differently, speech loses its performative power after being divorced
from the sovereign, metaphysical narrative first spoken by God, who created and sustains the
nature of reality. For this reason, “one could say that the existence of language” was for the
ancients “the performative expression of the existence of the world. In this sense metaphysics,
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the science of pure being, is itself historical and coincides with the experience of the event of
language to which man devotes himself in the oath”—i.e. the belief that what a person articulates
as true does in fact correspond with reality. 39 But “[i]f the oath is declining, [and] the name of
God is withdrawing from language,” then speakers have no way to authorize their truth claims as
veridical, “and this is what has happened,” Agamben observes, with the “‘death of God’ or, as
one should put it more exactly, ‘of the name of God’—[where] metaphysics also reaches [its]
completion.”40 By stating that God has withdrawn from language, Agamben means to say that
language is not able to conjure reality into being through its performance; the death of God
should bring with it the end of metaphysics and the possibility of a univocal master-narrative.
And yet, as we will see, in the modern age, the death of God gives way to God-surrogates who,
claiming to have sovereign ownership over exclusionary truth, assert their point of view with
theological authority. The God-surrogate at the center of Sartrean existentialism is the sovereign
subject, who, in keeping with Agamben’s analysis, believes themselves capable of conjuring
reality into being through its performance.
To state this plainly, Agamben makes a series of observations pertaining to the oath, the
language through which God was thought to speak reality into being, thereby ensuring the
connection between words and things. The first observation is that God alone determines the
nature of reality, so whenever people speak the truth, they are repeating utterances that were
already spoken by God. They are uniting their voices with God’s voice, and through these
utterances, giving life to a divine, truth-bearing narrative. However, perjury, or lying under oath,
as it were, reveals that not all utterances are veridical, despite the fact that all utterances
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presuppose their veracity by virtue of their performative nature. Following Aristotle’s law of
non-contradiction, moreover, we find that disagreement among people is further proof that not
all utterances are truthful. The logical conclusion, following these observations, is that spoken
words do not conjure reality into being. For Agamben, however, it is not only that language fails
to create reality through performative speech-acts, but, more to the point, it is that language is a
system of differentiation and deferral that even fails to describe the world beyond it. Recognizing
this, the poststructuralist regards all significations as arbitrary, differential constructs lacking in
metaphysical authority. But the object of Agamben’s political-theological critique—the
sovereign subject—continues to wield language as a lawmaking force that conjures reality into
existence. “The model of truth here is not that of the adequation between words and things but
the performative one in which speech unfailingly actualizes its meaning. Just as, in the state of
exception, the law suspends its own application only to found, in this way, its being in force, so
in the performative,” Agamben writes, “language suspends its denotation precisely and solely to
found its existential connection with things.”41 The sovereign, like God, speaks reality into being,
creating meaningful narrative discourse through self-authorizing significations. In a similar
fashion, society writ large continually reproduces violence against certain people groups through
recurring acts of exclusionary signification, dividing the human from the nonhuman, and the
privileged from the marginalized.
What Agamben terms anthropogenesis—referring to mankind’s origin, or the emergence
of the human species as such—first took place, he says, when certain primates developed
language and, in so doing, recognized themselves as superior to other animals. It just so happens
that the characteristic humanity recognized as its defining quality—the ability to communicate
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with each other through speech—is also the very tool it utilizes to mark out and authorize
distinctions between superior and inferior beings. Agamben applies a microscopic view to this
important moment in our anthropological history. He reports that, for the 19th century biologist
Ernst Haeckel, language marked the evolutionary transition from Pithecanthropus alalus to
Homo sapien, but, shortly after, the linguist Heymann Steinthal observed a significant aporia in
Haeckel’s claim: if speech is the characteristic that distinguishes mankind from the apes, then a
speechless man or, for that matter, a talking animal can never logically exist, as both would
violate Haeckel’s assertion that language is the unique practice of human beings. In Haeckel’s
view, human identity and the capacity to utilize speech are inextricable; one cannot exist without
the other. But if language is humanity’s defining characteristic then Heymann is right: both
speechless man and talking animal are logical contradictions; the first animalizes man by taking
away his speech, the second humanizes animals by giving them a voice. Therefore, to make the
evolutionary transition from animal to human there must be an intermediary stage between
speechless animal and talking man that bridges—only by violating—their categorical separation.
In the following passage, Agamben elaborates on the significance of this missing evolutionary
link:
What distinguishes man from animal is language, but this is not a natural given already
inherent in the psychophysical structure of man; it is, rather, a historical production
which, as such, can be properly assigned neither to man nor to animal. If this element is
taken away, the difference between man and animal vanishes, unless we imagine a
nonspeaking man—Homo alalus, precisely—who would function as a bridge that passes
from the animal to the human. But all evidence suggests that this is only a shadow cast by
language, a presupposition of speaking man, by which we always obtain only an
animalization of man (an animal-man, like Haeckel’s ape-man) or a humanization of the
animal (a man-ape). The animal-man and the man-animal are the two sides of a single
fracture, which cannot be mended from either side. 42
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No matter how gradual the psychophysical transition or incremental the development of
language, at some point in its evolutionary history the animal becomes human through its
acquisition of language proper. But defining humans by their use of language merely passes the
buck, forcing us to define the exact nature of language. The logic at play here is clearly circular:
animal life becomes human the moment we call it human, the moment it can demonstrate a
mastery of language, which we ourselves define. For this reason, Homo alalus—the intermediary
species identified above—should be thought of as an empty place holder, or zone of indifference,
who signals the need to distinguish between man and animal through an interpretive decision.
This zone of indifference is the place of pure decision because it stands at the crossroads between
humanity and its structural opposites. Agamben calls this place of pure decision the
anthropological machine.
The boundaries of human identity, he argues, must be arbitrarily decided upon through
exclusionary representations of the nonhuman. In this sense, our every decision is a
representational division, and all such divisions, by their very nature, must be decided upon, the
representational divisions must be drawn. “Insofar as the production of man through the
opposition man/animal, human/inhuman, is at stake here, the machine necessarily functions by
means of an exclusion (which is also always already a capturing) and an inclusion (which is also
always already an exclusion).”43 Unfettered decisionism, or the power to decide, therefore marks
the transition from non-speaking animal to humanity proper through the divisive operations of
language itself—a decision that includes particular content under the privileged title of
“mankind,” and a decision that excludes its structural opposites in an act of sovereign
domination. As Agamben explains:
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Both machines are able to function only by establishing a zone of indifference at their
centers, within which—like a “missing link” which is always lacking because it is already
virtually present—the articulation between human and animal, man and non-man,
speaking being and living being, must take place. Like every space of exception, this
zone is, in truth, perfectly empty, and the truly human being who should occur there is
only the place of a ceaselessly updated decision in which the caesurae and their
rearticulation are always dislocated and displaced anew. What would thus be obtained,
however, is neither an animal life nor a human life, but only a life that is separated and
excluded from itself—only a bare life.44
Agamben believes with Sartre that existence precedes essence, that the “ceaselessly updated
decision” of being-for-itself determines the boundaries of human identity, which are “always
dislocated and displaced anew.” Because humanity lacks being-in-itself, anthropogenesis can
only take place through a sovereign decision that separates the human from the animal by
presenting both life forms, in bad faith, as fixed ontological entities. In truth, however, the
decision merely separates humanity from bare life, or its structural opposites, none of which are
fixed ontic realities but are instead arbitrary, differential constructs. So it is not biological
difference, superior intelligence, or language acquisition per se that separates mankind from
animal life, but the sovereign decision alone. The distinguishing characteristic of humanity is
that it chooses to represent itself as a superior life form; man is the animal that distinguishes
itself from all other animals as superior. “[T]o define the human not through any nota
characteristica,” Agamben states, “but rather through his self-knowledge, means that man is the
being which recognizes itself as such, that man is the animal that must recognize itself as human
to be human.”45 Joseph Slaughter echoes this phrase in his discussion of human rights: “Although
human rights are presupposed to be self-evident, they must be publicly and officially articulated
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as such, named as self-evident to be made self-evident.” 46 Human rights achieve their legally
authorized status through self-insistence, sovereign choice, or the act of declaring oneself as
metaphysically authoritative.
Lynn Hunt observes this logic at play in the US Declaration of Independence and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in her 2007 monograph Inventing Human
Rights: A History: “This claim of self-evidence, crucial to human rights even now, gives rise to a
paradox: if equality of rights is so self-evident, then why did this assertion have to be made and
why was it only made in specific times and places?” 47 Were human rights truly self-evident they
would be found in every human society throughout history, and they would not be argued over,
questioned, or insisted upon because all people everywhere would already recognize human
rights as an essential part of nature, such as our biological need to sleep, eat, and drink in order to
survive (which itself is not a right but a biological truism). As Hunt observes, “[a]n assertion that
requires argument is not self-evident.”48 Our commitment to human rights requires logical
justification.
But logical justification cannot be found, I maintain, without incorporating a religious
element into the explanation. To argue in concert with modern Western society that human rights
are self-evident because human dignity is self-evident is merely to pass the buck, as there is
similarly no logical way to justify our belief that human dignity is inherent without introducing a
religious belief in objective moral value. One could argue, for example, that human life was
instilled with inherent dignity by a divine creator who determines the metaphysical value of
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nature. Deprived of this theological explanation, however, human dignity must be insisted upon
without logical justification. There is no good reason to believe that human life is more valuable
than the rest of the natural world, and, likewise, there is no good reason to believe that our
superior value is built into the metaphysical nature of being—at least not without God. Indeed,
the belief that human life is inherently valuable grows out of the anthropocentric presupposition
that human beings were created with moral purpose by a God who values them over the rest of
creation.
As Agamben, Slaughter, and Hunt point out, it is the declarative act alone—the use of
language to identify oneself as superior within nature—that distinguishes humanity from
nonhuman existence as exceptionally valuable and rights bearing. This decisionist metaphysic—
which divides humanity from the non-human other—represents, in Agamben’s view, the
prevailing ideology of modern state power. Even current democratic leaders have the legal right
to suspend constitutional law in times of an emergency, he explains. When the sovereign makes
use of these emergency powers, the moral authority of the constitution is transferred to the
lawmaking decisions of whoever is in charge. In this manner, a sovereign democratic leader is
afforded total command over the legal system just as, in Sartre’s existentialist worldview, the
sovereign individual is afforded total command over moral law after the death of God. This
transvaluation of values, as Nietzsche called it, represents an emergency state where the fixed
moral principles of, say, the Decalogue are suspended through the lawmaking authority of the
free individual, whose every decision now operates, according to Sartre, as the ontological origin
of moral law.
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Ostensibly, then, Sartrean existentialism outlines the tacit philosophical logic of modern
state power and can be framed, in this light, as the indirect target of Agamben’s politicaltheological critique. Agamben agrees with John Gillespie that God’s death and, concomitantly,
the suspension of fixed moral laws result in “the secularisation of God in the person of the
absolute free individual,”49 but Agamben, in contrast with Gillespie, extends his critique beyond
the sovereign individual to the sovereign leader of the state, whose lawmaking decisions produce
bare life, or life that has been set apart as nonhuman, by drawing arbitrary divisions between
citizen and non-citizen, humanity and the dehumanized other. This, I argue, is where Agamben’s
ontotheological critique of the Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt becomes especially helpful to our
analysis of Sartre. For Schmitt’s political theology is blatantly self-aware where Sartre’s
materialistic atheism has failed him: the former is knowingly based on secularized theological
views while the latter unwittingly conceals its theological origins (the imago Dei) within a
secular form (human rights, or human exceptionalism). For Schmitt, sacred human identity is
determined by the sovereign decision maker alone, who, in imitation of the divine creator of
mankind, endows the legal citizen with inherent rights or, what I am calling, the imago Dei—i.e.
that which separates mankind from the rest of creation as superior. In a theological context, this
refers to a divine being who literally creates human beings with superior moral value; in a
secular context, however, where human value has been severed from its theological origins, this
refers to the dogmatic insistence that human exceptionalism is self-evident; it refers to sovereign
decisionism.
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Looking at Sartre Through Agamben’s Eyes
Sartre’s atheistic views are identical in this regard to Schmitt’s political theology, but
Sartre does not acknowledge their theological origin until very late in his philosophical career
when he confesses to de Beauvoir that he feels as though he were created by a deity. This, of
course, directly contradicts his 1946 assertion in Existentialism is a Humanism that “there is no
human nature since there is no God to conceive of it.”50 According to Sartre, materialistic
atheism “bear[s out] the full consequences of” God’s non-existence, so there can be no human
nature to dictate the value, meaning, and significance of mankind; consequently, there is no
fixed standard upon which to base a system of transcendental moral laws. 51 The problem, which I
think Sartre does well to underscore, is that in order to standardize moral justice and thereby
elude the consequences of cultural relativism people must base their juridical divisions of good
and evil on God’s moral character but also—and just as importantly—on mankind’s moral value,
which is itself determined by God. For it is only by standardizing human identity and thereby
ascribing to all people an identical set of inherent rights that one may conceive of something like
equal treatment and, with it, a universalist conception of morality. Under this metaphysical view,
“[m]an possesses a human nature,” Sartre writes, but “this ‘human nature’ … is found in all men,
which means that each man is a particular example of a universal concept.” 52 This is why the
imago Dei is an essential part of any moralist paradigm; without it, the moral value of human
identity is left indeterminate, and this indeterminacy prevents us from standardizing a universal
concept of morality. “[M]an as existentialists conceive of him cannot be defined,” Sartre states;
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“He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what he makes of himself … since he
conceives of himself only after he exists, just as he wills himself to be after being thrown into
existence.”53
In Sartre’s view, the natureless nature of being-for-itself is the logical consequence of
God’s non-existence. “That is what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be free:
condemned, because he did not create himself, yet nonetheless free, because once cast into the
world, he is responsible for everything he does.” 54 Human life is therefore “perfectly empty,” as
Agamben would say, for it is “the place of a ceaselessly updated decision in which the caesurae
and their rearticulation are always dislocated and displaced anew.” 55 But Sartre conflates the
indeterminacy of being-for-itself with the transvaluation of moral law because “along with
[God’s] disappearance goes the possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There
could no longer be any a priori good, since there would be no infinite and perfect consciousness
to conceive of it.”56 Sartre again references Dostoevsky’s claim that, without God, everything is
permissible. Moreover, he argues that morality and human nature are interdependent concepts
because, if “God does not exist, we will encounter no values or orders that can legitimize our
conduct,” meaning that “we can never explain our actions by reference to a given and immutable
human nature.”57
Without God, there is no human nature, and without human nature, there is no basis for
moral conduct. Presumably, then, what ties all three elements of this moral-theological nexus
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together is the imago Dei, the secularized theological belief that mankind is more valuable than
the rest of creation, that humanity as image bearers are superior to the non-human creatures—or
bare life, in Agamben’s terms—who lack the divine image, and that each of us bears inalienable
rights by virtue of declaring them self-evident. As we have already seen, Sartre admits to de
Beauvoir, against his better judgment and in spite of his atheism, that he believes in some version
of the imago Dei. At a particularly revealing moment during one of their interviews, he states
that “it is doubtless not wrong for an eagle or a lion” to kill a human being, but it is “directly,
absolutely wrong” for human beings to kill one another. 58 Sartre affords mankind a unique moral
station in life, asserting that human beings must be held to a moral standard.
But Sartre also makes clear in his late interviews with de Beauvoir what he made explicit
decades earlier in Being and Nothingness and Existentialism is a Humanism: “secular morality”
inherently lacks the a priori legitimacy that naturally accompanies the theological. 59 He accuses
so-called French radicals of secularizing the absolutist morality that can only exist in relationship
to the imago Dei. But this is what makes Sartre’s metaphysical treatment of the sovereign
decision all the more peculiar. He condemns the failed atheism of French radicalism and accuses
their brand of secular humanism of sublimating a theological view of morality, but then, in what
appears to be a blatant contradiction of this view, he depicts the freely made choices of beingfor-itself as the ontological origin of moral law. Like the divine creator of the universe, the
existential subject makes self-ratifying choices ex nihilo, but these choices combine the
nothingness, or pure potentiality, of being-for-itself with the autonomous self-presence of beingin-itself to form universally binding laws. In this manner, the sovereign individual unwittingly
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regards his decisions as reality-making, just as, in The Sacrament of Language, the oath refers to
God’s ability to speak reality into being. The following passage from Existentialism is a
Humanism reveals the tacit illogic of Sartre’s philosophical thought:
the first effect of existentialism is to make every man conscious of what he is, and to
make him solely responsible for his own existence. And when we say that man is
responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own
individuality, but that he is responsible for all men. … When we say that man chooses
himself, not only do we mean that each of us must choose himself, but also that in
choosing himself, he is choosing for all men. In fact, in creating the man each of us wills
ourselves to be, there is not a single one of our actions that does not at the same time
create an image of man as we think he ought to be.60
The free individual as being-for-itself is every moment condemned to carve out the boundaries of
human identity, but, in Sartre’s opinion, one should never in bad faith regard those boundaries as
immutable laws. To become in-itself-for-itself—Sartre’s description of God—is impossible
because nothing can be at once absolutely free and ontologically fixed, as we will recall from
Being and Nothingness. Every decision signifies the human being as a universal concept in ways
that exclude opposing representations of humanity, but these choices can never do so in ways
that authorize as legally binding one representation of humanity over competing representations
of humanity. For this reason, materialistic atheism ought to result in decisions that inherently
lack the metaphysical authority of law. Yet Sartre describes the existential subject as a
“legislator” who chooses “what humanity as a whole should be.” 61 Under this view, the subject’s
decisions are not regarded as arbitrary representations totally lacking the metaphysical force of
law, but as self-originating instances of being-in-itself-for-itself, legally binding ontic realities
that force the legislator to recognize “his own full and profound responsibility.” 62 Following
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God’s death, the existential subject becomes the ontological origin of law; in choosing himself,
he chooses the ontic nature of mankind and its structural opposite, the nonhuman. Human nature
is subsequently ascribed the imago Dei in the secularized form of inherent rights, around which
the subject then constructs moral precepts geared toward their preservation and protection.
According to Agamben, the sovereign decision is that “through which Being founds itself
sovereignly, without anything preceding or determining it (superiorem non recognoscens) other
than its own ability not to be.”63 But the metaphysical authority of sovereign decisionism relies
not only on the absolute freedom of being-for-itself, but on the ontological impossibility of
being-in-itself-for-itself, a “zone of indistinction” where “pure potentiality and pure actuality”
become “indistinguishable.”64 When the pure potentiality of being-for-itself and the pure
actuality of being-in-itself are combined as being-in-itself-for-itself, the sovereign subject
becomes equipped with the absolute freedom to dictate, at will, the ontic nature of human
identity. Under this secularized theological view, each and every intervention divides the human
from the non-human, the imago Dei from bare life, and ratifies sovereign decision-making with
the moral authority of divine transcendence. According to Agamben, sovereign political leaders
adopt this metaphysical paradigm during times of emergency to justify their suspension of
constitutional law, claiming these legislative powers as their own. Sartre’s existentialism mirrors
the secularized theological view of state power described by Agamben in what appears to be an
outright betrayal of materialistic atheism. He says that “[c]hoosing to be this or that is to affirm
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at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. We always
choose the good.”65
In the face of God’s death, which Carl Schmitt frames as the deauthorization of
constitutional law, both Sartre and Schmitt transfer the moral authority of God to the sovereign
individual, who now dictates the boundaries of human nature at the expense of lesser, nonhuman beings. As the ontological origin of moral law, the sovereign decision ratifies its
representations of mankind through the mere fact of their being chosen. In other words, moral
authority follows juridical valuations of the imago Dei, which itself is the product of free choices
that every individual is “condemned” to make. 66 Agamben, of course, dismisses sovereign
decisionism as a secularized theological view bereft of true metaphysical authority, but Sartre, by
contrast, acknowledges the impossibility of being-in-itself-for-itself at the same time that he
imagines a decisionist philosophy based entirely on the logic of being-in-itself-for-itself. “I’ve
retained one single thing to do with the existence of God,” Sartre admitted near the end of a long
philosophical career, “and that is Good and Evil as absolutes.” 67 But these are not moral
principles based on the transcendental will of God; they are absolutes “in the midst of the
relative,” he says, freely chosen moral laws based on his personal valuations of human identity. 68
In his posthumously published Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre criticizes the moral
philosophy of Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, people will arrive at categorical imperatives
through logical deduction, universal moral principles that are true for all people under any
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circumstance. But, “[c]ontrary to Kant, both Sartre and de Beauvoir insist upon freedom from the
moral authority of any putative God, Reason, or any other absolute standard by which we might
judge our actions,” writes Gail Linsenbard; “Both philosophers argue that one is always free to
reject whatever standard is presented; this is why on their view freedom truly is itself a value.”69
As Sartre writes in Existentialism and Human Emotions, “Nowhere is it written that Good exists,
and that we must not lie; because the fact is we are on a plane where there are only men.” 70 And
as Sartre again writes in Notebooks for an Ethics, “Man is the source of good and evil and judges
himself in the name of the good and evil he creates.” 71 Failing to achieve the philosophical aims
of materialistic atheism, Sartre transfers the moral authority of being-in-itself-for-itself to
mankind. On the one hand, he lambastes those who, in bad faith, essentialize their own identity
to become like God, but, on the other hand, he unwittingly regards the free decisions of beingfor-itself as lawmaking instantiations of being-in-itself-for-itself, where pure potentiality and
pure actuality combine as “relative absolutes,” or individually chosen laws. Sartre disavows
being-in-itself-for-itself as an impossible fantasy, but he then commits himself to premises that
logically result in the fantastic. How Sartre misses the logical consequences of his combined
philosophical assertions is unclear, but he inadvertently reinscribes in materialistic atheism the
precise notion that he set out to critique, correct, and eliminate. Sartre announces the death of
God with a philosophical flourish and then transfers divine authority to the sovereign subject.
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The theological force of sovereign decisionism is made explicit in Sartre’s 1961 preface
to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. “This stunning essay … is one of Sartre’s most
vivid and brutal pieces of writing, both in its argument and its worldview,” says Ronald
Aronson; it begins by “denouncing colonial violence, asserts that its damage was being undone
by the natives’ own violence, and then celebrates that violence being turned against
Europeans.”72 As Sartre himself writes in The Wretched of the Earth, “no one can rob, enslave,
or kill their fellow human beings without committing a crime,” so European colonizers “establish
the principle that the colonized are not fellow human beings. Our strike force has been … given
orders to reduce the inhabitants of the annexed territory to the level of superior monkey.” 73 The
colonizer establishes political sovereignty in captured territories by animalizing the colonized
natives, drawing a division between the human and non-human, the imago Dei and bare life
under a zone of indistinction that endows the sovereign decision with its metaphysical,
lawmaking force. “I am not claiming that it is impossible to change human beings into
animals,”74 Sartre assures his audience. Because representational constructs bear out the same
real-world application as ontic reality under the decisionist philosophy of Sartre’s existentialist
worldview, the transformation of human being into animal is only too plausible; as we have
already seen, moral laws are relative absolutes, for Sartre, freely made decisions endowed with
the secularized theological force of the imago Dei.
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According to this view, every subject is captive to sovereign decision making, a zero sum
game of being-for-others that necessarily produces human identity at the expense of bare life, or
the non-human other. Sartre asserts in Being and Nothingness that to be free is to limit another
person’s freedom, that being-for-itself seeks to preserve its personhood by “making an object out
of the Other.”75 The other “puts me out of play and strips me of my transcendences by refusing to
‘join in,’”76 Sartre writes, rejecting my personal account of human identity in favor of their own
account. As representational exclusions, the animalized victims of anthropogenesis can only ever
reclaim their humanity by inflicting violence against their oppressors. This is why, in his famous
dispute with Albert Camus over the ethico-political value of revolutionary violence, Sartre
argues that “the limit of one right (that is, of one freedom) is another right (that is, another
freedom) and not some ‘human nature,’” or unchanging essence, that exists apart from the
choices of being-for-itself.77 Defending your humanity, Sartre argues, will also have
dehumanizing effects.
Sartre makes this point in response to Camus’s assertion that communist concentration
camps—and Sartre’s loyal support of the Soviet Union—are morally unjustifiable. “Absolute
freedom,” Camus writes in his 1951 essay The Rebel, which prompted the initial conflict with
Sartre and resulted in their eventual falling out, “is the right of the strongest to dominate.
Therefore it prolongs the conflicts that profit by injustice. Absolute justice,” by contrast,
“destroys freedom.”78 Sartre believed that murder was morally justifiable in the context of
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political revolution if the revolutionary act liberated the oppressed person from their
animalization under a hegemonic regime. In direct contrast with Sartre’s antagonistic view of
intersubjectivity, Camus wrote that “we have to live and let live,” 79 in the sense that our lives can
be carried out in isolation without directly impacting our neighbor’s wellbeing. As we have
already seen, however, Sartre did not believe there was any such middle ground. “If you are not
victims,” he asserts, “then you are unquestionably executioners.” 80 For Sartre, humanity only
ever exists at the expense of the nonhuman, and, likewise, the dehumanized are only able to
recover their humanity at the expense of an oppressor. At the center of this zero sum conflict are
competing representations of the imago Dei, relative valuations of human identity that legitimize
morality through self-authorizing choices.
But Sartre’s idea of a self-authorizing choice—which is to say, a divisive signification
that, in bad faith, assumes the authority of ontological difference—is a contradiction in terms.
According to Sartre, “the absolute [i]s a product of the relative”—so being-in-itself is a product
of being-for-itself—but this means that the absolute is formed by “the decision [one] takes with
regard to other men.”81 The sovereign decision instantiates being-in-itself-for-itself by replacing
God with human identity, or the imago Dei. This is why Sartre can declare with confidence “that
killing a man is wrong. Is directly, absolutely wrong,” 82 and at the same time declare, in what
appears to be a blatant contradiction of this statement, that we “can never choose evil. We always
choose the good.”83 Human identity and the sovereign decision go hand-in-hand: every decision
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produces the human being and only humans have the power of sovereign decision making.
Therefore, people are technically unable to commit, say, an act of murder, for example, because
the act itself reduces the victim to a non-human status. Sartre replaces God with mankind as the
moral center of the universe; the free individual ratifies the value of their decisions by making
whatever choices they make. In short, the sovereign individual can do no wrong.
Sartre condemns this authoritarian behavior in Being and Nothingness as an impossible
fantasy conducted in bad faith, but, as he later confesses to de Beauvoir, “[i]n Being and
Nothingness I set out reasons for my denial of God’s existence that were not actually the real
reasons.”84 So it may be that Sartre secretly envied the moral authority that comes with being-initself-for-itself. This would explain the contradictions that emerge from a close examination of
his work. In fairness to Sartre, entirely ridding oneself of moral commitments is no easy task
and, as Sartre admits to de Beauvoir, fully realizing the aims of materialistic atheism is “a very
long-term affair.”85 It requires considerable work to recognize the full effect of God’s absence on
the world. That Sartre failed to realize its fullness is evident from the metaphysical authority he
attributes to sovereign choice. It appears that Sartre was not entirely able to abandon his belief in
sacred human identity, but without a God in heaven to create the imago Dei, sacred human
identity had to be severed from its divine source. For this reason, human rights could no longer
be understood on theological grounds, but had to be seen, by contrast, as self-originating, a priori
realities that have no source of authorization outside of the mere fact of their existence. Sartrean
existentialism weaves itself into a tangled web of contradiction, preserving the imago Dei while
eliminating God. The result of this operation is a secularized theological view of sovereign moral
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choice. At the center of Sartrean existentialism is a God-surrogate—the sovereign subject—who,
in keeping with Agamben’s critique, believes themselves to be capable of conjuring reality into
being.
Hemingway’s Youth as an Oak Park Congregationalist
Having conducted a philosophical reading of Sartre’s life and work to establish the
theoretical logic behind sovereign moral choices, I now change direction with these building
blocks in place to conduct a biographical study of Hemingway, whose childhood influences led
him down a similar path of secularization. Like Sartre, Hemingway was born into a religious
environment structured around Christianity. The spiritual influence of Hemingway’s youth
spanned multiple generations of his family. Grandfather Hemingway, Anson Tyler, for example,
was a Civil War veteran who converted to Christianity in 1859 and later attended Wheaton
Academy, an Illinois college founded by Wesleyan abolitionists. Anson met his wife Adelaide,
the only grandmother Hemingway knew, during a campus prayer meeting, and the two raised as
devout Protestants six children that included Hemingway’s father, Clarence. Strongly “opposed
to such habits as smoking, drinking, dancing, and card playing,” Anson would become general
secretary of the Chicago YMCA whose evangelical focus “confirmed his deeply felt
spirituality,” as Hemingway biographer Mary Dearborn writes. 86 Hemingway’s maternal
grandfather, Ernest Hall, another Civil War veteran, was a pillar of Grace Episcopal Church in
Oak Park, Illinois who assembled the family and household servants every morning to kneel in
communal prayer. The Halls lived across the street from the Hemingways, so Ernest’s parents,
Grace Hall and Clarence Hemingway, would grow up in close quarters and eventually unite in
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holy matrimony as devout members of the First Congregational Church. Ernest himself was
baptized and confirmed in the church, and would even become a member of the Plymouth
League, a Christian organization that met every Sunday evening to organize community outreach
programs. Steeped in a religious environment first carved out by his grandparents, Ernest was
well primed for a life of spiritual devotion. Larry Grimes declares that “Family and church
marched young Ernest double time into the army of Christ.” 87
He was baptized Ernest Miller Hemingway by Dr. William E. Barton of the First
Congregational Church of Oak Park on October 1st, 1899. As Hemingway biographer Carlos
Baker records, both of these names were taken from Grace’s side of the family—“Ernest for his
grandfather Hall, and Miller for his great-uncle, the bedstead manufacturer. After the ceremony
Grace wrote piously that the child had been carried ‘as an offering unto the Lord, to receive his
name and hence forth be counted as one of God’s little lambs.’” 88 Shortly after, the family would
start attending an affiliated church led by pastor William J. Norton so that Grace, a former New
York City opera singer, could serve as the choirmaster. It was here at the Third Congregational
Church of Oak Park that Hemingway and his sister Marcelline received their first communion.
The two would also participate in a Bible-reading competition hosted by the youth group, and
though neither of them would win the competition, Marcelline later wrote in her memoir that she
and Ernest “passed a detailed test on the Bible reading and [they] both learned a lot.” 89
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Ernest and Marcelline transferred back to the First Congregational Church in 1915, where
they attended the sermons of Reverend Barton throughout their junior and senior years of high
school. Barton was part of an accomplished family; his sister was Red Cross founder, Clara
Barton, and his son, Bruce Barton, would author a controversial bestseller titled The Man
Nobody Knows (1925). Presenting Jesus as the ancient founder of modern business practices, the
book promoted what Grimes calls the “Masculine Christianity” preached by Bruce’s father. 90
Barton himself enjoyed a considerable renown and was even invited to speak to President
Woodrow Wilson in 1917. Not surprisingly, Oak Park committed itself to the theological
teachings of this religious powerhouse, whose sermons were often reprinted in the local
newspaper, Oak Leaves. There seems to be little question, in fact, that Reverend Barton was the
spiritual lifeblood of Oak Park. If Hemingway believed in Christianity—and we certainly have
reason to believe that he did—it was first presented to him in the form of Barton’s Christianity.
As Hemingway biographer Michael Reynolds explains, “it was not possible in Oak Park to be
properly baptized, graduated, married or buried unless Rev. Barton conducted the ceremony.” 91
As to the exact nature of Barton’s theological influence, Grimes asserts that the “hell-fire
Protestantism associated with the Midwest” was abandoned by citizens of Oak Park in pursuit of
Barton’s “forward-thinking” approach to religion, which sought to establish the kingdom of
heaven on earth in the form of an otherwise secular medium known plainly as social progress. 92
The Oak Park community lacked the theological burden of original sin and, as a direct
consequence of this view, they understood Christian salvation as a practice in self-mastery—
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which is to say, the responsible application of free will—not the redemptive intervention of a
deity. According to Grimes, Barton’s particular strand of Protestantism was
a lumpy mix of liberal theology, Victorian morality, and sentimental piety. These terms
describe the religious ethos of Oak Park during Hemingway’s formative years and, taken
together, they constitute a “civil religion.” Between the years 1899 and 1920, neither
religion nor the social order in Oak Park were static. During these two decades of rapid
growth and change, Oak Park grew from a small town of 10,000 in 1900 to a city of
35,000 in 1917. As it grew, it tried hard to maintain the myth of its Edenic origins and
perpetuate itself as a Covenant community of the early New England order. Essential to
the myth were the notions of human innocence, healthy-mindedness, social progress, and
optimism, all hallmarks of liberal theology. Blended with Victorian morality, sentimental
piety, and expanded into a civil religion, this progressive Protestantism provided just the
formula required to maintain the myth. For those who could affirm it, and they seem to
have been a majority, this religio-mythic perspective on life in Oak Park had great
power.93
Among the fundamental tenets of Barton’s liberal theology was the belief that human nature is
not yet completed at birth. We become fully human through morally righteous decisions that
build up our ethical character in the image of Christ. When everyone in Christian society behaves
like the risen lord, they “bring the kingdom of God ever closer to existence on this earth. Nothing
but human weakness”—what Grimes qualifies as “a failure of the will”— “can prevent the
triumph of goodness in private lives or in the public domain.” 94 Because the residents of Oak
Park likened themselves to John Winthrop’s famous city on a hill, their sense of pride and
community obligation drove the parents of this tightly knit congregation to indoctrinate their
children with the theological teachings of Reverend Barton, their spiritual leader.
Self-mastery, for Barton and his followers, was a deeply gendered concept. Making
morally righteous decisions was considered a masculine virtue, while immoral decision making
was considered a feminine, or effeminate, vice. Under this theological rubric—where freedom
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was a sign of virility and masculinity a practice in sovereign decisionism—Reverend Barton
fostered a “muscular” Christianity that measured moral character on a “masculine-feminine
scale.”95 It is only through the sheer force of will that one develops Christian character, so the
community pressure to live righteously was bound up with traditional gender expectations.
Grimes tells us that, for the residents of Oak Park,
Masculine Christianity was moral Christianity. It presupposed a God who had provided
humans with the capacity to do good if they will it in fellowship with that God … No
doctrine of special election sorts anyone out for eternal life, and no doctrine of total
depravity condemns the rest to hellfire. Sin (an ontological state) is gone from the
emergent modernist church; only sins (matters of morality) remain. 96
Grimes distinguishes between competing theological worldviews: one that frames sin as the
depraved ontological state of mankind, and one that frames sin as an isolated free choice in no
way determined by humanity’s fallen nature. Under the first theological system, a person
overcomes their sinful nature by way of divine intervention. Under the second theological
system, people are absolutely free to determine their own moral character without divine
interference. To become the man he wanted to be, Hemingway would have to take possession of
his identity, a moral pursuit that framed masculinity as the sovereign exercise of free will. For
Hemingway and the other residents of Oak Park, the morally upright citizen was someone who
exhibited total control over his destiny, so to be found lacking in this quality cast a shadow of
doubt over that person’s purported manhood. This might explain why Hemingway had such a
vexed relationship with his mother. Biographers tell us that Grace was head of the household, the
breadwinner of the family, and that she emasculated Clarence with her domineering personality.
“Hemingway affected an exaggerated bravado” as a result of this, “and pursued activities that
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would exhibit male prowess” to compensate for the “early insecurity” he felt around his gender
identity, a feeling that developed, J. Gerald Kennedy writes, from viewing “his father’s passivity
and ‘cowardice.’”97
But this characterization of Clarence only gives a partial depiction of the man, for
Hemingway’s father was otherwise well practiced in the art of masculinity, traditionally
conceived. He trained the young Ernest in so-called manly activities like camping, fishing, and
hunting, but also and most importantly, he trained Ernest in the practice of upright moral
behavior. According to Dearborn, “Dr. Hemingway taught his children about life outdoors. …
Ernest learned how to survive in the wilderness, how to walk like an Indian, how to preserve and
stuff animals after they were dead, how to tie flies to catch trout, and countless other lessons
about the out-of-doors.”98 Clarence also “forbade all recreational activity on the Lord’s Day,”
Baker tells us; “attendance at church and Sunday school was compulsory. Major infractions of
the rules were swiftly punished with a razor strop … followed by injunctions to kneel and ask
[for] God’s forgiveness.” 99 According to Dearborn, Clarence was by far “the more rigid and
serious about his faith.” 100 He was also a stricter disciplinarian than Grace and regularly brought
Ernest to tears for failing to live up to his moral expectations. This is not to say, however, that
Grace was uninterested in Ernest’s spiritual upbringing. To the contrary, “Grace called
Hemingway back into step with true soldiers of the cross” after his moral failures “by reminding
him of his heritage and urging him to measure up to … the standards set for him by his ancestors,
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particularly Reverend William Edward Miller and Ernest Hall.”101 It would seem that Grace, as
much as Clarence, raised the boy to emulate the masculine ideals of his spiritual forebears, ideals
that in Oak Park took the form of self-determination, self-mastery, and moral rectitude. 102 Grimes
says that “Oak Park took quite literally the biblical injunction to raise up children in the way they
should go. And in the case of Ernest Hemingway, the community was shocked, angered, and hurt
when it seemed in later years that in spite of its best efforts he had chosen another way.” 103
A Change in Hemingway’s Religious Temperament
The young Ernest would feel morally conflicted when River Forest High School nearly
expelled him for authoring an underground publication titled The Jazz Journal, which attributed
salacious jokes to various members of the teaching staff. Not surprisingly, Grace and Clarence
chose to let Ernest face the consequences of this poorly made decision. He would not actually be
expelled from school for circulating the publication, but Ernest seriously resented his parents for
failing to intervene in the matter. Their inaction exacerbated Ernest’s growing distaste for, what
Grimes calls, the stifling “Victorian morality” of Oak Park Congregationalism and ignited a kind
of rebellious streak in Ernest that he directed toward institutional authority. 104
Ernest was urged by his father to attend Oberlin College with his sister, Marcelline, but
he would reject his father’s recommendation on principle and skip higher education altogether.
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Clarence was nevertheless invested in his son’s future, so he reached out to his brother Tyler
Hemingway, who wrangled Ernest a summer apprenticeship at The Kansas City Star. To his
surprise, Ernest was hired by Henry J. Haskell, one of Tyler’s old school mates who was now
editor-in-chief at the Star, to start a full-time position in the fall. During his time at the Star,
Hemingway’s adolescent rebellion matured into an egotistical battle for his parents’ respect.
“Kansas City represented the first time he had lived away from home,” Dearborn writes, “and it
was a liberation. He would begin a lifetime habit of serious drinking, he would write every day
except Sunday and be paid for it, and he would fall in love for the first time.” 105 But Hemingway
still felt the lingering expectations of his former Oak Park community. It would seem that friends
and family clung to an image of the boy that Hemingway rebelled against in his search for
masculine independence.
But for the young newspaper man—who was now fornicating, abusing alcohol, and
working late into the early morning—establishing autonomy as an adult also meant sloughing off
the religion of his youth. In January 1918, Hemingway wrote home to his mother from Kansas
City in a letter that would poorly mask his growing skepticism about religion. Apparently, some
time had passed since their previous correspondence, so Hemingway complains that they “were
cut off for a while” because the “coal shortage [wa]s still pretty bad.” 106 Whether or not
Hemingway’s excuse was legitimate, he clearly felt resentment toward his mother for criticizing
his lack of religious devotion. He writes to her in an almost mocking tone:
Now dry those tears Mother and cheer up. You will have to find something better than
that to worry about. Don’t worry or cry or fret about my not being a good Christian. I am
just as much as ever and pray every night and believe just as hard so cheer up! Just
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because I’m a cheerful Christian ought not to bother you. The reason I don’t go to church
on Sunday is because always I have to work till 1 a.m. getting out the Sunday Star and
every once in a while till 3 and 4 a.m. And I never open my eyes Sunday morning until
12:30 noon anyway. So you see it isn’t because I don’t want to. You know I don’t rave
about religion but am as sincere a Christian as I can be. Sunday is the one day in the week
that I can get my sleep out. Also Aunt Arabell’s church is a very well dressed stylish one
with a not to be loved preacher and I feel out of place. 107
On the one hand, the passage feels self-assuring, as if Ernest were losing faith in his childhood
religion but is too afraid to admit the fact to himself. It may have been that Ernest was not quite
ready to take ownership of his budding atheism by confronting the matter head on. He writes to
his mother that he prays “every night” and believes “just as hard,” that he’s “sincere” and wants
to go to church but is not able to because of his schedule. It would also appear that Ernest
genuinely missed the First Congregational Church of Oak Park; he feels “out of place” at Aunt
Arabell’s church and bemoans the fact that they dress differently and have a “not to be loved
preacher” who clearly, in the young man’s opinion, failed to live up to Reverend Barton.
On the other hand, the passage comes across as defensive. Ernest condescends to his
mother and trivializes her moral concerns ostensibly because she discourages his sinful desires to
skip church, fornicate, and abuse alcohol—desires that Ernest describes with the euphemism
“cheerful” to justify his immoral choices. He distinguishes those who “rave about religion” from
level-headed Christians like himself who pray to God with sincerity but also have the good sense
to live their own lives. To master one’s destiny is among the primary theological lessons of
Hemingway’s youth. He seems to genuinely miss the spiritual leadership of Reverend Barton,
but the moral strictures of Oak Park Congregationalism were too closely associated with parental
control for a young man in search of his independence. With Hemingway’s transition into
adulthood—which he hoped to realize in the form of masculine self-determination—came
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reasons to eschew his childhood Christianity, which embodied a host of community and parental
expectations.
To complicate matters further were theological notions of masculinity that conflated selfmastery, or the sovereign demonstration of free will, with moral goodness. You become a man,
according to Reverend Barton, by taking control of your will in the service of God. But simply
conforming to the “Victorian morality” of Oak Park Congregationalism was no different, for
Ernest, than submitting to his mother’s control, an emasculating practice that the 19-year-old was
trying his best to avoid. Ernest was therefore faced with a catch-22: he could either take
ownership of his manhood by rejecting the moral expectations of his parents, or he could
conform to the masculine ideals of Oak Park morality and, in the process of doing so, abandon
his quest for masculine autonomy. Because of the unique structuring of Oak Park theology—
which combined moral imperatives with the contradictory imperative to choose your own way—
Hemingway was forced to side with one of two extremes. But as the young professional now
living on his own discovered, mastering your will, in the theology of Reverend Barton,
apparently did not mean taking control of your life; it meant choosing the path that best fulfills
God’s will, which, for Hemingway, meant conforming to the life already mapped out for him by
his parents. The 1918 letter to his mother reveals a strong—if passive aggressive—desire to
break free from the bondage of parental authority, a masculine proclivity that prompted Ernest to
reconsider his religious commitments. But, in his quest for manhood, Ernest was faced with a
dilemma: how does he forgo the religious duty to perform upright moral behavior and, at the
same time, retain his masculine identity? The mixed messages of Hemingway’s theological
upbringing instilled him with conflicting impulses. How he eventually overcame this conflict
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would be decided years later during the war, where a brief but very serious encounter with death
forced the young man to acknowledge his diminishing faith.
Grimes concludes that the atrocities Hemingway witnessed as a Red Cross ambulance
driver in the first World War turned him away from Oak Park Congregationalism but not away
from Christianity as a whole. “When the liberal theology, sentimental piety, and Victorian
morality of Hemingway’s childhood were forced to do battle against the irrational forces and
terrible realities of World War I and its aftermath, they failed Hemingway in the fray;” rather
than “turn to atheism when Protestantism fails him,” however, “Hemingway converts to
Catholicism … and continues to attend mass and say prayers until his death.” 108 Grimes admits
that Hemingway experienced “a profound crisis of faith” during the war, but “Hemingway’s
descent into darkness” does not result in the loss of religious belief. 109 Disillusioned by the war,
Hemingway turns from the optimism of Barton’s liberal theology to the timeworn traditions of
Roman Catholicism, whose doctrine or original sin, H.R. Stoneback and Matthew Nickel
contend, helps to make sense of the death and destruction Hemingway witnessed during the war.
Nickel agrees with Grimes that “Hemingway never rejected certain fundamental principles of
Christianity; he rejected Oak Park’s theologically liberal version” in favor of Catholic
orthodoxy.110 “[W]itnessing the dead bodies, hearing the injured soldiers and the gun-fire, and
then being blown up” himself was simply too much for Hemingway to reconcile with Barton’s
theological teaching that spiritual perfection is achieved through self-mastery, or the sovereign
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exercise of free will.111 “[W]hen he moved to Paris in 1921, [Hemingway] was immersed in a
place very familiar with the imperfectibility of human life, with the acceptance of evil and
original sin, and he was surrounded by the presence of a Church that allowed for a ritualistic and
disciplined redemption.”112
Like Nickel, Stoneback accuses biographers of misrepresenting Hemingway’s Catholic
allegiance as strictly nominal and asserts that before “his twenty-eighth birthday (in 1927),”
Hemingway had already “accepted the tradition, the authority, and the discipline of Rome and
formalized his conversion” to Roman Catholicism. 113 But Hemingway was wounded in war at
just eighteen years of age; this leaves nearly a decade between his spiritual disillusionment in
1918 and his Catholic conversion in 1927. Both Stoneback and Nickel point to a canonical
inquest of the Parisian Archbishopric in 1927 that formally recognized Hemingway as a Catholic
in good standing just one month prior to his second marriage. According to Nickel, the “inquest
should resolve any doubt the biographers may have had regarding Hemingway’s status as a
Catholic up until his marriage to Pauline.”114 But this is a dubious claim; the inquest only
accounts for the month prior to their marriage and leaves open the convenience of its motivation,
telling us nothing about the preceding nine years. Nickel assigns “the moment of [Hemingway’s]
conversion” to 1918, writing that “until his marriage to the devoutly Catholic Pauline Pfeiffer in
1927, Hemingway read and learned about the Catholic Church and its rituals, travelled to sacred
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places, and incorporated this knowledge, emotional experience, and spiritual understanding into
his writing.”115
Nickel would have us believe that Hemingway was a Catholic believer throughout this
entire period, as if he had directly swapped Oak Park Congregationalism for Roman Catholicism
in one fell swoop. Stoneback, however, describes Hemingway’s conversion as a gradual process,
writing that after Hemingway’s “near-death experience on an Italian battlefield in 1918, and
continuing with increasing intensity through the early and mid-1920s, Hemingway’s personal
religious pilgrimage takes him … far beyond the social-gospel” of Oak Park Congregationalism
and “into the ever-deepening discovery of Catholicism.” 116 At no point did Hemingway doubt the
truthfulness of Christianity; as Stoneback, Nickel, and even Grimes contend, he simply doubted
whether his theology—be it Protestant or Catholic—best explained his religious orientation.
These claims challenge the popular view that Hemingway lost his faith after a brush with
death during the war. Scott Donaldson, for example, writes that Hemingway’s “upbringing had
provided him with a rosy picture of existence that did not square with the brutality of modern life
he found everywhere about him.”117 The war “served as a catalyst in crystallizing Ernest’s
disillusionment with Oak Park religion,” so the young man, Donaldson writes, “rebelled against
his religious heritage.” 118 Biographer Jeffrey Meyers likewise argues that while Hemingway’s
sisters “remained religious throughout their lives,” Ernest “attempted to eradicate in himself
every vestige of Oak Park” after leaving it.119 Of course, the evidence would show that
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Hemingway was baptized by a Catholic priest who walked between the aisles of wounded
soldiers at the field hospital in Fornaci, Italy. But, as Carlos Baker notes, the baptism failed to
result in a genuine conversion for Hemingway, and, following the war, the young man would
show evidence of religious doubt. In support of this claim, Baker records a conversation
Hemingway had with a British infantry officer who, while contemplating the consequences of
war, quoted Shakespeare’s The Second Part of Henry the Fourth: “By my troth, I care not; a man
can die but once; we owe God a death … and let it go which way it will, he that dies this year is
quit for the next.”120 (This same line would be quoted in Hemingway’s 1936 short story “The
Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber” by the white hunter Robert Wilson, whom Hemingway
presents as the model of masculinity). According to Baker, the line resonated with Hemingway,
who, in a letter written home to his parents, had recently espoused a similar, fatalistic view of
dying.
Personally, I agree with critics and biographers who cast Hemingway’s near-death
experience during the war as a catalyst that forces his religious doubts to surface. It appears that
when people confront the end of life as a palpable, immediate threat to their existence rather
than, say, as a distant, abstract possibility that will no doubt happen to a much older, significantly
altered version of themselves, comforting narratives of immortality crack under the pressure.
Even devout religious believers will sometimes experience moments of panic when death
approaches, as if the promise of a spiritual afterlife is finally weighed against the uncertainty of
the moment by someone who, until that very instance, never really believed they were going to
die—separated, as they were, by time and the pacifying hypothesis that someone else—someone
older and better prepared, perhaps—would take their place on the chopping block. Hemingway
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was a mere eighteen years old when death first confronted him as an inevitable fact of life.
Italian soldiers were dying all around him, and, after just weeks as a Red Cross ambulance
driver, Ernest was struck by a mortar shell that punctured his lower body in over two hundred
places. One man lay next to him dead, and another man lay just beyond him who was “badly hurt
and crying piteously,” Baker tells us, so Hemingway picked up the Italian soldier and carried
him for fifty yards before getting shot through the knees by a machine gun. 121 “He never
afterwards remembered how he covered the final hundred yards,” Baker reports, but, driven by
adrenaline, Hemingway “made it [back to the trenches,] delivered his man, and lost
consciousness.”122 He was so “thickly soaked with Italian blood that they thought at first he had
been shot through the chest” and was himself only moments away from dying. 123 But no chest
wounds were discovered.
Hemingway was treated for his leg injuries and moved to a hospital in Milan. There, he
was visited by friend and fellow reporter at The Kansas City Star, Ted Brumback, who had also
volunteered to drive ambulances during the war. Brumback wrote a letter to Hemingway’s
parents after the visit that reported on their son’s injuries and heroics. It would seem that
Hemingway’s adolescent bravado had matured into real confidence. Commenting on this
transformation, Baker writes that “experience in being blown up, in rescuing a wounded
companion, [and] in courageously enduring the pain of his wounds … had enlarged [Ernest’s]
confidence. Without loss of his endearing boyish qualities, he had suddenly taken on some of the
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qualities of manhood.”124 It would seem that moving away from home, working long hours as a
newspaper man, and saving another human life during the war gave Hemingway a sense of
ownership over his masculine identity, but it was his personal brush with death, I believe, that
finally prompted the young man to let go of his religion and spurn the moral expectations of Oak
Park. Hemingway writes home to his parents approximately three months after being
hospitalized:
There is nothing for you to worry about, because it has been fairly conclusively proved
that I can’t be bumped off. And wounds don’t matter. I wouldn’t mind being wounded
again so much because I know just what it is like. And you can only suffer so much, you
know, and it does give you an awfully satisfactory feeling to be wounded. It’s getting
beaten up in a good cause. … All the heroes are dead. And the real heroes are the parents.
Dying is a very simple thing. I’ve looked at death and really I know. If I should have died
it would have been very easy for me. Quite the easiest thing I ever did. But the people at
home do not realize that. They suffer a thousand times more. … And how much better to
die in all the happy period of undisillusioned youth, to go out in a blaze of light, than to
have your body worn out and old and illusions shattered. So, dear old family, don’t ever
worry about me! It isn’t bad to be wounded: I know, because I’ve experienced it. And if I
die, I’m lucky. Does all that sound like the crazy, wild kid you sent out to learn about the
world a year ago? It is a great old world, though, and I’ve always had a good time and the
odds are all in favor of coming back to the old place. 125
To be sure, much of what Ernest says here still smacks of youthful immaturity, for, yet again, the
young man feels a need to posture. He calls his former self a “crazy, wild kid,” as if adopting a
condescending attitude toward his past self will demonstrate to his parents that he has grown
more mature. At the same time, however, his tone strikes me as somewhat tongue-in-cheek, like
someone who uses humor to cushion an otherwise serious comment. Perhaps Ernest knew his
observations about personal growth would come across as needy to his parents, revealing that he
was in fact desperate for their approval, so he engages in self-mockery to mask what is really a
genuine comment. He refers to his earlier self as an “undisillusioned youth” who, protected by a
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lack of worldly experience, has not yet had his “illusions shattered,” but we know from the
context of his letter that this is not the case. Ernest stared death in the eyes and breathed in its
stench; his ironic self-awareness is meant only to appease his parents, who make use of a
hackneyed platitude—namely, that maturity comes with age—to maintain their parental
authority over the young man. Obviously, Ernest knew that his parents were partial to an ageist
view of maturity, so, feeling insecure about their response but still desiring to assert the value of
his personal growth, he deploys a set of rhetorical strategies to persuade them to his side.
“Dying is a very simple thing,” Hemingway observes. Death itself is never actually
experienced because, at the moment you die, you have already ceased to exist. Our illusions of
immortality—which is to say, the sense of metaphysical permanence that so many of us cling to
in a futile effort to make meaning of our existence—only serve to mask the meaninglessness of
our lives. Whether we die today or fifty years from now, a young Hemingway seems to observe,
really makes no difference, as each of us, regardless of how long we exist in the world, spends
the rest of eternity in oblivion. A person’s death might be unexpected, or it may be anticipated
and drawn out, preceded by fear and agony, but in both instances the light goes out; each
person’s fate is ultimately the same. What differences do exist are only encountered by the living
and, even then, a longer life, stripped of its illusions, is not to be preferred. Significantly, the
young man takes no solace in the possibility of an afterlife but instead confronts meaninglessness
head on.
Writing to his parents that death “is a very simple thing,” Hemingway appears to
renounce his religious beliefs at a time when no one, not even Reverend Barton himself, would
question the young man’s masculinity. As Baker reports, Reverend Barton sent a letter to
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Hemingway after his injury saying that “the bell on the First Congregational Church was rung
every day at noon for the boys who were at war,” and Hemingway, among them, had proven
himself to be a war hero.126 So this was Hemingway’s opportunity: he could assert his
independence and abandon Oak Park Congregationalism without casting a shadow of doubt over
his masculine identity. With a certain degree of leverage under his belt and, tactfully, without
being too direct, that is, Hemingway asserts his masculine independence at the opportune
moment, and he does so from what is ostensibly an atheistic perspective. It is only after
establishing his masculine identity in a non-religious setting that Hemingway is able to confess
to his atheism.
Hemingway the Existentialist
That being said, I take Nickel’s point. To “presume that because Hemingway rejected
Oak Park’s Congregationalism, Hemingway must have rejected all Christianity” is a logical
misstep; “these interpretations,” he writes, “assume that one cause of Hemingway’s World War I
trauma was an inevitable abandonment of a traditionally religious faith … as if no man had ever
been wounded in war before.” 127 To reject Congregationalism is not to reject Christianity per se,
and, likewise, to reject Christianity is not to reject theism. Moreover, to assume that the
brutalities of war or even a near-death experience would necessarily result in a loss of faith is to
exclude a range of reasonable human responses to death and bloody warfare. Over the centuries,
religion has been used incessantly to justify war, and, indeed, a person may very well find logical
justification for military killings in various Christian theodicies. When confronted with their own
mortality, a great many more will be comforted by the promise of an afterlife. So there is good
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reason to believe that Hemingway’s confrontation with death would have strengthened rather
than weakened his belief in God. As Nickel himself writes, the “possibility of evil,” death, and
destruction in Hemingway’s fiction is not presented as a reason to “deny belief, but as an
affirmation of the need to believe.” 128 And yet, as the letter written home to his parents after
being injured during the war indicates, Hemingway does in fact appear to have lost his faith.
“I’ve looked at death and really I know. If I should have died it would have been very easy for
me,” 129 not because Hemingway had full confidence that he would be entering the afterlife, but
because, in his confrontation with death, he saw that life does not possess lasting significance.
He realized that slipping into nonexistence is not something he would actually experience, and
that letting go of life would be easy enough, as it was not really his to keep in the first place.
“But the people at home do not realize that,”130 he observes, for as we have already discovered,
the people at home were deeply religious and therefore blind to the inherent meaninglessness of
their mortal existence. Hemingway looks death square in the eyes and what he sees there shatters
the illusion of immortality.
There is reason to believe, in light of this, that Hemingway’s religious disillusionment
during the war—which is to say, the deeply felt atheism he experienced after a confrontation
with death and his own mortality—resulted in his development of an existentialist or, more
exactly, a Sartrean point of view. Killinger convincingly argues that throughout the 1920s and
30s Hemingway produced work revolving around Sartrean themes. Like his fictional heroes,
Hemingway confronted mortality on the battlefield and, thereafter, death arguably became the
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central theme of his writing. “The Hemingway hero,” he observes, is “very much alone in this
world, because he has no God and no real brother.” 131 Confronted with the secular implications
of death, these code heroes, as they are often referred to, take control of their identities and, in
true Sartrean fashion, assert mastery over their will, lest they relapse, Killinger writes, “into
ordinary childishness.”132 With these assertions, Killinger paves the way for future scholarship on
Hemingway as a Sartrean thinker, a theme that in later years is taken up most deliberately by the
literary critic Ben Stoltzfus, who writes in his 2010 Hemingway and French Writers:
The tragedy of life and death is a dominant Hemingway theme, be it in the bullring, on
the battlefield, or in daily life, and this is one of the reasons why Sartre incorporates
Hemingway’s writing into his thinking. … Death is a leitmotif that haunts Hemingway’s
oeuvre, and titles such as Death in the Afternoon and ‘A Natural History of the Dead’ are
symptomatic of artistic, epistemological, and ontological affinities with the author of
L'Être et le néant (1943; Being and Nothingness). Nowhere is this nada—the void,
emptiness, meaninglessness—more insistent than in the two African stories that
Hemingway wrote in 1936: “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber” and “The
Snows of Kilimanjaro.”133
Significantly, the two works that Stoltzfus highlights, “The Short Happy Life of Francis
Macomber” and “The Snows of Kilimanjaro,” were composed well after Hemingway’s Catholic
marriage to Pauline in 1927 and well before their divorce in 1940. Like Killinger, Stoltzfus
provides considerable evidence that Hemingway’s work in the 1920s and 30s reflected a Sartrean
point of view, where the death of God in conjunction with one’s own mortality rendered life
inherently meaningless. Admittedly, it might be a mistake to confuse Hemingway’s personal
worldview with the worldviews exhibited by his characters, but even Death in the Afternoon,
Hemingway’s non-fictional commentary on Spanish bullfighting, reflects an atheistic view of
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death. Certainly, the author’s personal comments in this work of non-fiction should be trusted as
his own. In the following excerpt, Hemingway contrasts the Spaniard’s attitude toward death
with those held by the citizens of both England and America:
In Castille the peasant … has food, wine, his wife and children, or he has had them, but
he has no comfort, nor much capital and these possessions are not ends in themselves;
they are only a part of life and life is something that comes before death. Some one with
English blood has written: “Life is real; life is earnest, and the grave is not its goal." And
where did they bury him? and what became of the reality and the earnestness? The people
of Castille have great common sense. They could not produce a poet who would write a
line like that. They know death is the unescapable reality, the one thing any man may be
sure of; the only security; that it transcends all modern comforts and that with it you do
not need a bathtub in every American home, nor, when you have it, do you need the
radio. They think a great deal about death and when they have a religion they have one
which believes that life is much shorter than death. 134
Hemingway admires the Spaniards because they live in full view of their mortality. The
American, by contrast, is not conscious of death, so he regards his belongings as something he
truly possesses, as if they were not merely his to use before the grave swallows him up. The “one
thing any man may be sure of,” Hemingway writes, is not the eternal life of the soul, but the
sobering truth that life will come to an end. Despite growing up as a Protestant believer, and
despite having purportedly converted to Catholicism during the war, Hemingway expresses an
atheistic view of death that spans from the 1918 letter written home to his parents all the way to
his 1932 reflections in Death in the Afternoon. This, no less, was five years into his marriage
with Pauline Pfeiffer—a time when Hemingway, according to Stoneback and Nickel, was a
practicing Catholic in good standing. Without question, Ernest was affiliated with the Church
during this time, and we know that his conversion to Catholicism was at least nominal, but we
see reflected in his non-fiction writings throughout the period an atheistic view of death that
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pervades his fiction, and that for Killinger, Stoltzfus, and others conveys a Sartrean view of
nothingness.
Hemingway the Catholic
As we have already covered at some length, Nickel believes that Hemingway made a
direct transition from Protestantism to Catholicism, while Stoneback advances the more cautious
thesis that Hemingway’s Catholic conversion took place gradually between the years of 1918
and 1927, when Hemingway’s marriage to Pauline required that Hemingway officially convert to
Roman Catholicism. In both accounts, Hemingway’s reported baptism during his hospitalization
in Fornaci, Italy, his growing interest in the rituals and practices of Roman Catholicism, and his
formal recognition in 1927 as a Catholic in good standing by the Parisian Archbishopric are cited
as evidence that the writer experienced a genuine religious conversion. But as we have just seen,
Hemingway expressed an atheistic view of death as early as 1918, and this view was elaborated
in Death in the Afternoon five years after his marriage to Pauline in 1927, which was eight years
before their divorce in 1940. In Chapter Three of this dissertation, I will show that Hemingway
portrayed an atheistic view of death in his short stories and novels throughout this time. That
Hemingway expressed atheistic views during his years as a practicing Catholic is perhaps
evidence that his conversion truly was nominal, but the writer’s personal correspondences with
family, friends, and priests throughout this period reveal a more complicated picture. My task is
to square the atheistic view of death portrayed in Hemingway’s writings throughout the 1920s
and 30s with his decision to self-identify as a Catholic in multiple letters from the same period.
In a letter written on November 17, 1929 to the modernist painter and American
expatriate Waldo Peirce, Hemingway says that their mutual acquaintance, Charley Sweeney,
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would join him at the Sunday bike races, but then stopped after learning that the races were
rigged. Hemingway claims not to mind the fixed races himself as long as he does not lose any
money. He then writes: “It’s Sunday morning and got to go to church—Dimanch C’est l’Eglise
et le Vel D’Hiv— Thank God not forced to choose between them—They are wise not to compete
—Imagine the priests derriere grosse motos at St. Sulpice.” 135 The first part of the quote
translates as “Sunday it’s church and the Velodrome d’Hiver,” an indoor bike racing track near
the Eiffel Tower that Hemingway regularly attended to bet on the races; the end of the quote
translates as “Imagine the priests behind big motorcycles at St. Sulpice,” the second-largest
church in Paris, which Hemingway regularly attended with Pauline. Given his irreverent tone, it
seems obvious that Hemingway would choose to attend the bike races over Church, if not for
Pauline’s expectation that Hemingway would join her in the pews. Because the Sunday bike
races—which Hemingway liked to gamble on—would clearly be less important to an ardent
believer than attending Church, it seems plausible that Hemingway is mocking the Sunday Mass
in this letter. “Thank God not forced to choose between them,” he writes; “Imagine the priests
behind big motorcycles.”
Compare this with a letter that Hemingway wrote on July 15, 1931 to Guy Hickok, a
Paris correspondent for the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, a newspaper published in Brooklyn, New
York from 1841-1955, and you get the sense that Hemingway was an irked and even resentful
critic of the Church. Pauline was pregnant with their second child, Gregory, at the time, and
doctors were recommending a Caesarean section. Gregory’s predicted birth date was November
15th, and Pauline was planning a trip to the U.S. in August. Hemingway explains to Guy that
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they hoped to make their way from Paris to Kansas City to Piggott, Arkansas and finally to Key
West.
Original plan was for Pauline to go back to U.S in August— But she has gotten spooked
on being caught in Piggott at mercy of Doc Cone—Ex German army pharmacist 2nd
class— No hospital in Key West— Damn if we could only have it in K.W. Catholic
church if it insists on production of more Catholics by all Catholics ought to make some
provision for rolling hospital kitchens for members who have to risk death to conform to
Papal encyclicals— I wish they’d have one married Pape—you’d see how long he’d put
out those encyclicals.136
Hemingway and Pauline do not trust the family doctor in Piggott, and there are, in Hemingway’s
opinion, no suitable hospitals in Key West. 137 Frustrated that his wife is facing a life-threatening
procedure as the result of her pregnancy, Hemingway voices his disapproval of the Church’s
stance on birth control. Were the Catholic Church to sanction the use of contraceptives, Pauline
would not be pregnant again, and her life would not be at risk. In Hemingway’s opinion, the
Church is responsible for Pauline’s pregnancy, so they should either create a makeshift hospital
in the Church kitchen for his and Pauline’s convenience or the Papacy should change its stance
on birth control. Hemingway questions the moral authority of the Pope and he again addresses
the Church in an irreverent and even mocking tone. Speaking to a friend and fellow news
reporter, Hemingway does not want to lose face and risk coming across to the reading public as
the willing dupe of papal authority, so the writer creates critical distance between himself and the
Church to show Hickok and his readers at the Brooklyn Daily Eagle that, in keeping with his
masculine reputation, he makes his own decisions (Hemingway insists that Hickok not publicly
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report the affair, but he certainly would not have to insist upon his personal privacy if Hickok
was a trustworthy journalist).
It would be easy, in light of these letters, to cast Hemingway as an unbeliever who
begrudgingly attends Church to satisfy the moral expectations of his devout wife, but we can also
frame Hemingway as a sincere Catholic believer who feels embittered by the Church’s
impossible moral standards, which he continually fails to live up to. Hemingway voices a similar
sentiment about the Church’s stance on contraceptives four months later in a letter to Pauline’s
parents. He writes that “at 10 minutes to Seven Dr. Guffy decided a caeserian was the only thing
as 7 hours of labour had not moved it down a half an inch … He wanted to be sure a normal
labor was impossible since the caeserian is dangerous of course and only justifiable if altogether
necessary.”138 He then states more pointedly: “If the Church insists that I must put Pauline
through what I have just seen her through am afraid must consider myself an outlyer from now
on—‘a lesser breed without the law’ If a sovereign Pontiff bore children when not built for it he
might write a bull of exceptions.”139 Hemingway again voices his disapproval of Catholic
morality, asserting that the Papacy would change its stance on birth control if Church leaders had
to undergo childbirth themselves. Again we encounter a hint of mockery in Hemingway’s voice,
but he seems to be genuinely disappointed with himself, uttering these words under a distinct air
of sadness. It is as if Hemingway gives up hope after witnessing the pain and suffering of
Pauline’s labor. He wants to believe, he wants to be as devoutly Catholic as Pauline, he wants to
live up to the moral standards of the Church, but he is unable to square these desires with his
lived experience.
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During a moment of self-realization, Hemingway somewhat defensively admits that he is
an outlier and “lesser breed without the law.” I doubt that Hemingway would feel compelled to
make such an admission were his faith really just a matter of lip service. He solemnly refers to
himself as a lesser Catholic who is unable faithfully to endorse the encyclicals surrounding birth
control, which would likely be changed if a sovereign pontiff were to undergo childbirth himself,
according to the writer. Were Hemingway really just an unbelieving critic of the Pope who
falsely converted to Catholicism for the sake of marriage, he would probably reject the Church
outright if he felt this strongly opposed to its stance on birth control. Instead of rejecting the
Church, however, Hemingway draws a nuanced distinction between faith and obedience,
between the devout believer who, like Job,140 struggles to accept the ways of God, which he does
not agree with and cannot understand, and the obedient Catholic, who blindly submits to papal
authority. Hemingway is frustrated with the Church, and he struggles to embrace the pontiff’s
stance on birth control, but he does not renounce the faith. And yet, there are other ways to
interpret the letter. If Hemingway were truly an unbelieving critic of the Church, he might be
trying to jab the Pope without seriously injuring his relationship to Pauline’s parents, who would
likely question the legitimacy of his and their daughter’s marriage were they to find out that their
son-in-law was actually an atheist. So Hemingway’s statements of faith may be rhetorical
gestures. Both interpretations are possible.
The same is true of an unpublished letter Hemingway wrote to Father Vincent C.
Donovan where he describes himself as a genuine but inferior Catholic:
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I have always had more faith than intelligence or knowledge and I have never wanted to
be known as a Catholic writer because I know the importance of setting an example—and
I have never set a good example. … Also I am a very dumb Catholic and I have so much
faith that I hate to examine into it.141
Again, Hemingway identifies as a Catholic believer who is unable to live up to the moral
expectations of the Church. Given the atheistic content of Hemingway’s writings throughout the
1920s and 30s, it makes sense that he would resist publicly identifying as a religious believer,
either because he did not wish to tarnish the reputation of the Church, as he indicates above, or
because he wanted to protect his reputation as a modernist writer, which could be minimized by
his affiliation with Catholicism, a longstanding institutional force in the West. Hemingway
explains in an unpublished letter to a Mr. Hall on October 16th, 1933 that he “tries to keep his
private life to himself, and, as a writer, he must tell the truth, much of which will be unpleasant
and will seem to have no moral viewpoint.” Hemingway is afraid that he will “embarrass the
church with his presence, so it is just as well … to say he is a man of no religion.” Hemingway’s
willingness to identify publicly as an atheist would reinforce the identity he was constructing for
himself as a modernist author. That he continually identifies as a Catholic, however, shows that
he was either genuinely faithful or that he wished, for Pauline’s sake and for the sake of their
marriage, to remain in good standing with the Church. The documentary evidence fails to
provide a definitive account. Hemingway publicly identified as an atheist and privately identified
as a Catholic.
Hemingway the Un/Believer
So what are critics to make of this interpretive deadlock? On the one hand, the vast
majority of Hemingway scholarship presents the writer as “Hemingway-the-Nihilist,
141
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Hemingway-the-Non-believer, Hemingway-the-amoral Existentialist, etc. ad infinitum.” 142 On
the other hand, Grimes, Stoneback, and Nickel argue that Hemingway was a Catholic believer.
Both sides of the debate supply biographical evidence in addition to literary critical readings of
Hemingway’s fiction to substantiate their claims. I have focused on biographical evidence in Part
Two of this dissertation to show that Hemingway’s Protestant Congregationalism gave way to an
atheistic view of death, while Stoneback and Nickel focus on a literary critical approach to show
that Hemingway’s Congregationalism gave way to a belief in Roman Catholicism. To be sure,
Stoneback and Nickel present persuasive arguments that Hemingway showed a spiritual interest
in Catholicism before, during, and after his marriage to Pauline, but Hemingway’s letter home
after the war and his reflections in Death in the Afternoon present someone who clearly did not
believe in an afterlife from the years 1918 to 1932. More will be said on Death in the Afternoon
in Chapters Three and Four of this dissertation to illustrate the full extent of Hemingway’s antiChristian sentiments. While it might be tempting to assert the authority of Hemingway’s nonfictional statements over religious interpretations of Hemingway’s fiction, I do not wish to fall
back on binary, either/or assertions concerning Hemingway’s religious status. Instead, I am
suggesting a third option that ties together the Oak Park Congregationalism of Hemingway’s
youth, the existential atheism of his early adult life, and his ostensible conversion to Roman
Catholicism years later.
Like Sartre, Hemingway knew that, without in a God in Heaven, he was free to be the
master of his own life. But he was also taught from a very young age that self-determination was
an essential part of his Christian identity. Add in the fact that masculinity, under both theistic and
atheistic worldviews, was itself, for Hemingway, a matter of self-determination, and you have, in
142
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effect, an existential atheist whose masculinity carried with it implicit theological baggage. It
may be that Hemingway genuinely believed in Catholicism, which existed paradoxically
alongside of his atheism; it may be that Hemingway’s religious commitments were racked with
existential doubt; it may even be that Hemingway’s faith was nominal, but that his writings were
informed by Catholicism, to which he remained sympathetic and in which he would consistently
demonstrate a genuine interest, despite his lack of faith. All three options are compatible with
Hemingway’s personal correspondences and works of nonfiction, which sometimes confess
religious belief and at other times reveal an atheistic understanding of death. The common
denominator in this binary struggle between religious belief and disbelief is Hemingway’s
internalized view of masculinity, which itself became a kind of religion for Hemingway. As
Harvey Mansfield helped to illustrate in Chapter One of this dissertation, masculine selfassertion was theologically significant for the author, for it “is through manliness that humans
insist that they are worthy of the attention of the gods or have an honored place in the scheme of
things.”143 Comparing Hemingway with Sartre, we can see how a Roman Catholic view of
human ontology as nothingness, or nada, complements Hemingway’s existentialist view of
sovereign freedom, which itself was informed by his masculine training under Reverend Barton
as an Oak Park Congregationalist. I have also shown in what manner this secularized theological
view of free will refashions the imago Dei as human exceptionalism, or the belief that human
beings are metaphysically superior to the rest of nature.
Ultimately, the writer’s exact religious affiliation will remain ambiguous, but one thing
can be regarded as certain: despite the vicissitudes of his religious odyssey, Hemingway retains a
belief in sovereign moral choice and, with it, a belief in sacred human identity. This means that
143
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Hemingway’s atheism, whatever its extent, is a failure; he secularizes divine morality in the form
of masculine volition and commissions the imago Dei, or a secularized version of it, to authorize
his choices (over against the Church at times). In Chapters Three and Four of this dissertation, I
trace how this secularized theological belief in masculine volition plays out in the context of
Hemingway’s fiction. The author’s Sartrean view of nothingness overlays the atheistic tenor of
his stories with divine elements, and, as I will show, many of his characters model the kind of
failed atheism, or secularized theism, that we have developed at length in the previous pages.

CHAPTER THREE
THE PROBLEM WITH HUMAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Approaching the Masculine in Hemingway’s Fiction
As we have already seen, revisionary scholarship from feminist and queer studies has
gone a long way to disrupt the so-called Hemingway myth. The author’s love of big-game
hunting, deep-sea fishing, bullfighting, and boxing contributed to an exaggerated image of the
man that his unmatched celebrity as a writer surely compounded. Hemingway rose to fame amid
a burgeoning culture of celebrity worship, and, in a manner that rivals the acumen of today’s
social media influencer, Hemingway leaned into his macho persona in order to capitalize on his
growing reputation. In 1935, after The Sun Also Rises and A Farewell to Arms catapulted the
author to fame, Hemingway would write an “absolutely true” account of his African safari with
Pauline to see whether it could “compete with a work of the imagination.” 1 But the narrative
mostly serves to demonstrate, in general, that Hemingway’s self-discipline makes him a superior
writer and that, when applied to the hunt, his self-discipline results in a higher number of quality
kills, allowing him to win favor with the white hunter and native trackers, all of whom are
experts at their trade. In this sense, Green Hills of Africa can be framed as an adventure narrative
that compares itself against works of the imagination to underscore the grandiose nature of the
hunt. Hemingway boldly asserts the truthfulness of the tale to fortify his masculine public image.
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To a remarkable degree, it would seem that Green Hills of Africa is geared toward selfpromotion.
But as revisionary critics have repeatedly pointed out, Hemingway’s literary treatment of
masculinity is far more nuanced than the cultural stereotype of masculinity would allow, tending
to focus on male vulnerability rather than male bravado. Even Green Hills of Africa betrays the
Hemingway myth at times, presenting manhood as a burden with occasionally toxic effects.
Throughout the narrative, the kills are presented as thinly veiled phallic symbols: sometimes
Hemingway takes pride in the size of his beast, asserting its superiority over the smaller kills of
his opponent Karl, and at other times he feels ashamed of its comparatively small stature.
Near the end of the book, and after a long, exhilarating day of hunting, Hemingway
boasts that “no one could beat” the size of his kill, but then Karl enters with a fifty-seven pound
kudu.2 Encountering the beast, Hemingway writes that “[t]hey were the biggest, widest, darkest,
longest-curling, heaviest, most unbelievable pair of kudu horns in the world. Suddenly, poisoned
with envy, I did not want to see mine again; never, never.” 3 That Hemingway is willing even to
suggest through symbolic representation that his phallus might be inferior—just as he does in
The Sun Also Rises with his fictional stand-in, Jake Barnes, whose member was injured beyond
repair during the war—complicates overblown stereotypes of the writer as a male chauvinist.
Hemingway demonstrates an unexpected willingness to engage with male vulnerability,
exploring feelings of inferiority, inadequacy, and emasculation in the face of sometimes crushing
expectations, as represented by Karl’s “unbelievable pair” in the passage above. Voicing this
same sentiment, the white hunter says to Hemingway: “We have very primitive emotions … It’s
2

Ibid., 291.

3

Ibid.

115
impossible not to be competitive. Spoils everything, though.” 4 So even an exercise in selfpromotion like Green Hills of Africa that enlarges upon the Hemingway myth by glorifying
masculine stereotypes offers moments of male vulnerability, thus exposing the cracks in
Hemingway’s macho persona.
But Hemingway’s exploration of male vulnerability and the burden of manhood extends
well beyond Green Hills of Africa to permeate the writer’s entire oeuvre. In the short story “Ten
Indians,” for example, a pubescent Nick Adams is teased by his neighbors, the Garner family, for
becoming infatuated with a young Indian girl, Prudence Mitchell. In spite of the racist overtones
of the story (at one point the Garner family refers to Prudence as a skunk), their teasing is wellintentioned, for they seem to be charmed by Nick’s coy disposition and take delight in the young
man’s romantic vulnerability. According to the story’s masculine coding, which Hemingway
bases on patriarchal depictions of manhood, becoming infatuated with a love interest is one
possible sign of male weakness, for men are supposed to demonstrate their sexual prowess
through detached promiscuity. Under Hemingway’s treatment of gender stereotypes, men are
immune to feelings of romantic attachment, which is a characteristically female defect, and this
is precisely why a young man can be teased for falling in love—it shows that he is guilty of
behaving like a girl. Matters are made worse by Nick’s father, who reveals that he saw Prudence
“having quite a time” with Frank Washburn, one of Nick’s peers, in the forest that afternoon. 5
Nick weeps in front of his father who maintains a cold disposition and orders Nick to bed. By the
story’s end, Hemingway shatters the emotionless exterior of traditional masculinity modelled by
Nick’s father to reveal what really happens in the broken heart of a young man. He writes:
4
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After a while he heard his father blow out the lamp and go into his own room. He heard a
wind come up in the trees outside and felt it come in cool through the screen. He lay for a
long time with his face in the pillow, and after a while he forgot to think about Prudence
and finally he went to sleep. … In the morning there was a big wind blowing and the
waves were running high up on the beach and he was awake a long time before he
remembered that his heart was broken. 6
Nick lies face down in the pillow, suffocating with emotional strife. Benumbed by the pain, he
focuses on the wind outside, the sound it makes in the trees, and its cooling effect, quietly
agonizing over Prudence, whose name is a warning against rushing in, falling too hard, and
having your heart ripped out by an untrustworthy girl—be cautious, have prudence, and never let
the opposite sex hurt you like this again, her name seems to counsel.
Hemingway’s early short story collection in our time7 takes on the topic of manhood in
light of the Great War and its devastating aftermath. The collection was published in 1925 when
joining the military, going into battle, and putting your life on the line were exclusively male
responsibilities. War epitomized masculine heroism for the young men of Hemingway’s
generation, and Hemingway grew up idolizing his grandfathers, who, as we have already seen,
both fought courageously in the Civil War. in our time—a title that marks a distinction between
Hemingway’s generation and the generations leading up to it—is largely about the crushing
weight of male responsibility, the false heroism of military service, the disillusionment
experienced by an entire generation of young men at war, and the unexplored underbelly of the
masculine experience. The collection intersperses graphic paragraph-length sketches of the war
between each story, and the stories themselves feature accounts of Nick Adam’s postwar trauma,
as in “Big Two-Hearted River,” as well as his prewar training in masculinity, as in “The Doctor
6
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and the Doctor’s Wife.” Hemingway’s careful ordering of the collection ostensibly gives voice to
a basic overarching narrative: namely, that the little boys of Hemingway’s generation were raised
to be masculine heroes, but their masculinity culminated in loss, disconnection, and the
inexplicable tragedies of war.
Two of its titles, “The End of Something” and “Three-Day Blow,” are companion stories
that, in concert with “Ten Indians,” explore Nick Adams’s struggle with romantic vulnerability.
In the stories, a young Nick Adams breaks up with his girlfriend Marjorie and sometime
afterwards he mourns the loss of Marjorie with the support of his friend Bill. The two of them
get drunk while discussing their fathers’ shortcomings, baseball, and finally Marjorie herself.
“The liquor had all died out of him and left him alone. … All he knew was that he had once had
Marjorie and that he had lost her. She was gone and he had sent her away. That was all that
mattered. He might never see her again.”8 Nick’s unwillingness to get tied down at a young age,
sacrificing both his masculine ambition and the opportunity to prove his manhood through an
array of sexual conquests, results in the loss of loving companionship. Spurred on by his
masculine duties, Nick abandons what he really wants and perhaps what he really needs.
Hemingway questions the value of masculine ambition by focusing on its counterproductive
effects.
And yet, Hemingway was nevertheless captive to the culture of masculinity. When the
second American edition of In Our Time was published by Scribner’s in 1930, “On the Quai at
Smyrna,” then titled “Introduction by the Author,” 9 replaced “Indian Camp” as the first story of
the collection. The original title of the story is remarkably fitting because, as the introductory
8
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piece of Hemingway’s first critically acclaimed publication, “On the Quai at Smyrna” outlines
the stakes of Hemingway’s lifelong project. As that project unfolded, the author’s purpose would
become more and more clear: he wanted to show that mastery over death is the true indicator of
masculine heroism and that masculinity, defined in this way, is that which distinguishes man
from the rest of nature as sacred. Hemingway develops this idea across multiple works in the
years and decades following the publication of In Our Time, but its origins can be traced back to
“On the Quai at Smyrna,” a powerful vignette that, in spite of its brevity, introduces a range of
elements that would eventually define the Hemingway project. The young writer was disabused
of Reverend Barton’s social gospel by the noxious ramifications of war, but he nevertheless
retained a commitment to masculine self-determination and its corollary, the imago Dei. “On the
Quai at Smyrna” internalizes this tension, exploring masculine stoicism in the face of death.
On the Quai at Smyrna
The story takes place in the port city of Smyrna at the close of the Greco-Turkish War.
Exercising the minimalist technique that would come to define his experimental style,
Hemingway begins the vignette in medias res with one character commenting on the peculiarity
of a scene that, as readers, we do not yet know anything about. As a matter of esthetic principle,
Hemingway reveals the tip of an iceberg that becomes more and more visible as we put in the
interpretive work:
The strange thing was, he said, how they screamed every night at midnight. I do not
know why they screamed at that time. We were in the harbor and they were all on the
pier and at midnight they started screaming. We used to turn the searchlight on them to
quiet them. That always did the trick. We’d run the searchlight up and down over them
two or three times and they stopped it.10
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Readers not already familiar with the story are confronted with uncertainty—who or what is
screaming? Is the timing inopportune or just unpredictable and senseless? Should they be
sleeping, or dead, or bound and gagged? Why does the searchlight eventually silence them? And,
perhaps the most compelling question of all, why does the speaker describe their screaming as
“strange”? Readers are given some indication that the screaming lifeforms are animals, not
people, for the speaker and his compatriots would surely move to help other human beings if
they were found screaming on the pier in agony and pain. And yet the speaker says that, rather
than aiding the floundering creatures, the sailors remained in the harbor and “turn[ed] the
searchlight on them,” running it “up and down over them two or three times” because that
“always did the trick.” We can imagine screaming animals growing silent out of caution when
flooded by a blinding light, suddenly aware that something else, maybe a predator, is present in
the vicinity, but it is much harder to imagine human beings growing silent in the same situation.
This is because human beings would recognize the searchlight as man-made, and, if
anything, their cries would intensify, becoming more purposeful when presented with other
human beings. The only time humans would not call out for help in this or a similar situation is if
they recognized the searchlight as the approach of an outside threat, or at least the possibility of
an outside threat. But we know from the passage that this is a recurring event; the creatures have
had this same light shined on them for multiple nights in a row, and its owners have neither
helped nor harmed them. Rather, its owners shine their searchlight merely to silence the
creatures, whose screaming, readers are safe to assume, keeps the sailors awake at night. As the
speaker callously remarks, the searchlight “always did the trick.” He does not care about the
creatures; their cries fail to elicit a compassionate response from the sailors, and it would seem
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that he and his compatriots demonstrate no interest in the lifeforms beyond keeping their mouths
shut. Were the animals in fact human beings, their recurring cries at midnight may very well
qualify as “strange” behavior, but the speaker’s choice to describe their actions as strange rather
than as heartbreaking or disturbing, for example, reflects a low level of concern for the animals.
The speaker regards their cries as inconvenient, unpleasant, and unwanted. The sailors need to
sleep.
Reading further down the page, however, we discover that the screams at midnight do
emanate from human beings—Greek refugees who have been left behind by the military and
their more affluent countrymen. Moreover, as the biographer Jeffrey Meyers describes in
“Hemingway’s Second War: The Greco-Turkish Conflict, 1920-1922,” Hemingway based the
story on the complicated political history between the Greeks and the Turks. “The Greek
occupation of the city in May, 1919, followed by a massacre of the Turks, inspired the Turkish
Nationalist Movement and was the immediate cause of the Greco-Turkish War,” but as Meyers
explains, “The Turks reoccupied Smyrna and completed the reconquest of Anatolia on 9
September. Order prevailed for only a brief period, and arrests began immediately of vast
numbers of Greeks and Armenians suspected of being implicated in the massacre of Turks in
May, 1919.”11 Turkish troops subsequently set fire to the Greek, Armenian, and European
quarters of Smyrna. The surviving population flocked to the quay at the western end of the city.
Readers may be surprised to learn, however, that Hemingway was never actually present
to witness the exodus of refugees; he arrived too late after spraining his ankle at home and then
battling malaria in Constantinople. He nevertheless produced fourteen articles on the Greco-
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Turkish War for the Toronto Star and he was also conversant with an array of war-related media.
Meyers suggests that Hemingway lifted the story from two London newspaper articles, one from
the Times and one from the Daily Mail. Here is the September 16th, 1922 report from the Times:
A stream of refugees is still leaving Smyrna, and my informant describes the quay last
night as packed with dense crowds herded together inside a cordon of Turkish regulars,
while searchlights of foreign warships in the harbour played upon them. … The waters of
the harbour were full of the dead bodies of persons drowned or shot by the Turks while
trying to reach the ships, and some of the corpses were horribly mangled by the
propellers.12
The second report by the Daily Mail was published September 19th, 1922:
The crews of the British destroyers moored near the quay say that it was the ghastliest
experience of their lives to be obliged to listen to the imploring screams of the Greek
women and children on the quay close by. The women shrieked to the British, “You can’t
leave us to burn alive or to be raped or murdered by the Turks!” 13
There are clear similarities in these reports and Hemingway’s story. That Hemingway felt
inspired by the reports to write the “On the Quai at Smyrna” is certainly possible and even likely,
but the writer—rather than the reporter—in Hemingway knew how to use imagery and dialogue
to illicit a deeper meaning from the events depicted, saying something more complex and
significant than what the reports themselves were able to convey.
Regarding his formal techniques, the young writer presents readers with four interacting
images: screaming refugees, dead babies, mothers in the midst of childbirth, and drowning
livestock. The first of these terrifying images has already been accounted for. The speaker,
presumably a British naval officer, describes himself and the crew as shining a searchlight on the
suffering refugees to quiet their screaming at midnight. The refugees are not their military
enemies but the citizens of a displaced nation, so there is no reason to attack, torture, or kill the
12
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refugees, as we can see reflected in the British sailors’ apathetic response. But men, women,
children, their grandparents and presumably entire families scream out in agony, calling for
mercy and supplication just a short distance away, and yet the sailors do nothing. Their apathy
extends beyond a lack of military duty to a complete lack of concern for human life. The
searchlight is almost certainly intended as an ironic symbol, for the refugees are “discovered” by
the light and sadly no one rushes to their aid (this can be contrasted with the aid supplied by a
“search party”). But, in reality, searchlights were created as military weapons to produce
artificial moonlight in the First World War, increasing the opportunity for night attacks against a
military’s political enemy. In this sense, the sailors essentially turn their weapon on the
screaming refugees in order to silence them because, again, doing so “always did the trick,” as
the officer callously reports. 14 The refugees are citizens without a nation who have been deprived
of their legal rights. Consequently, they huddle together in the dark like animals, screaming at
midnight not because they expect to be rescued, not to awaken the sailors out of spite, and not in
the service of another such strategy, but because they are tormented and feel moved to express
their desperation, plain and simple.
This first image combines with the final image of the vignette to form thematic bookends.
The officer sarcastically remarks in the closing paragraph that “The Greeks were nice chaps too,”
referring here to members of the Greek military who left after the reoccupation of Smyrna by the
Turkish government. “When they evacuated they had all their baggage animals they couldn’t
take off with them so they just broke their forelegs and dumped them into the shallow water. All
those mules with their forelegs broken pushed over into the shallow water. It was all a pleasant
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business,” the officer decries; “My word yes a most pleasant business.” 15 The disfigured animals
floating in the harbor will surely remind readers of the 1922 Times report that floating corpses
filled the harbor and were subsequently disfigured by the boats’ propellors. Just as the cargo animals are shoved into shallow water after having their front legs broken, so too are the Greek
refugees abandoned by their government and rendered defenseless, many of them drowning
alongside of the cargo animals themselves, which are shown a complete lack of mercy. To be
sure, the Greek military drowns the animals so that their Turkish enemies do not inherit valuable
military assets, but their actions are nevertheless cruel by conventional standards, prioritizing
military advantage over the livestock’s wellbeing. The officer takes umbrage with animal cruelty, looking down on the Greeks for their seemingly ruthless behavior, but the layered imagery
suggests that the refugees were animalized not only by their fellow countrymen, who metaphorically “broke their forelegs and dumped them into the shallow water,” but by the British naval officer as well, who, in the opening scene, shines a searchlight on their screaming bodies. That the
officer exhibits no sympathy for the animalized refugees is surprising given his concern for the
drowned livestock, but this apparent inconsistency in the officer’s thought should not eclipse the
bigger picture: refugees are animalized to justify their mistreatment. In the officer’s opinion,
moreover, leaving your own people for dead is truly unconscionable behavior, so he regards the
whole lot with disgust, casting them as morally inferior, inhumane, and as literally inhuman.
These combined images—screaming refugees and screaming mules, both of whom float
side by side in the harbor after drowning—form thematic bookends which encase two other
prominent images: dead babies and mothers in labor. “The worst part,” says the officer, “were
the women with dead babies. You couldn’t get the women to give up their dead babies. They’d
15
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have babies dead for six days. Wouldn’t give them up. Nothing you could do about it.” 16 In his
characteristic use of repetition, Hemingway reinforces the shock value of these lines by repeating
“dead babies” in back-to-back sentences and then inverting the phrase as “babies dead” in the
sentence that follows. He subsequently presents readers with a truly morbid visual:
Then there was an old lady, most extraordinary case. I told it to a doctor and he said I was
lying. We were clearing them off the pier, had to clear off the dead ones, and this old
woman was lying on a sort of litter. … So I had a look at her and just then she died and
went absolutely stiff. Her legs drew up and she drew up from the waist and went quite
rigid. Exactly as though she had been dead over night. She was quite dead and absolutely
rigid. I told a medical chap about it and he told me it was impossible. 17
The scene is jarring. An elderly woman becomes suddenly stiff, her corpse folding in half. This
truly grotesque image—a phrase I choose carefully 18—anticipates what, over the next century,
will become horror cinema’s excessive depiction of ugly, mutilated bodies on screen and harkens
back to a long tradition of grotesquerie in painting and literature. Anna Journey describes aspects
of the grotesque tradition, writing that “[t]he grotesque style of painting interweaves human and
animal forms, … violat[ing] proportion, scale, and symmetry” to cultivate “distortion and
bizarre, hybrid figures. … As in the hybrid bodies of the chimera, sphynx, or centaur, the
grotesque’s power lies in its ability to defy borders.” 19 And as Ani Kokobobo explains,
“Grotesque ugliness can strip someone of his or her humanity, turning them into a monstrous
other unworthy of active love.”20 Thus, according to tradition, the grotesque refers in part to
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animalized individuals whose monstrosity diminishes their human value. A doctor describes the
account as “impossible,” as something the officer must have surely lied about due to its
“extraordinary” nature. The woman is clearly a medical anomaly, and her ugly, inhuman form is
beyond the pale of scientific explanation. In these passages, Hemingway questions the difference
between human and animal suffering, pressuring readers to formulate a moral response to both.
Coupled with these grisly images of death—which claims the lives of young and old alike
—are, by the officer’s description, feral women in the midst of childbirth. “You didn’t mind the
women who were having babies as you did those with the dead ones. They had them all right.
Surprising how few of them died. You just covered them over with something and let them go to
it. They’d always pick out the darkest place in the hold to have them.”21 Again, the officer uses
dehumanizing language to describe the refugees. Like animals, the women seek out dark places
to bear their young, and rather than tend to the mothers in their time of need, the sailors throw
blankets over them while they “go to it” and are surprised by how few of them die. The story’s
admixture of death and new life, decrepit and infant, animal and human aims to remind readers
that everyone—no matter their station, their nationality, their age, gender, or even their animal
species—eventually faces death. Conveying the same message, the title of Hemingway’s 1940
novel For Whom the Bell Tolls quotes part XVII of John Donne’s 1624 Devotions Upon
Emergent Occasions, which reads: “never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for
thee.”22 Of course, Donne himself was a devout cleric of the Church of England, and part XVII
of Devotions celebrates each individual believer’s unity in the body of Christ, so when Donne
writes the lines quoted above, he has in mind the shared destiny of all Christian believers. Putting
21

Hemingway, In Our Time, 12.

22

Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls (New York: Scribner, 1940), epigraph.

126
an ironic twist on For Whom the Bell Tolls, in which the protagonist, Robert Jordan, dies for a
political cause, Hemingway co-opts the lines written by Donne, urging readers to reconsider
them from an atheistic point of view. What unites all lifeforms is not their shared ontology in the
body of Christ, as Donne maintains, but their inevitable, everlasting annihilation, as my
discussion of the novel will show. Consigning them to an identical fate, Hemingway blurs the
distinctions among women, babies, animals, and military men, interrogating the boundaries of
human identity and, concomitantly, the basis of sacred human rights, which have been violated
in spades.
Death in the Afternoon
Hemingway’s 1932 meditation on Spanish bullfighting, Death in the Afternoon, is part
cultural commentary, part travel guide, part political satire, and part polemic (seemingly against
his former mentor Gertrude Stein, whom he fictionalizes as the Old lady). Throughout this piece,
Hemingway plays with generic boundaries, finding himself carried away at one point with a
fictional exchange between himself and the Old lady. At the end of chapter twelve—a detailed
account of bull breeding reminiscent of Herman Melville’s cetology chapter in Moby Dick—
Hemingway abruptly changes directions, leaving off his studied appraisal of the Spanish
bullfight to satisfy the Old lady’s readerly expectations, which have not been met by the author.
The result is a short, stand-alone piece entitled “A Natural History of the Dead,” which would be
republished one year later in Winner Take Nothing as a short story. But, according to Lewis
Weeks, Jr., the piece “can hardly be called a story,” for it is “a skillful and terrifying parody and
satire.”23 Ray B. West, Jr. refers to the piece as “a short and curious little essay,” 24 and
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Hemingway himself describes the work as “the Whittier’s Snow Bound of our time,”25 a long
narrative poem that depicts a peaceful return to rural domesticity after the Civil War. Much like
Death in the Afternoon, the story defies generic boundaries, but it is nevertheless laser-focused in
its critique of natural theology. Popularized by the 19th century Christian apologist William
Paley, natural theology proposed that God’s existence and benevolent nature could be logically
deduced through a scientific study of nature. Hemingway challenges this claim in the most
sardonic of ways.
I turn to “A Natural History of the Dead” as the logical next step in our study, for
Hemingway alludes to “On the Quai at Smyrna” twice in Death in the Afternoon, once in the
opening pages and again in chapter twelve. On the very first page of the book, in fact,
Hemingway recalls explaining to Stein his reasons for disliking the sport of bullfighting. “I had
just come from the Near East,” he writes, “where the Greeks broke the legs of their baggage and
transport animals and … shoved them off the quay into the shallow water when they abandoned
the city of Smyrna, and I remember saying that I did not like the bullfights because of the poor
horses.”26 Just as the British naval officer of In Our Time feels sympathy for the drowned mules
at Smyrna, a young Hemingway not yet educated in the art of bullfighting feels sympathy for the
horses killed in the ring, admitting that “I cannot see a horse down in the street without having it
make me feel a necessity for helping the horse.” 27 He references “On the Quai at Smyrna” again
in chapter twelve while giving the Old lady an account of the horrors he witnessed during the
war:
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In twenty years of observation in civil life I had never seen a dead mule and had begun to
entertain doubts as to whether these animals were really mortal. … But in war these
animals succumb in much the same manner as the more common and less hardy horse. …
They seemed a fitting enough sight in the mountains where one was accustomed to their
presence and looked less incongruous there than they did later, at Smyrna, where the
Greeks broke the legs of all their baggage animals and pushed them off the quay into the
shallow water to drown.28
Meyers may be correct that Hemingway never witnessed the drowning of the mules at Smyrna,
but the secondhand reports clearly got under Hemingway’s skin and grew into something bigger
than the reports themselves. “You wrote about these mules before,” the Old lady remarks, to
which Hemingway replies, “I know it and I’m sorry. Stop interrupting. I won’t write about them
again. I promise.”29 There is something to be gleaned, Hemingway suggests, from watching an
innocent mule having its bones shattered and then pushed off the quay, where it struggles to
stand upright, its front legs inverted and its back legs fully functioning, in water just deep enough
to drown it. Hemingway is unable to shake off this disturbing image and draws our attention to
the fact perhaps to signal its rare importance to the writer.
The reason these images resonate, moving Hemingway and many of his readers to an
emotional response, is because we identify with the animal as a thinking, feeling creature and,
consequently, we empathize with the creature in its time of need. We understand feelings like
fear, confusion, and helplessness, we understand physical pain, and, as mortal creatures
ourselves, we can at least imagine the wild panic that boils up and takes hold of a creature in the
face of its impending doom. Significantly, animal life resembles human life, but as Hemingway
is careful to emphasize, the reverse is also true, as humans will sometimes resemble animals.
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“The first thing you found about the dead,” he writes, “was that, hit badly enough, they died like
animals.”30 But what does it mean to die like an animal, exactly? Hemingway answers:
They died from little wounds as rabbits die sometimes from three or four small grains of
shot that hardly seem to break the skin. Others would die like cats, a skull broken in and
iron in the brain, they lie alive two days like cats that crawl into the coal bin with a bullet
in the brain and will not die until you cut their heads off. Maybe cats do not die then, they
say they have nine lives, I do not know, but most men die like animals, not men. I’d
never seen a natural death, so called, and so I blamed it on the war and like the
persevering traveller, Mungo Park, knew that there was something else, that always
absent something else, and then I saw one. 31
According to Hemingway, the majority of men do not die like human beings but like animals.
The difference, Hemingway seems to imply, is that human beings die with dignity, perhaps in the
comfort of their home, where loved ones have gathered by their bedside to honor them and pay
their respects as the departing pass into their eternal slumber. Such a depiction sanitizes death,
making it appear domestic, peaceful, and even beautiful. How much easier to face death, a
person may conclude, if we are surrounded by loved ones at home in the comfort of our beds.
But this is not how most people die. The average person, Hemingway assures his readers, dies
like an animal, their bodies brutalized, their psyches tormented, and their personhood robbed of
all dignity. Again, Hemingway makes use of grotesque imagery—a broken skull, a severed head,
and the walking dead corpse of a feline—to illustrate just how dehumanizing death can be. Death
is undignified and aberrant, violating our human standards and expectations.
Hemingway entertains the possibility that a death resulting from natural causes, rather
than from gunshot wound or the blast of a mortar shell, can in fact be dignified, reflecting the
unparalleled value of human life. He writes that the natural theologian, Mungo Park, realized, on
the brink of death while stranded in the dessert, that God would never allow for one of his
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beloved children to perish in such an undignified manner. But even natural deaths, Hemingway
replies, are often horrific. “The only natural death I’ve ever seen, outside of loss of blood, was
death from Spanish influenza. In this you drown in mucus, choking, and how you know the
patient’s dead,” Hemingway quips, is that “he shits the bed full. So now I want to see the death
of any self-called Humanist because a persevering traveller like Mungo Park or me lives on and
maybe yet will live to see the actual death of members of this literary sect and watch the noble
exits that they make.”32 The 32-year-old writer is grim and cruelly mocking. Humanists wrongly
assume that our noble species is superior to the rest of nature and will exhibit deaths worthy of
the dignified, exceptional creatures that we are, but Hemingway has seen deaths both natural and
unnatural, on the battlefield and off, and so he lacks the anthropocentric presumptions of
humanism. Human beings and animals die in like manner, he asserts; there is no hierarchy of
value.
Alongside of this already scathing critique of secular humanism is served a more severe
critique of Christian humanism in the form of natural theology. Beginning his polemic with a
meditation on the 18th century explorer Mungo Park, Hemingway underscores the illogic of
natural theology to show, against Park’s conclusion, that human beings lack the exceptional
status afforded to them by the imago Dei, or the sacred image of God in humanity.
When the persevering traveler, Mungo Park, was at one period of his course fainting in
the vast wilderness of an African desert, naked and alone, considering his days as
numbered and nothing appearing to remain for him to do but to lie down and die, a small
moss-flower of extraordinary beauty caught his eye. “Though the whole plant,” says he,
“was no longer than one of my fingers, I could not contemplate the delicate conformation
of its roots, leaves and capsules without admiration. Can that Being who planted, watered
and brought to perfection, in this obscure part of the world, a thing which appears of so
small importance, look with unconcern upon the situation and suffering of creatures
formed after his own image? Surely not. Reflections like these would not allow me to
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despair; I started up and, disregarding both hunger and fatigue, travelled forward, assured
that relief was at hand; and I was not disappointed.” With a disposition to wonder and
adore in like manner, as Bishop Stanley says, can no branch of Natural History be studied
without increasing that faith, love and hope which we also, every one of us, need in our
journey through the wilderness of life? Let us therefore see what inspiration we may
derive from the dead.33
Park’s logic runs as follows: the physical size of an organism does not determine its complexity,
for the moss-flower is much smaller than a human being but extremely complex; complexity, in
turn, is proof that an organism was intelligently designed, for surely no one would encounter an
operating wristwatch in nature, as in the famous watchmaker analogy, 34 and assume that it
assembled through chance, natural selection, and other natural processes; finally, if God cares
after a complex lifeform of seemingly “small importance” in an “obscure part of the world,” as
he does with the moss-flower, then he will surely care for more complex organisms like human
beings; in conclusion, observing the natural world should increase a person’s faith in God
because its complexity is evidence that God designed it with a special purpose.
Readers of Hemingway discover, however, that if God exists, he actually neglects human
beings, who die horrifically both on and off the battlefield, and whose “sacred” bodies are
profaned, mutilated, and defiled, as Hemingway will demonstrate over the course of ten pages.
“Until the dead are buried,” Hemingway writes,
they change somewhat in appearance each day. The color change in Caucasian races is
from white to yellow, to yellow-green, to black. If left long enough in the heat the flesh
comes to resemble coal-tar, especially where it has been broken or torn, and it has quite a
visible tarlike iridescence. The dead grow larger each day until sometimes they become
33
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quite too big for their uniforms, filling these until they seem blown tight enough to burst.
The individual members may increase in girth to an unbelievable extent and faces fill as
taut and globular as balloons.35
Again, Hemingway indulges in the grotesque, describing the bloated corpses of soldiers rotting
on the battlefield. He writes about how ambulance drivers collected fragments of human scalp
after the explosion of a munition factory; they knew the fragments belonged to women, he says,
because they were attached to extra-long strands of hair. He writes about the “half-pint of
maggots working where [people’s] mouths” used to be and about “a man whose head was broken
as a flower-pot may be broken.”36 This robust gallery of grotesque images comprises
Hemingway’s natural history of the dead. Contra the naïve conclusion made by Park and other
natural theologians that God protects and honors those created in his divine image, Hemingway
proposes that human beings are really no different from animals, who, within the Christian
tradition, are said to lack the imago Dei. This is because human beings are animals, in
Hemingway’s view, glorified beasts whose undignified deaths reflect, as would be the case with
other animal species, a complete lack of divine interest in their survival and wellbeing. He writes
that “few travellers would take a good full breath of that early summer air” filled with the stench
of rotting flesh “and have any such thoughts as Mungo Park about those formed in [God’s] own
image.”37
Hemingway’s stance on the inherent value of human life—or, rather, its complete lack of
inherent value—is made explicit in the final three pages of “A Natural History of the Dead,”
where the writer finally delivers the story he had promised to the Old lady before becoming
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distracted by his reflections on Mungo Park and the grotesqueries of war. This short sketch is
about a conflict between a band of military officers and their captain, a doctor and leading
medical advisor with the army. Rather than lay a dying soldier among those recovering from
their wounds, the doctor lays the soldier among the dead, for there is little hope the man will
survive his injuries. Troubled by his groans, the officers implore the doctor to place the dying
man among the other survivors, saying “We don’t like to hear him in there with the dead.” 38
When the doctor refuses, the officers beg him to kill the soldier with a lethal dose of morphine,
but morphine is a valuable resource that cannot be wasted, so the doctor says no, urging an
artillery officer to handle the problem himself. The following interaction ensues:
“I will shoot the poor fellow,” the artillery officer said. “I am a humane man. I
will not let him suffer.”
“Shoot him then,” said the doctor. “Shoot him. Assume the responsibility. I will
make a report. Wounded shot by lieutenant of artillery in first curing post. Shoot him. Go
ahead shoot him.”
“You are not a human being.”
“My business is to care for the wounded, not to kill them. That is for gentlemen of
the artillery.”
“Why don’t you care for him then?”
“I have done so. I have done all that can be done.” 39
There are two perspectives at war in this passage—one humanist, represented by the artillery
officer, and the other anti-humanist, represented by the doctor, who, in my analysis, has been
disabused of the artillery officer’s anthropocentric presuppositions. We can see from their
interaction that the doctor maintains a clinical practice, carrying out his professional tasks with
an austere and even robotic consistency. When their argument intensifies and the artillery officer
attacks the doctor, the doctor is forced to defend himself, blinding the artillery officer with
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iodine. Living up to his professional duty, the doctor then prepares the officer for medical
treatment.
The coldhearted doctor is detached from his patients—he does not exhibit a sliver of
sympathy for the dying soldier, and he is ready to administer medical treatment to the artillery
officer in spite of their conflict—but it is nevertheless the artillery officer who should unsettle
readers, especially those who share his humanistic urges. Certainly, the artillery officer
demonstrates a genuine concern for the dying soldier, first imploring the doctor to save the
soldier’s life and then, after the doctor refuses, courageously offering to end the young man’s
suffering himself. But the artillery officer threatens to murder the doctor almost immediately
afterwards, drawing his pistol as he rushes toward the doctor in a fit of rage. “I’ll kill you!” he
screams after having iodine splashed into his eyes; “I’ll kill you as soon as I can see.” 40 At first
glance, the officer appears morally driven to protect human life, declaring himself “humane” and
regarding the doctor as inhumane (indeed, as literally inhuman—“You are not a human being,”
he asserts), but the officer betrays his moral conviction at the drop of a hat, threatening to take
the life of another human being himself. The officer’s contradictory impulses both to destroy and
preserve human life, vowing either to harm or protect an individual in the service of humanity,
reveal what in Chapter Two of this dissertation was described as the problematic nature of
humanitarian thought: namely, that affording humanity special treatment with protected rights
and privileges comes at the expense of the nonhuman, which is conceptualized as inferior.
Without realizing it, the artillery officer has committed himself to a sort of game, where
a negotiable boundary between human and nonhuman determines his moral convictions. Because
the doctor’s robotic medical practices strike the artillery officer as dehumanizing, he seeks to
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preserve the soldier’s dignity first by relocating him and then by mercifully ending his life.
Human beings should not have to suffer, and they should never be left for dead, the artillery
officer reasons, because, unlike the rest of creation, human beings have intrinsic moral value and,
as such, they deserve to be treated with morally upright behavior on the basis of their humanity
alone. When presented with an individual who does not follow this humanitarian code, the
artillery officer is quick to identify that person as nonhuman, for this is the only way to make
sense of an individual who acts outside of our understanding of human behavior and, more
importantly, this is the only way to justify harming an enemy without violating their human
rights. The artillery officer dehumanizes the doctor precisely in order to harm him, for the doctor
stands in the way of the artillery officer’s humanitarian project. We saw this kind of behavior
enacted before by the British naval officer at the quay of Smyrna. The Greek military’s decision
to abandon their own people violated the officer’s understanding of normal human behavior, so
he comes to view the Greeks as not only inhumane but as literally inhuman. Because of this, he
treats the screaming refugees like animals, joining the Greek military in their dehumanization of
the Greek refugees. The irony is palpable, but, as Agamben demonstrates, this is exactly how
humanism operates (see Chapter Two of this dissertation): humanity cannot exist without the
nonhuman, and the special rights afforded to humanity can only be realized at someone else’s
expense.
Hemingway begins “A Natural History of the Dead” by lambasting Mungo Park and the
natural theologians for their belief that scientific observations of nature will increase a person’s
faith in God, so readers will recognize that, when taken in context, the doctor’s perspective,
which appears to be thoroughly atheistic, represents Hemingway’s perspective as well. Human
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life, as with animal life, ends in death, or eternal nonexistence, so there is no reason to believe
that human beings are intrinsically more valuable than animals; all living species end up in the
ground. Moreover, to believe that God created human beings for everlasting glory simply
because our physical bodies show evidence of intelligent design is naïve. Our bodies are
designed to age, die, decay, and disintegrate. If God created us—a premise that Hemingway is
clearly reluctant to accept in this context—it is not for everlasting glory, but for a life that ends in
brutality, horror, and eventually death. Just moments after the doctor blinds the artillery officer,
the wounded soldier finally dies, prompting the doctor to remark: “See, my poor lieutenant? We
dispute about nothing. In time of war we dispute about nothing. … Your eyes will be all right. It
is nothing. A dispute about nothing.”41 Readers of Hemingway hear pulsating in these lines the
existential nothingness, or nada, that Hemingway will write about one year later in “A Clean,
Well-Lighted Place.” Not believing in God, the doctor sees no significant difference between
human and nonhuman lifeforms, so he stands firmly against the officer’s humanitarian code.
Hemingway’s Stance on Animal Equality
On Hemingway’s account, the war forced—what are supposed to be—morally superior
creatures to commit heinous acts of violence against—again, what are supposed to be—creatures
made in God’s image, relegating an exceptional species of superior moral value to grotesque,
undignified deaths. Hemingway entered the war as a young man who, to that point, had merely
questioned the Christian faith, struggling, as he did at the time, to reconcile his newfound
autonomy as a Kansas City newspaper man with the religious expectations of Oak Park. But he
left the war disillusioned. This is why Frederic Henry, the protagonist of A Farewell to Arms—a
novel inspired by Hemingway’s service as an ambulance driver on the Italian front—says to the
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soldier Gino that “[a]bstract words such as glory, honor, courage, or hallow were obscene” to
him, and that he was “always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice.” 42
Frederic, as with Hemingway at the time, lost faith in the war and could no longer support the
patriotic worship of so-called war heroes. Struggling to reconcile warfare’s dehumanizing effects
with its humanitarian goals, members of Frederic’s platoon likewise confess that they “don’t
believe in the war” anymore. 43 “I had seen nothing sacred,” Frederic confesses, “and the things
that were glorious had no glory and the sacrifices were like the stockyards at Chicago if nothing
was done with the meat except to bury it.”44 In the now infamous Chicago stockyard, animals
were slaughtered, processed, and distributed at an unprecedented rate. “The sheer scale of the
processing and slaughter of cattle, hogs, and sheep is mind boggling,” Angela Pienkos writes;
“In 1924, the peak year of its operations, the Stockyard took some 18.6 million head of livestock
into its endless maze of holding pens.” 45 Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle memorialized
the stockyard by drawing attention to its unsanitary labor practices. In the novel, careless
accidents on the factory floor—like dismembered human body parts making their way into the
meat grinders—resulted in the blending of animal product with human flesh. Remembering the
dead bodies of soldiers scattered across the battlefield, Hemingway refers to the Chicago
stockyard to depict the animalization of men at war.
But the takeaway here is not that Hemingway objected to the war for animalizing human
beings, or for desecrating the imago Dei by violating their human rights; rather, the takeaway is
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that the war uncovered humanity’s animal nature, disabusing Hemingway of the anthropocentric
delusion that human life is inherently superior to the rest of the natural world. Hemingway again
questions the ideological privileging of man over beast in his 1940 novel For Whom the Bell
Tolls in a conversation between the protagonist Robert Jordan and Anselmo, one of Robert
Jordan’s guerilla comrades in the anti-fascist efforts of the Spanish Civil War. Fantasizing about
life after the war, Anselmo invites Robert Jordan to hunt with him someday:
“And after we have won [the war] you must come to hunt.”
“To hunt what?”
“The boar, the bear, the wolf, the ibex—”
“You like to hunt?”
“Yes, man. More than anything. We all hunt in my village. You do not like to
hunt?”
“No,” said Robert Jordan. “I do not like to kill animals.”
“With me it is the opposite,” the old man said. “I do not like to kill men.”
“Nobody does except those who are disturbed in the head,” Robert Jordan said.
“But I feel nothing against it when it is necessary. When it is for the cause.”
“It is a different thing, though,” Anselmo said. “In my house, when I had a house,
and now I have no house, there were the tusks of boar I had shot in the lower forest.
There were the hides of wolves I had shot. In the winter, hunting them in the snow. … It
was a very beautiful thing and all of those things gave me great pleasure to
contemplate.”46
Just as the doctor and artillery officer in “A Natural History of the Dead” represent opposing
perspectives on the matter of human rights, so too do Robert Jordan and Anselmo represent
opposing perspectives on the matter of animal rights. Anselmo loves to kill animals, decorating
his home with their corpses, but he does not like to kill men. He says, in fact, that decorating
your home with animal corpses is a “very beautiful thing,” and he contemplates it with “great
pleasure.” Robert Jordan, by contrast, likes to kill neither men nor animals, and, in his judgment,
those who kill men out of pleasure rather than out of practical necessity are “disturbed in the
head.” The discussion continues:
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“On the door of the church of my village was nailed the paw of a bear that I killed
in the spring, finding him on a hillside in the snow, overturning a log with this same
paw.”
“When was this?”
“Six years ago. And every time I saw that paw, like the hand of a man, but with
those long claws, dried and nailed through the palm to the door of the church, I received
pleasure.”
“Of pride?”
“Of pride of remembrance of the encounter with the bear on that hillside in the
early spring. But of the killing of a man, who is a man as we are, there is nothing good
that remains.”
“You can’t nail his paw to the church,” Robert Jordan said.
“No. Such a barbarity is unthinkable. Yet the hand of a man is like the paw of a
bear.”
“So is the chest of a man like the chest of a bear,” Robert Jordan said. “With the
hide removed from the bear, there are many similarities in the muscles.”
“Yes,” Anselmo said. “The gypsies believe the bear to be a brother of man.”
“So do the Indians in America,” Robert Jordan said. “And when they kill a bear
they apologize to him and ask his pardon. They put his skull in a tree and they ask him to
forgive them before they leave it”
“The gypsies believe the bear to be a brother to man because he has the same
body beneath his hide, because he drinks beer, because he enjoys music and because he
likes to dance.”47
Robert Jordan and Anselmo agree that human beings and bears have similar skeletal structures in
addition to other important similarities. This is why gypsies and American Indians regard the
bear as their equal, ask for forgiveness whenever they kill a bear, and assume that bears have the
power to grant them forgiveness in the first place. This egalitarian view of the animal kingdom—
under which mankind is also considered an animal species—runs up against Anselmo’s belief
that animals are inferior to human beings. It would be unthinkable, barbarous, and even
sacrilegious in Anselmo’s view to nail a human hand to the door of the church, ostensibly
because human beings are superior creatures who bear the sacred image of God. This is why he
can remember killing a bear with pleasure but is sickened by his memory of killing men:
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“You have killed?” Robert Jordan asked in the intimacy of the dark and of their
day together.
“Yes. Several times. But not with pleasure. To me it is a sin to kill a man. Even
Fascists whom we must kill. To me there is a great difference between the bear and the
man and I do not believe the wizardry of the gypsies about the brotherhood with animals.
No, I am against all killing of men.”
“Yet you have killed.”
“Yes. And will again. But if I live later, I will try to live in such a way, doing no
harm to any one, that will be forgiven.”
“By whom?”
“Who knows? Since we do not have God here anymore, neither His Son nor the
Holy Ghost, who forgives? I do not know.”
“No. Man. Certainly not. If there were God, never would He have permitted what
I have seen with my eyes. Let them have God.”
“They claim Him.”
“Clearly I miss Him, having been brought up in religion. But now a man must be
responsible to himself.”
“Then it is thyself who will forgive thee for killing.”
“I believe so,” Anselmo said. “Since you put it clearly in that way I believe that
must be it. But with or without God, I think it is a sin to kill. To take the life of another is
to me very grave.”48
Anselmo models what in Chapter Two of this dissertation was described as a secularized belief
in the imago Dei. For Anselmo, it is not only wrong to kill another human being—in the sense
that killing someone violates society’s ethical standards—it is also a sin. The difference here
between an ethical violation and a sin is that the former is subjectively wrong (in that it violates a
communal agreement) while the latter is objectively wrong (in that it violates the will of God).
Killing another human being breaks a metaphysical law because human beings, on this view,
were created in God’s divine image with superior moral value. But just as Frederic Henry of A
Farewell to Arms is unable to reconcile his belief in God with the brutal atrocities of war, so too
is Anselmo unable to believe in a God who permits such atrocities to take place. For this reason,
Anselmo embraces contradictory viewpoints: he loses faith in God but retains a belief in sacred
human identity. After Robert Jordan underscores the contradiction in Anselmo’s thought,
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Anselmo is forced to admit that, in his now secularized theological view, human identity, rather
than some divine axiology, is the metaphysical basis of moral law. “[W]ith or without God, … it
is a sin to kill,” he says, because human beings are inherently valuable. But whereas the imago
Dei is bestowed upon mankind by a deity who determines the metaphysical nature of being,
“human identity,” as we saw in Chapter Two of this dissertation, is a cultural construct that must,
in essence, be decided upon by each individual meaning-maker. Anselmo must define “human
identity” over against the gypsies and American Indians who, we have learned, have a different
understanding of “human identity.”
Thus, metaphysical authority is first transferred from God to “human identity,” after
Anselmo stops believing in God, and then from “human identity” to Anselmo himself, the
lawmaking individual, who realizes, with the help of Robert Jordan, that “human identity” is a
cultural construct. Under this contradictory point of view—which conflates subjective morality
with objective morality—each individual decision maker now operates as the ontological origin
of moral law, for the individual alone, the Sartrean existentialist will argue, defines the
boundaries of human identity. As with Sartre, Anselmo begins with the belief that mankind was
created in God’s image and thus endowed with inherent rights and privileges. After losing his
faith, however, Anselmo continues to believe in the inherent value of human life against his
better judgment, retaining a secularized view of the imago Dei in spite of God’s absence. But just
as Sartre realizes that all people must construct a notion of “human identity” for themselves, so
too does Anselmo realize, in concert with Sartre, that the individual decides “what humanity as a
whole should be.”49 As Robert Jordan adeptly observes, Anselmo is logically forced to adopt the
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role of a deity due to an irresolvable conflict in his thought. As a result, he must ask himself for
forgiveness rather than God.
Robert Jordan, however, does not understand the pleasure of killing, whether the target is
man or beast, for, in contrast with Anselmo, he does not view humanity as fundamentally
different from the rest of the animal kingdom and, arguably, for this reason, he does not take any
pleasure or pride in the act of killing, as Anselmo does. Rather, Robert Jordan kills out of
necessity and believes that those who take pleasure in killing are mentally disturbed. He says that
neither man nor beast bear the sacred image of God, and so it is perfectly acceptable to kill either
species if the situation calls for it. But this does not mean that Robert Jordan will experience
pride or pleasure in the act of killing, for such emotions grow out of a mental disturbance, he
asserts—the belief that an individual’s superiority is reinforced through repeated acts of
sovereign domination.
Now, it is certainly the case that human beings are smarter than other animal species
(granting, of course, that, when saying this, we adopt an anthropocentric view of what constitutes
superior intelligence), but it should also be noted that some human beings are significantly
smarter than other human beings, so superior intelligence does not necessarily indicate a
difference in species. It is similarly the case that human beings can physically dominate other
animals, but, in like manner, it should be noted that human beings can physically dominate each
other as well, so neither does the ability to physically dominate your opponent necessarily
indicate a difference in animal species. Nevertheless, when it comes to certain abilities, some
species are superior to other species, just as some individuals are superior to other individuals.
The Dorcas Gazelle, for instance, which can survive its entire life without drinking water, is
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much better than any human being at remaining hydrated in arid conditions. But this does not
mean that the gazelle should be afforded sacred rights and privileges in light of its (hypothetical)
superior metaphysical value, which has no logical relationship to its abilities whatsoever. So
even if human beings are the most intelligent animals on earth, the most loving animals on earth,
the most creative animals on earth, or what have you, this does not mean that they have superior
metaphysical value. In short, differences in ability do not necessarily indicate a “great
difference” between animal species, as Anselmo would seem to believe, and, moreover, a
lifeform’s inherent, metaphysical value has no logical relationship to its abilities whatsoever, no
matter how “superior” that lifeform may appear.
The problem is that human beings tend to overvalue their own abilities and, as a direct
consequence of this, they mistakenly regard themselves as inherently more valuable than other
lifeforms. But values are subjective by nature; they vary from person to person, and even from
species to species. So inherent value, in principle, is a hypothetical notion—it does not actually
exist for the atheist. Thus, when nonreligious people use the phrase inherent value, they do so in
bad faith, for, without logical justification to demonstrate its existence, inherent value is a mere
rhetorical device—it authorizes the speaker’s value system over competing value systems by
simply calling itself authoritative. For religious people, by contrast, the phrase refers to anything
valued by God, who determines the metaphysical nature of being. Religious believers therefore
have logical justification for their belief in objective moral value: human beings are superior to
other species, for example, because they bear the divine image. For nonreligious people,
however, their belief in human superiority reflects entirely subjective values.
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Not being captive to anthropocentric views himself, Robert Jordan, as with many of
Hemingway’s characters, disrupts the human/animal hierarchy. From the 1925 edition of in our
time to A Farewell to Arms (1929), Death in the Afternoon (1932), For Whom the Bell Tolls
(1940), and, looking some thirty years into the future, The Old Man and the Sea (1952)—a
period of time that Hemingway is thought to have been a practicing Catholic—the writer
consistently undermines the notion that human beings are inherently superior to nonhuman
lifeforms. “You are killing me, fish,” reflects Santiago, the celebrated protagonist of
Hemingway’s Nobel-Prize-winning novella, “[b]ut you have a right to. Never have I seen a
greater, or more beautiful, or a calmer or more noble thing than you, brother. Come on and kill
me.”50 Not only is the marlin superior to Santiago in a variety of ways, but, according to
Santiago, it is the marlin’s right to kill him. This directly contradicts the Christian teaching that
“[e]very moving thing … shall be food” for God’s image-bearers, that special creature of
supreme importance at the center of his cosmic plan.51 Santiago recognizes the fish as his
“brother,” just as the American Indians and gypsies in For Whom the Bell Tolls recognized the
bear as theirs. Hemingway presents us with an egalitarian view of the animal kingdom that
recognizes human beings as themselves an animal species.
Readers of Hemingway scholarship will already be familiar with the often-cited passage
of the lion’s first-person perspective in “The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber.”
According to Ryan Hediger, “Hemingway reverses conventional anthropocentric perspectives [in
the short story by] literally making the ‘man’ in the scene an it, part of an ‘object,’ a mere scent
on the wind. To do this, Hemingway has relied upon the subjectivity of the lion to make his own
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text.”52 Christopher McGill says that the lion “becomes a character,” providing “an opportunity
for the reader to think through the experience of a hunted animal.”53 The lion “eclipses the
privileged perspective of the hunters,” he writes, “and generates, in turn, a distinct and powerful
nonhuman presence in the story.”54 The animal perspective introduces a shift in power, exposing
readers to an interspecies dynamic that questions the value of human story-telling, which, by its
very nature, tends to be self-oriented and self-aggrandizing. As Margot Macomber says to
Francis and their white hunter, Robert Wilson: “You’re both talking rot … Just because you’ve
chased some helpless animals in a motor car you talk like heroes.” 55 One could extend Margot’s
sentiment a bit further and argue that most man-made stories are egotistical by nature insofar as
they focus on human characters, human action, and human concerns from an all-too-human
perspective. Not surprisingly, Francis and Wilson are the heroes of their own story, performing
courageous, praiseworthy acts that result in the triumphant defeat of their antagonists (whom
Margot identifies as innocent, unsuspecting animals). Hemingway’s shift to the animal
perspective is only a momentary blip in the narrative—it seems to appear without anticipation or
forethought, as if the writer seized the opportunity, quite simply, to experiment with shifting
perspectives—but the technique nevertheless decenters the story and, through this decentering,
the shift to an animal perspective questions the value of anthropocentric storytelling and,
alongside of it, the superiority of human life.
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Given the fact that many readers feel sympathy for the lion—take, for example, Nina
Baym’s article “Actually, I Felt Sorry for the Lion” 56—Hemingway’s critique of
anthropocentrism may come across as a defense of animal rights. But Hemingway’s egalitarian
vision of the animal kingdom should not be interpreted as a defense of animal rights, in which he
expressly does not believe. As Hemingway states in the opening pages of Death in the
Afternoon, there are “two general groups” of people: those who do not identify with animals and
those who do, “the almost professional lovers of dogs, and other beasts.” 57 As we have already
seen, Hemingway does not believe, as the first group does, that human beings are inherently
superior to other animals, but he also fails to identify with the second group, who agrees with his
view that human beings are themselves an animal species. This is because, in contrast with
Hemingway, the second group is opposed to animal cruelty (something that Hemingway defends
at great length), and they base their defense of any nonhuman creature “on that fact that [said
creature] is an animal and hence worthy of love.” 58 The animal rights advocate would appear to
defend animals on the basis of their animality alone just as the human rights advocate defends
human beings on the basis of their humanity alone. As Agamben explains (see Chapter Two of
this dissertation), the lifeforms in question are illogically attributed an inherent, metaphysical
value which serves as the basis of their inviolable rights. Hemingway admits that he loves certain
animals on a personal basis in light of their individual qualities, but he does not love “dogs as
dogs, horses as horses, or cats as cats.”59 He does not, in other words, love animals on the basis
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of their animality alone, and he does not, with the animal rights advocate, believe that animals
have inherent, metaphysical value. Thus, Hemingway is actually part of a third group: he
identifies with both animals and humans (themselves an animal species), but he does not believe
that either group has inherent rights.
At stake here are contrasting forms of egalitarianism, both positive and negative. The
positive form seeks to elevate animals to the level of humans, granting animals the same rights
and privileges traditionally afforded to humanity, while the negative form lowers humanity to the
level of animals, stripping humans of the rights and privileges that have traditionally set them
apart as superior. In both cases, humans are regarded as equal to animals, but, in the former case,
humans and animals alike are afforded sacred rights, whereas, in the latter case, humans and
animals both are stripped of their rights and denied a sacred status. It is my belief that
Hemingway falls within this second camp of egalitarianism, stripping humanity of its sacred
rights in order to identify as an animal, which is given no rights whatsoever. After all, the deepsea fisherman and big-game hunter loved to kill animals, and, as a bullfight aficionado, he loved
watching other people kill animals as well, so it is quite probable that Hemingway opposed the
idea of animal rights.
That being said, critic Kevin Maier persuasively argues that, as Hemingway ages, he
becomes more and more committed to wildlife conservation and the so-called “sportsman’s ethic
[that President Theodore] Roosevelt helped [to] make famous.” 60 But Roosevelt—Hemingway’s
childhood hero—demonstrated an insatiable bloodlust in his lifetime, killing nearly 300 animals
on safari in 1909 and famously leading the Rough Riders to victory at San Juan Hill during the
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Spanish-American War. Hemingway continued to idolize Roosevelt well into his adulthood and
even hired Phillip Percival, one of Roosevelt’s hunting guides from the well-known and highly
celebrated expedition of 1909, to lead his own safari with Pauline in 1933. Like Roosevelt,
Hemingway was a lifelong hunter whose own “body-count” was, in the words of Glen Love,
“startlingly high.”61 The “Hemingway kill record is astonishing,” Love states; “Not only biggame animals (lions, leopards, buffalo, rhinoceros, kudu, etc.) in Africa and the American West,
including a flying eagle and some of the last grizzly bears outside protected areas in America,
but also shoals of marlin, tuna, dolphin, tarpon, kingfish, and sea turtles.” 62 Like Roosevelt,
Hemingway loved to kill, so he most likely adhered to a negative form of egalitarianism that
animalizes humanity rather than to a positive form of egalitarianism that humanizes animals.
These contrasting forms of egalitarianism also mark the difference between animal rights
activism and certain veins of posthumanist thought. Take, for example, Tom Regan’s landmark
study The Case for Animal Rights (1983). Regan argues that animals share certain qualities with
human beings, among which include self-consciousness, the ability to experience pleasure or
pain, and the instinctual desire to protect their own wellbeing; these qualities indicate, in turn,
that animals have inherent, inviolable rights, just like the human beings whom they resemble. In
other words, because human beings—the “genius and the retarded child, the prince and the
pauper, the brain surgeon and the fruit vendor, Mother Teresa and the most unscrupulous usedcar salesman—all have inherent value,” it follows, in Regan’s view, that animals too have
inherent value, for they consciously experience both pleasure and pain just as human beings do,
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and they wish to increase their pleasure and decrease their pain just as human beings wish to. 63
Regan wrongly conflates a creature’s inherent value with their conscious desire to avoid pain, as
if the two elements were somehow evidence of each other, but there is simply no reason to
conflate the two, as neither claim logically requires that the other be true as well. Regan reverse
engineers an argument for animal rights, first, by treating the desire to avoid pain as proof that
animals resemble humans, and, second, by treating the similarities between animals and humans
as proof that animals too are inherently valuable. But Regan’s argument rests on a religious
presupposition for which he does not provide logical justification: namely, the belief that human
beings are inherently valuable.
Regan models a positive form of egalitarianism that characterizes how the lion’s share of
animal rights activists approach the issue of animal equality. Beginning with Peter Singer’s 1975
Animal Liberation, animal rights advocates have argued that sentient lifeforms should be given
the same moral consideration as human beings because, like humans, they too are capable of
suffering. Singer argues that speciesism, or discrimination against other (nonhuman) species, is
comparable to racism and should therefore be abolished. Singer promotes a positive form of
egalitarianism that strives toward a more inclusive, ever-widening scope of personhood. As
Michael Pollan, a contemporary voice in the study of animal rights, describes in his reading of
Singer’s watershed contribution to the field, “the white man’s circle of moral consideration was
expanded to admit first blacks, then women, then homosexuals. In each case, a group once
thought to be so different from the prevailing ‘we’ as to be undeserving of civil rights was, after
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a struggle, admitted to the club. Now it [i]s the animal’s turn.” 64 But, as Pollan indicates, there is
a problem with Singer’s egalitarian vision. “I asked Salatin,” the owner of Polyface Farm, which
specializes in sustainable agriculture, “how he could bring himself to kill a chicken,” and Salatin
replied: “People have a soul; animals don’t … Unlike us, animals are not created in God’s image,
so when they die, they just die.”65 Under the positive form of egalitarianism, to be treated equally
is to be treated like a human being, but, barring the imago Dei, there is simply no reason to
believe that human life constitutes the metaphysical standard around which we should organize a
moral code. Positive egalitarianism is the driving force behind animal rights advocacy; it strives
to include animals, the dehumanized, and other nonhuman lifeforms within the fold of sacred
human identity, a secularized theological standard whose true vacancy, when revealed to be
vacant, unravels the entire system from within.
Certain veins of posthumanist thought offer in its place an alternate form of
egalitarianism, a negative egalitarianism that, in keeping with Agamben’s critique of
anthropogenesis, eliminates the violent oppression of nonhuman lifeforms through the
deconstruction of “human rights”—a point that I developed at length in Part Two of this
dissertation. In works like Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) and “Beyond
Human Rights” (1993), a short essay written five years earlier, Agamben argues that in modern
nation-states human rights are only afforded to legal citizens. But citizenship can be revoked, as
it often has been in the modern era, the consequence of which is the loss of one’s legal rights
and, alongside of them, the loss of one’s humanity. So-called human rights, then, as with legal
citizenship, are not inherent qualities, and, as Agamben will argue a decade later in The Open
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(2003), the very concept of humanity is the problem here, not just the laws governing citizenship.
This is because, as a differential construct, “human identity” must be distinguished from the
nonhuman to appear intelligible, so the very notion of human rights, whether those rights legally
authorized or not, itself has dehumanizing effects, producing the nonhumans who, as a matter of
principle, will not be afforded those same rights.
Agamben recognizes that humanism will only ever protect humanity at the expense of
nonhuman life because positive forms of egalitarianism necessarily subsist of hierarchies. He
offers in its place a negative egalitarianism that levels the playing field through a so-called
profanation of transcendental forms. Agamben’s project is posthumanist, in this sense, because it
seeks to overcome the founding metaphysical divisions of humanistic thought. His goal,
therefore, is not to reform humanism, but to deconstruct it from within. Humanism itself cannot
be reformed, according to Agamben, because every humanitarian gesture toward a more
inclusive society is also already exclusive by nature. In order to achieve true equality, then, we
must overcome human exceptionalism. According to Agamben scholar Matthew Calarco,
“humanism is founded on a separation of the humanitas and animalitas within the human,” so
“no genuinely posthumanist politics can emerge without grappling with the logic and
consequences of this division,” as we see in Agamben’s assiduous examination of
anthropogenesis and “human-based politics.”66 Agamben scholar Adam Kotsko seconds this
notion, observing that Agamben’s goal “is not to reform the system or return it to a more stable
balance—for instance, to stop relying on exceptional emergency powers and return to the
‘normal’ rule of law—but to fully grasp it in order to understand how to dismantle it.” 67
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Agamben wants to deconstruct “human rights,” which are based on human exceptionalism—or a
secularized theological belief in the imago Dei—in order to make room for a new kind of
equality, what he calls absolute immanence, or a world devoid of metaphysical hierarchies. This
is the negative form of egalitarianism to which Agamben ascribes in his critique of the sovereign
exception; and it is also the model to which Hemingway ascribes in his own ostensible rejection
of God, the afterlife, and the imago Dei.

CHAPTER FOUR
HEMINGWAY’S MASCULINE HERO
There Are No Happy Endings
Hemingway’s animalization of human beings follows his war-time observations of dead
and dying soldiers, none of whom exited the world in a dignified way. As a young ambulance
driver, Hemingway was shaken by the grotesque manner in which both soldiers and civilians
were killed; he was likewise disturbed by the process undergone by their decaying bodies. As
discussed at length in Chapters One and Two of this dissertation, Hemingway was raised as a
devout Congregationalist in the tight-knit community of Oak Park, so when he saw that God’s
beloved creatures, who were created in his image for a special purpose, could themselves rot
above ground without proper ceremony, he realized that human beings are inherently no different
from the cargo mules drowned at Smyrna. Both animals and humans (an animal species) end up
in the same place, and, in this sense, they are equals, he reasoned; there is no hierarchy of value.
By the time Hemingway wrote Death in the Afternoon, the concept of negative equality had
already taken hold of the writer, as we see in his sardonic appraisal of Mungo Park, the traveler
and natural theologian. At some point in his discussion with the old lady, Hemingway tells her a
story about a monogamous bull who is deemed useless and sent to the ring after he stops mating
with the entire herd. The old lady calls it a “sad story,” and Hemingway replies with the
following:
Madame, all stories, if continued far enough, end in death, and he is no true-story teller
who would keep that from you. Especially do all stories of monogamy end in death, and
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your man who is monogamous while he often lives most happily, dies in the most lonely
fashion. There is no lonelier man in death, except the suicide, than that man who has
lived many years with a good wife and then outlived her. If two people love each other
there can be no happy end to it.1
Hemingway again draws a comparison between animals and human-animals. The old lady
expresses sympathy for the bull, perhaps because she identifies with its seemingly romantic
desire to be monogamous. But Hemingway implores the old lady to redirect that sympathy
toward herself, for, in a manner of speaking, she too will be sent to the ring. Death is the true
equalizer, Hemingway suggests; it proves that we are inherently no different from the animals
we condescend to, for, at the time of death, we slip into nonexistence and our bodies begin to
decay. As Salatin, the owner of Polyface farm had put it in his conversation with Michael Pollan,
“when [animals] die, they just die.”2 The same is true of humans, so even the person who lives
“most happily,” basking in the pleasure of their day-to-day experience, should realize that their
joy will soon come to an end. Just as monogamy—an archetypal site of the much-sought-after
fairytale ending—eventually gives way to unfathomable loneliness, so too does every attempt to
create lasting significance in our lives eventually give way to feelings of insignificance, the
devastating realization that the life we live will soon be replaced by eternal nonexistence.
The passage alludes to the final pages of A Farewell to Arms, Hemingway’s great love
story published just three years earlier. After deserting the war, Frederic Henry and his lover, the
nurse Catherine Barkley, abscond first to Montreux and then to Lausanne, Switzerland. Away
from the war, Frederic and Catherine live happily in romantic bliss, awaiting the birth of their
child. But tragedy looms on the horizon, and after many strenuous hours in the delivery room,
Catherine and the baby die. Earlier in the novel, we learn that both Frederic and Catherine are
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atheists. Catherine, for instance, confesses that she “ha[s]n’t any religion,” though she carries a
necklace of Saint Anthony with her “for luck,” in keeping with the popular custom. 3 Frederic too
observes that our earthly existence is “all and all and all” there is to life, a sad reality that keeps
him awake at night.4 After losing their baby boy, who was strangled to death by Catherine’s
umbilical cord, Frederic confesses that he has “no feeling” for the deceased child, but he
wonders if the baby should have been baptized, given the Catholic teaching that unbaptized
babies go into limbo.5 Like Catherine, Frederic pays tribute to the Church out of respect for
polite society, but, when it comes down to it, he simply “ha[s] no religion.” 6 Frederic then
reflects on the fact that both he and Catherine will die too. “That was what you did,” Frederic
thinks to himself; “You died. You did not know what it was about. You never had time to learn.
They threw you in and told you the rules and the first time they caught you off base they killed
you. … You could count on that. Stay around and they would kill you.” 7 Life has no lasting
significance and, even if you put your faith in the Church, there is still no hope of an afterlife, or
so Hemingway appears to suggest.
As we have already seen, both Frederic and Catherine pay tribute to the Church,
practicing aspects of religion without actually believing in their efficacy, as if out of respect for
tradition and cultural custom. Frederic admits to an elderly priest, his friend Count Greffi, that
his “religious feeling … comes only at night,” though he expects to “become very devout” as he
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ages.8 Readers should note, however, that this “religious feeling” is not the same as religious
belief, for Count Greffi compares it to romantic love, which can be experienced by anyone,
regardless of their religious affiliation. From what I can gather, “religious feeling,” in
Hemingway’s secularized theological view, is a natural inclination toward the core qualities of
religion, an aspiration for something greater beyond ourselves, such as everlasting love. But
Frederic is disabused of his religious feeling after God takes the life of Catherine, his one true
love: “Don’t let her die. Oh, God, please don’t let her die. I’ll do anything for you if you won’t
let her die. Please, please, please, dear God, don’t let her die. … You took the baby, but don’t let
her die.”9 Frederic does not believe in religion, but he genuinely wants to, befriending priests,
observing Catholic doctrine, and sincerely begging God for help. But Frederic knows deep down
that God will not help him. He sits in the hospital, awaiting Catherine’s diagnosis, when a
troubling memory comes to mind:
Once in camp I put a log on top of the fire and it was full of ants. As it commenced to
burn, the ants swarmed out and went first toward the centre where the fire was; then
turned back and ran toward the end. When there were enough on the end they fell off into
the fire. Some got out, their bodies burnt and flattened, and went off not knowing where
they were going. But most of them went toward the fire and then back toward the end and
swarmed on the cool end and finally fell off into the fire. I remember thinking at the time
that it was the end of the world and a splendid chance to be a messiah and lift the log off
the fire and throw it out where the ants could get off onto the ground. But I did not do
anything but throw a tin cup of water on the log, so that I would have the cup empty to
put whiskey in before I added water to it. I think the cup of water on the burning log only
steamed the ants.10
According to Christianity, God has the power to save the life of every human being, those
exceptional creatures of supreme importance at the center of his cosmic plan, and yet he chooses
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not to, allowing a great many of them to perish. Reconciling the two concepts—the first, that
human life matters to God, the second, that God chooses to save some people and not others—is
a difficult task, especially when you put yourself in the shoes of the deity, as Frederic does. The
fact is, Frederic could have removed the log without any effort, saving the entire colony, just as
an omnipotent deity can save the soul of every person, should he choose to. But Frederic watches
the ants burn. The act is sadistic, at worst, and apathetic, at best, as we could say that Frederic
simply lacked the motivation to rescue creatures of so little importance. But this is precisely
Frederic’s point: that an omnipotent deity would choose not to save every person is evidence that
human life is not as significant as we think—Frederic suggests that we are mere “ants” in the
cosmic scheme of things. Hemingway challenges Christianity’s belief in the imago Dei by
depicting human beings as mortal animals; he challenges anthropocentrism by advancing a
negative view of equality that frames death as the shared destiny of every organism. Human
exceptionalism is a religious fiction.
With this point in place, I draw my reader’s attention back to Sartre, for the belief that
human life is rendered insignificant by death is an important tenet of his existentialist
philosophy. My thesis, of course, is that both writers secularize the imago Dei without realizing
it, that both Hemingway and Sartre adopt a belief in human exceptionalism after first rejecting
their belief in the imago Dei. Thus, throughout this project, it has been my task to delineate the
logical (or perhaps illogical), step-by-step process that leads both Hemingway and Sartre down
the path of secularized theism. Their shared belief in human insignificance—or the
meaninglessness of life, as the phrase is often put—is the first of several parts, all of which are
portrayed in the authors’ fiction. As a point of comparison, I offer a brief analysis of Sartre’s
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“The Wall,” a short story on the Spanish Civil War written just one year prior to Hemingway’s
publication on the same topic in For Whom the Bell Tolls. Three prisoners of war are sentenced
to death, the protagonist, Pablo Ibbieta, and two of his comrades, Tom and Juan. They spend the
night in anticipation of their executions, which will take place against a firing wall, from which
the story gets its name. Of course, the title also symbolizes the inevitable ending that each of us
will someday face. Insurmountable, impermeable, a dead stop—the wall is a passage into
permanent nonexistence.
Readers should note that Pablo is a leftist revolutionary fighting against the fascist
dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Pablo cares deeply about politics and refuses to give up their
leader, Ramon Gris, when the fascists offer to spare his life in exchange for Gris’s location. But,
at some point during Pablo’s long journey into the morning, at which time he will finally be
executed, Pablo undergoes a transformation. Sartre presents us with the changes that take place
in a human being after they have accepted their mortality, a before-and-after look at an
individual confronted with certain death. Finding himself on the other side of this transformation,
Pablo is stricken by the absurd thoughts and behavior of his former self:
A crowd of memories came back to me pell-mell. There were good and bad ones—or at
least I called them that before. There were faces and incidents. I saw the face of a little
novillero who was gored in Valencia during the Feria, the face of one of my uncles, the
face of Ramon Gris. I remembered my whole life: how I was out of work for three
months in 1926, how I almost starved to death. I remembered a night I spent on a bench
in Granada: I hadn’t eaten for three days. I was angry, I didn’t want to die. That made me
smile. How madly I ran after happiness, after women, after liberty. Why? I wanted to free
Spain, I admired Pi y Margall, I joined the anarchist movement, I spoke in public
meetings: I took everything as seriously as if I were immortal. At that moment I felt that I
had my whole life in front of me and I thought, “It’s a damned lie.” It was worth nothing
because it was finished. I wondered how I’d been able to walk, to laugh with the girls: I
wouldn’t have moved so much as my little finger if I had only imagined I would die like
this. My life was in front of me, shut, closed, like a bag and yet everything inside of it
was unfinished. For an instant I tried to judge it. I wanted to tell myself, this is a beautiful
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life. But I couldn’t pass judgment on it; it was only a sketch; I had spent my time
counterfeiting eternity, I had understood nothing. … death had disenchanted everything. 11
Pablo’s thought process begins with the memory of a young bullfighter, a matador in training
who was gored to death before his time. Pablo remembers the young man’s face, as if perceiving
the memento mori in his expression. He then remembers the face of his uncle, who presumably
also died, and then the face of Ramon Gris, whose own death has been foreshadowed. Their
deaths remind Pablo that he once battled to stay alive himself, still enchanted, as he was at the
time, with the illusion of immortality. He strove after women, happiness, and liberty as if they
were his human right, and he fought to secure these rights as if they had lasting significance. But
the truth is that Pablo will die, just as every person dies, and whether or not he had women,
happiness, or liberty will make no difference in the end. “I took everything as seriously as if I
were immortal,” Pablo states; “I had spent my time counterfeiting eternity.” When confronted
with the overwhelming promise of eternal nonexistence, our current lives appear relatively
unimportant. Had someone “told me [while I was on death row that] I could go home quietly,”
Pablo reflects, “it would have left me cold: several hours or several years of waiting is all the
same when you have lost the illusion of being eternal.” 12 People may experience pain or pleasure,
despair or ecstasy, peace or even outright boredom in their lifetimes, but their quality of life will
cease to matter after they die. Every one of us is on death row, waiting for the flame to burn out.
After reading “The Wall,” one cannot help but wonder if Sartre, himself a reader of
Hemingway, was inspired by “Chapter V” of Hemingway’s In Our Time, which reads as follows:
They shot the six cabinet ministers at half-past six in the morning against the wall of a
hospital. There were pools of water in the courtyard. There were wet dead leaves on the
paving of the courtyard. It rained hard. All the shutters of the hospital were nailed shut.
11
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One of the ministers was sick with typhoid. Two soldiers carried him downstairs and out
into the rain. They tried to hold him up against the wall but he sat down in a puddle of
water. The other five stood very quietly against the wall. Finally the officer told the
soldiers it was no good trying to make him stand up. When they fired the first volley he
was sitting down in the water with his head on his knees. 13
Sartre’s short story is reminiscent of Hemingway’s sketch, in which “the wall” is mentioned
three times.14 Hemingway depicts a cabinet minister sick with typhoid who resembles Pablo’s
comrade, Juan Mirbal, “a sick man who defends himself against illness by fever.” 15 In Sartre’s
story, “Two soldiers took [Juan] under the arms and set him on his feet. But he fell as soon as
they released him.”16 Likewise, in Hemingway’s sketch, “Two soldiers carried [one of the
cabinet ministers] downstairs and out into the rain. They tried to hold him up against the wall but
he sat down in a puddle of water.” The striking similarities between the two works are perhaps
evidence that Sartre was familiar with Hemingway’s sketch, which appeared in the 1924 Paris
edition of in our time. That Sartre wished to enlarge upon its themes, even borrowing specific
images from the sketch, is debatable, but the similarities between the two works show that
Hemingway and Sartre were operating on a shared wave length: both understood the
consequences of death’s inevitability.
Similar comparisons can be made between “The Wall” and Hemingway’s “In Another
Country,” which was published as part of the 1927 short story collection Men Without Women.
The two stories exhibit important overlap in their portrayal of individuals who have come face13
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to-face with death, in their portrayal, that is, of the transformation undergone by people who
have accepted their mortality. The story takes place in Milan, Italy during the First World War.
A band of injured soldiers make daily visits to a doctor who treats their ailments with new,
experimental machinery. The narrator, for example, puts his leg into a contraption that “bend[s]
the knee and make[s] it move as in riding a tricycle. … In the next machine was a major who had
a little hand like a baby’s.”17 The doctor encourages the patients to have high hopes, promising
that the machinery will improve their conditions and even make them stronger. The doctor
presents stunning before-and-after photos to prove the machinery’s efficacy, but the narrator
knows not to trust the photos, as he and the other soldiers are “the first ones to use the
machines.”18
Among the injured soldiers was the lieutenant of Arditi, a “tall boy with a very pale face”
who “had lived a very long time with death and was a little detached. They were all a little
detached” because, as soldiers formerly in battle, each of them had lived with death for a time. 19
Like Harold Krebs of “Soldier’s Home,” who struggles to find employment and appears totally
unable to connect with friends and family after his return home from the war—stating at one
point that he “do[es]n’t love anybody”20—the injured soldiers appear indifferent to life and even
lack enthusiasm for the machines that promise their recovery. Supposing they do recover, it will
not be long before they die, for death is always just around the corner for people who recognize
its inevitability. That said, momentary gratification in the lived experience itself can certainly
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motivate a dying person to engage meaningfully in life, but even momentary joy, however
ecstatic, loses its appeal when you know that certain death follows in its wake.
The same can be said of momentary rage and the gratification that one gets from causing
harm to their enemy. When Sartre’s Pablo Ibbieta is shown false kindness by a fascist doctor on
the night before his execution, Pablo begins to accost the doctor but quickly loses interest. “I was
going to continue, but something surprising suddenly happened to me; the presence of this doctor
no longer interested me. Generally when I’m on somebody I don’t let go. But the desire to talk
left me completely; I shrugged and turned my eyes away.” 21 And then later: “I had been dripping
[sweat] for an hour and hadn’t felt it. But that swine of a [doctor] hadn’t missed a thing; … I
wanted to stand up and smash his face but no sooner had I made the slightest gesture than my
rage and shame were wiped out; I fell back on the bench with indifference.” 22 No longer
beholden to a false sense of immortality, Pablo’s rage wells up but very quickly fizzles out.
“In Another Country” ends with a heated exchange between the narrator and a fellow
patient, the major, who asks the narrator what he plans to do after the war. When the narrator
answers that he hopes to marry, the major castigates him: “‘The more of a fool you are,’ he said.
He seemed very angry. ‘A man must not marry. … If he is to lose everything, he should not
place himself in a position to lose that. He should not place himself in a position to lose.’” 23 The
narrator asks the major why a man should necessarily lose his wife, and the major responds:
“He’ll lose it,” the major said. He was looking at the wall. Then he looked down at the
machine and jerked his little hand out from between the straps and slapped it hard against
his thigh. “He’ll lose it,” he almost shouted. “Don’t argue with me!” Then called to the
attendant who ran the machines. “Come and turn this damned thing off.” He went back
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into the other room for the light treatment and the massage. Then I heard him ask the
doctor if he might use his telephone and he shut the door. When he came back into the
room, I was sitting in another machine. He was wearing his cape and had his cap on, and
he came directly toward my machine and put his arm on my shoulder. “I am so sorry,” he
said, and patted me on the shoulder with his good hand. “I would not be rude. My wife
has just died. You must forgive me.” … The doctor told me that the major’s wife, who
was very young and whom he had not married until he was definitely invalided out of the
war, had died of pneumonia. She had been sick only a few days. 24
Ripping his hand away from the machine in a symbolic gesture, the major rejects the false hope
that this new technology represents. It is technological advancement, after all, that led to
automatic weaponry, his own injuries, and the unprecedented death toll of modern warfare. The
major’s hope of recovery is soured, in other words, by the fact that technological advancement is
indirectly responsible for the soldiers’ injuries. At the same time, he recognizes that—with or
without technology, with or without debilitating injuries—he, his loved ones, and every soldier at
the hospital is going to die; the unexpected loss of his young wife, moreover, reminds the major
that youth is no protection against death, which is always imminent, regardless of one’s age. The
major castigates the narrator for investing too much hope in a temporary life, urging him to
invest only in things that cannot be lost. As the reader discovers, however, both the major and the
narrator well know that everything will eventually be lost. The major expresses a desire to kill
himself but confesses that he is too afraid to go through with it. The narrator likewise states: “I
was very much afraid to die, and often lay in bed at night by myself, afraid to die and wondering
how I would be when I went back to the front again.” 25 Both characters are confronted by the
wall, certain that eternal nonexistence will overtake their lives, and it terrifies them.
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On the Use of Ritual
Before we declare the Hemingway hero a full-blown atheist who rejects the imago Dei,
the afterlife, and everything that religion entails, I will remind readers that Hemingway’s
characters often practice religion, just as the writer himself practiced religion, and they often
demonstrate the “religious feeling,” just as Frederic Henry does in A Farewell to Arms. In short,
there is a marked ambiguity reflected in Hemingway’s fiction: he lacks a sincere belief in the
afterlife—an essential doctrine of Christianity—but he shows genuine interest in religious ritual
and practice. “Now I Lay Me,” the final story of the Men Without Women collection, embodies
this ambiguity, as the narrator, Nick Adams, recites Catholic prayers but recognizes death as the
final stop. The title of Hemingway’s short story alludes to the famous child’s prayer “Now I Lay
Me Down to Sleep,” the first four lines of which most often appear as follows, though there are
other versions: “Now I lay me down to sleep/ I pray the Lord my soul to keep/ If I should die
before I wake/ I pray to God my soul to take.” As even a cursory examination of Hemingway’s
short story reveals, however, the allusion does not suggest a Christian interpretation of the
story’s themes, which, to the contrary, are atheistic in nature. The title is clearly meant to be
ironic.
Nick, a lieutenant, and John, a fellow soldier, lay injured in a hospital tent awake at night
while the other soldiers sleep. Nick had a near-death experience on the battlefield, and now he
desperately tries to stay awake at night for fear of dying in his sleep:
I myself did not want to sleep because I had been living for a long time with the
knowledge that if I ever shut my eyes in the dark and let myself go, my soul would go out
of my body. I had been that way for a long time, ever since I had been blown up at night
and felt it go out of me and go off and then come back. I tried never to think about it, but
it had started to go since, in the nights, just at the moment of going off to sleep, and I
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could only stop it by very great effort. So while now I am fairly sure that it would not
really have gone out, yet then, that summer, I was unwilling to make the experiment. 26
Recounting the summer he was hospitalized in Milan, Italy during the war, Nick says he
experienced an irrational fear of dying during his sleep. We learn from the passage that Nick was
“blown up at night,” during which time his soul left his body and then returned to it, so it may be
the close association of nighttime with dying that first caused his paranoia. “I knew my soul
would only go out of me if it were dark,” he says. 27 Readers of A Farewell to Arms will
remember that Frederic Henry had a strikingly similar experience on the Italian front after being
hit by an explosion: “I tried to breathe but my breath would not come and I felt myself rush
bodily out of myself and out and out and out and all the time bodily in the wind. I went out
swiftly, all of myself, and I knew I was dead,” he narrates; “Then I floated, and instead of going
on I felt myself slide back.” In both instances, the character’s soul leaves his corporeal form,
floats around, and then returns to the body. The accounts suggest that Hemingway believed in a
human soul.
When we compare these excerpts against Hemingway’s own near-death experience on
the Italian front, however, it seems less likely that Hemingway believed in the human soul, or the
continuation of life after death. We already discussed in Chapter Two of this dissertation the
letter that Hemingway wrote home to his parents after being hospitalized, in which he states that
“[d]ying is a very simple thing. I’ve looked at death and really I know. If I should have died it
would have been very easy for me. Quite the easiest thing I ever did. … And how much better to
die in all the happy period of undisillusioned youth, to go out in a blaze of light.” 28 On the one
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hand, dying would be very easy for a Christian believer if they could be certain of life after
death. Like Frederic Henry and Nick Adams, they could simply float out of their bodies and
return to God, confident that their next phase of existence will be blissful. But I do not believe
readers can in good faith adopt a Christian interpretation of Hemingway’s letter. I would remind
them that Hemingway was still very young at the time of writing, and while he had managed to
break ties with the Congregationalist church of Oak Park, he was still beholden to parents who
expected their son to be faithful. Were it, in fact, the case that Hemingway was a believing
Congregationalist (or even a believing Catholic, for that matter), there would be no reason to
tiptoe around the concept of death. He would undoubtedly reassure his parents that death is
succeeded by everlasting life, stating the fact overtly, in celebration, as something that he and his
parents can take solace in together. Instead, he writes that death is a “simple thing” that he alone
understands, for, unlike his parents, he has “looked at death and really [he] know[s].” People do
not transition from this life into the next as everlasting souls that survive their mortal bodies;
they simply “go out,” Hemingway writes, moving from existence to nonexistence in the blink of
an eye.
Matthew Nickel argues in his analysis of “Now I Lay Me” that Nick’s relationship to
“darkness and night is complicated, not only because it reminds him of the wound[s incurred on
the battlefield], but because his wounding experience led him to the recognition of his soul.
Thus, night and darkness are perpetual reminders that he has a soul and of the possibility [that]
he may lose his soul again, permanently.” 29 “Now I Lay Me” is proof of Hemingway’s Catholic
belief, in Nickel’s opinion, but, according to Catholic doctrine, the human soul is eternal, so, if
Nick really has a Catholic point of view, as Nickel says he does, he would not fear losing his
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soul permanently, as if it risked annihilation. The matter becomes even more confusing when
Nickel writes that “many tribal cultures [still believe] that one’s soul goes out of one in the night.
Thus, in the night, Nick contemplates the existence of his soul in the dark” as something he risks
temporarily losing.30 Nickel equates Nick’s anxiety over these matters with the Catholic mystic’s
dark night of the soul, a “moment of fatigue following joyous ecstasy.” 31 But if we accept
Nickel’s rather complicated reading, Nick is afraid of nightfall for multiple, contradictory
reasons: first, he fears that his soul will be permanently annihilated; second, he fears that his soul
will escape his body to wander the earth until morning; and, third, he fears descending into a
dark night of the soul, a spiritual crisis described by Catholic mystics that, we learn, has nothing
to do with the first two fears at all. Catholics do not believe that the human soul risks
annihilation, after all, and neither do they believe that the human soul temporarily leaves the
body at night. It is strange that Nickel presents these views in support of his interpretation, to say
the very least.
Moreover, there is a glaring problem with the third item on this list, for Nick is not afraid
of the darkness itself, which forces the narrator into a spiritual crisis, according to Nickel.
Rather, Nick is afraid to fall asleep in the darkness. “I myself did not want to sleep,” Nick states,
“because I had been living for a long time with the knowledge that if I ever shut my eyes in the
dark and let myself go, my soul would go out of my body.” 32 The distinction here is important.
By Nickel’s account, “darkness itself” is the problem; it represents “an emptiness; [and] the
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struggle through darkness requires a leap of faith.”33 So Nick should actually want to sleep at
night, as sleep is the only way to avoid the darkness of night and, with it, the dark night of the
soul. Against Nickel’s interpretation, we learn something very different from the story itself.
Nick is not afraid of darkness per se, and he is not afraid of the spiritual crisis brought on by
darkness; he is afraid to fall asleep in the darkness, as Nick very clearly states, because the
combination of sleep and darkness will result in his death. He fears the possibility so much, in
fact, that he spends long nights engaged in a kind of ritual performance designed specifically to
keep himself awake. Nickel arrives at a Catholic interpretation of the story only by ignoring this
important detail. Nick does not believe that there is an afterlife waiting for him, which is
precisely why he dreads falling asleep at night.
“I had different ways of occupying myself while I lay awake. I would think of a trout
stream I had fished along when I was a boy,” Nick reflects, “and fish its whole length very
carefully in my mind; fishing very carefully under all the logs, all the turns of the bank, the deep
holes and the clear shallow stretches, sometimes catching trout and sometimes losing them.” 34
Nick methodically recounts the details of his childhood fishing trips, walking the same paths,
fishing the same spots, baiting his hook, and eating “lunch very slowly,” just as he had done
many times before.35 When fishing failed to occupy his attention, Nick tried to remember every
girl he had ever dated, and at other times still, he “tried to remember everything that had ever
happened to [him], starting with just before … the war and remembering back from one thing to
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another.”36 For fear of dying in his sleep at night, Nick would try to remember things that
demanded his attention, performing a kind of ritual to test his memory. On some nights, as well,
Nick turned to prayer, for it was challenging to remember everyone on his prayer list, requiring
significant time and effort. “But some nights I could not fish, and on those nights I was coldawake and said my prayers over and over and tried to pray for all the people I had ever known,”
Nick says; “If you prayed for all of them, saying a Hail Mary and an Our Father for each one, it
took a long time and finally it would be light.” 37 It would be easy to dismiss Nick’s recitation of
Catholic prayer as the mechanical ramblings of a lapsed Catholic who, in fear of annihilation, or
eternal nonbeing, will take any measure to stay awake at night, even resorting to the rote
memorizations of his boyhood religion. But Hemingway paints a more complicated picture than
this.
Scholars will note that “Big Two-Hearted River,” one of the author’s most anthologized
short stories, has often been interpreted as a redemption story, the river symbolizing a kind of
holy water that helps to restore Nick after the war. 38 Moreover, repetition and recital are essential
parts of the Catholic liturgy, so the fact that Nick engages in these practices lends further
credence to a Catholic interpretation of “Now I Lay Me,” which is, after all, the partial title of a
well-known prayer. Obviously, it would be a mistake to dismiss the Catholic elements of the
story, which are readily apparent. At the same time, it would be equally misguided to interpret
Nick as a believing Catholic, for the reasons I have already discussed, but for additional reasons,
as well. The incompleteness of the story’s title, for one—presented by Hemingway as “Now I
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Lay Me” rather than as “Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep”—mirrors the frequent partiality, or
incompleteness, of Nick’s prayers. “Some nights,” Nick recalls, that, while attempting to recite
the paternoster, he “could only get as far as ‘On earth as it is in heaven’ and then have to start all
over and be absolutely unable to get past that.”39 For readers unfamiliar with the paternoster, or
Lord’s Prayer, the first few lines are recited as follows: “Our Father, who art in heaven, hallowed
be thy name; thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” Nick is able to
imagine a hallowed deity, and he can even imagine the coming kingdom (or, if he cannot
imagine them, he can at least utter this part of the prayer without choking on his words). What
Nick cannot imagine, finding himself “absolutely unable to get past,” is the notion that God’s
will is somehow performed on earth “as it is in heaven.” Like Hemingway, Nick witnessed the
dark realities of bloody war, and just as Hemingway is unable to believe in a God who allows for
the brutal killing of his beloved creatures, so too is Nick unable to believe that God’s benevolent
will is present on earth.
Further evidence of Nick’s atheism can be seen in the short story’s treatment of the
marriage motif, which is similarly handled by “In Another Country,” the second title of the Men
Without Women collection. The major of “In Another Country” loses his young wife to
pneumonia and then castigates the narrator for planning to get married. “A man must not marry,”
the major says to the narrator; “If he is to lose everything, he should not place himself in a
position to lose that. He should not place himself in a position to lose.’” 40 The major is naïve to
think that there is something—anything at all—that will not eventually be lost in life, but it is
especially naïve to think that marriage will somehow mitigate that loss. Hemingway seems to
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suggest, in fact, that in order to commit oneself to marriage, an individual must first buy into the
idea that family life, domestic partnership, and monogamous romance are worth their devastating
loss. Ironically, the author himself married four times, fathering three children, but he
nevertheless seems opposed to the idea of marriage, at least in principle. The major warns
against it, and Hemingway himself writes in Death in the Afternoon that “all stories of
monogamy end in death … There is no lonelier man in death, except the suicide, than that man
who has lived many years with a good wife and then outlived her. If two people love each other
there can be no happy end to it.”41 From one perspective, at least, institutional monogamy
presents itself as a safeguard against death, for, as a Catholic sacrament, marriage implies the
eternality of the soul; as an archetype of romantic love, moreover, it obscures death with the
promise of everlasting companionship.
Romantic love ideology had grown into a cultural centerpiece by the time that
Hemingway was writing in the 1920s and 30s; the author himself contributed to society’s idea of
romantic monogamy through love stories like A Farewell to Arms and For Whom The Bell Tolls,
both of which were great commercial successes. But the presence of death in Hemingway’s
novels overshadowed their romantic elements, even if the film adaptions of Hemingway’s books
often did the reverse, presenting romantic story lines that overwhelmed and eclipsed their
treatment of death. In “Now I Lay Me,” as elsewhere, Hemingway regards marriage with
skepticism. Readers learn that John too stays awake at night, traumatized by the war, but he
sleeps more often than Nick does, so he offers the following advice: “You ought to get married,
Signor Tenente. Then you wouldn’t worry.”42 Nick resists the idea, and they quarrel over the
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topic until John finally reasserts: “A man ought to be married. You’ll never regret it. Every man
ought to be married.”43 John takes comfort in his marriage, which, for symbolic reasons, tempers
his fear of death. Seeing that Nick faces a similar challenge, John recommends marriage just as
someone might recommend religion to an individual struggling to make meaning out of their life.
Nick remarks at the end of the story that John “came to the hospital in Milan to see me several
months after and was very disappointed that I had not yet married, and I know he would feel
very badly if he knew that, so far, I have never married. … he was very certain about marriage
and knew it would fix up everything.”44 For John, marriage is the end-all solution that, like
religion, will finally help a person sleep at night. Nick, however, recognizes in John’s religious
certainty the overconfidence and naivete of dogmatic thinking. He knows that marriage will not
ward off death.
Critics generally adopt the view that Nick Adams and other Hemingway heroes are
surrogates for the author himself, fictional alter-egos who convey Hemingway’s point of view,
reenacting versions of his life in what is clearly autobiographical literature. Lesley M. M. Blume
argues in Everybody Behaves Badly: The True Story Behind Hemingway’s Masterpiece The Sun
Also Rises (2016) that Hemingway’s debut novel was a carbon copy depiction of the real-life
experiences of Hemingway and his closest friends. 45 That Nick’s religious experience in “Now I
Lay Me” mirrors Hemingway’s real-life experiences is therefore plausible and even likely, given
the atheistic tenor of Hemingway’s writings and his nominal commitment to the Catholic Church
(Men Without Women was released the same year that he married Pauline). We find that Nick
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recites Catholic prayers and engages in ritual practices—perhaps because, like Frederic Henry of
A Farewell to Arms, he hopes to achieve the “religious feeling”—but we also find that Nick
dreads dying for fear of permanent annihilation, a view that utterly contradicts the Catholic
promise that there will be eternal life after death. Like his protagonists, Hemingway is not able to
place his faith in God, but he strives after the “religious feeling”—a sense that we matter beyond
our mortal existence—and attempts to replicate that feeling through a kind of ritual practice.
In anticipation of the next section, I highlight a final element of “Now I Lay Me”—
Nick’s relationship to animals. As we have already discussed at some length, Hemingway
promoted a negative view of animal equality. As an avid hunter, he also loved to kill animals,
and went about the practice ritualistically. In the short story, Nick uses worms, insects, “white
grubs with brown pinching heads,” pieces of cut-up trout, grasshoppers, and a variety of
additional nonhuman lifeforms as fishing bait. 46 He then tries a salamander, running a hook
through its miniature body, and regrets doing so. “Once I used a salamander from under an old
log. The salamander was very small and neat and agile and a lovely color. He had tiny feet,”
Nick reflects, “that tried to hold on to the hook, and after that one time I never used a
salamander, although I found them very often. Nor did I use crickets, because of the way they
acted about the hook.”47 One need only compare the feet of a salamander with the hands of a
human baby to see that Hemingway is drawing a ghastly comparison: salamander feet wrapped
around a fishing hook look like a baby’s hand grasping at their parent’s finger. Nick sympathizes
with salamanders and crickets, in other words, because their suffering reminds him of human
suffering. But this does not mean, perforce, that Nick humanizes the creatures, elevating them to
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a human status. By drawing the comparison, Nick could just as easily be animalizing human
beings, supplanting a positive egalitarianism with a negative egalitarianism that reduces humans
to an animal status. Nick is himself a predator, after all, hooking live insects in order to catch
fish, and he beams with pride when his father returns home from a hunting trip, hands Nick his
gun, and orders the boy to carry his game-bags. In light of these details, it seems improbable that
Nick stops hooking salamanders and crickets out of a concern for their animal rights.
More likely, in my opinion, is that Nick recognizes his own animal nature in the
salamander. Lying injured in the hospital tent, he imagines the wriggling, writhing body of a
dying creature and it reminds him of himself. Nick recognizes that the boundary separating
humans and animals is alterable, that the imago Dei is therefore a fiction, and that, consequently,
death is the beginning of eternal nonexistence for himself, the salamander, and every other living
being. This is why he fights to stay awake at night—he realizes that death is the ultimate
equalizer, and that there is hope for neither himself nor the salamander in the end. Nick refuses
to use the salamander as bait because he does not want to be reminded of this unwelcome truth.
He is like Catherine Barkley of A Farewell to Arms who says on her death bed that “I’m going to
die … I hate it. … I just hate it.”48 Like Nick and Catherine, Hemingway hates it too, but, being
unable to deny the truth, he puts significant effort toward dismantling human exceptionalism,
both secular and religious, in spite of the dark reality it forces us to confront. Hemingway
acknowledges that human beings share the same lot as their animal counterparts, but, at the same
time, this is ultimately not something that he wants to embrace. In other words, he knows that
human beings lack inherent value, but he wishes to overcome the fact. How the writer deals with
this predicament will be addressed in the following sections: after explaining an important
48
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difference between nihilism and existentialism, the latter of which describes Hemingway’s point
of view, I argue that he reasserts human exceptionalism in the face of death through the
ritualistic killing of animals. The act of killing, it would seem, fills Hemingway with the
“religious feeling,” a momentary glimpse of eternity that deludes the writer into reinstating a
secular version of the imago Dei.
Suicide as Cowardice
“Death was Hemingway’s great subject,” Scott Donaldson writes, “and his great
obsession. He wrote about it in his earliest stories, and his last ones. Of his seven completed
novels, five end with the death of a male protagonist, and a sixth with the death of the heroine.” 49
Death, it seems, was the author’s foremost concern, and, like a prisoner condemned to the
electric chair, he lived in anticipation of that final moment. Moreover, Hemingway discovered
that, when you are on death row, the size of your prison cell, your haircut, who said what about
whom, the tear in the crotch of your pants, and what happens to be for dinner that night no longer
seem as important. But, as he would make apparent at various points in his fiction, every one of
us is on death row, and absolutely no one gets out alive. Considering this almost defeatist attitude
toward death, readers might assume that Hemingway had given up on life, that there was no
reason to engage with the world after realizing how meaningless our actions truly are. One might
even ask why Hemingway did not simply kill himself, echoing the existentialist Albert Camus’s
assertion that, when confronted by meaninglessness, we come “face to face” with “the problem
of suicide.”50 But, like Camus’s rebel, who revolts against suicide by positively affirming life,
Hemingway lived passionately, tackling his pursuits, one could say, with the desperation of a
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dying man. The author was ambitious, competitive, earnest (and aptly named), he loved
feverishly, and he wrote thoughtfully. This is not the disposition of someone who had checked
out of life.
Yet Hemingway really did believe that life was meaningless, and, likewise, he really did
believe, as a logical corollary, that human beings lack inherent value. How a person reaches
these conclusions and then goes on to live with ardor and determination, as Hemingway did,
may, at first, seem difficult to account for, as one might reasonably expect a hopeless person to
give up on life. But this apparent conflict between Hemingway’s thoughts and actions can be
explained away if we note the difference between nihilism and existentialism, the latter of which
represented Hemingway’s philosophical worldview. For one to become an existentialist—or
someone who, every moment, revolts against the inherent meaninglessness of life by creating
their own personal meaning through (what they believe to be) sovereign acts of volition 51—one
must first become a nihilist. For nihilism is the logical first step toward existentialism, and one
must move through the former to become the latter, first accepting that life has no inherent
purpose in order to then manufacture a sense of purpose for themselves. Nihilism and
existentialism can be thought of, in this sense, as opposing responses to death: the former
completely denies the value of life while the latter reinstates its value through sovereign acts of
volition (commonly referred to as existential choice). Much like Camus, Hemingway actually
disparaged nihilism and judged those who, like Hemingway’s father in 1928, succumbed to
suicide. According to Donaldson, “Ernest always believed that the principal reason for his
father’s suicide was his emasculation” at the hands of Grace, but, nevertheless, Hemingway
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“could not condone what his father had done.” 52 This is because Hemingway was an existentialist
at his core, and though he would sometimes make use of fictional characters to express a
nihilistic viewpoint, he believed that a person should always—vigorously and defiantly—choose
life.
Of course, Hemingway too would eventually kill himself, as would three of his siblings,
his granddaughter Margaux Hemingway, and his ex-wife Martha Gellhorn. Suicide haunted the
Hemingway clan, and though Ernest believed that his father’s suicide was a cowardly,
emasculating act, the writer would himself go out with a bang, taking his own life with a 12gauge shotgun in July of 1961. I describe the suicidal act as emasculating because—for
Hemingway the existentialist, Hemingway the Oak Park Congregationalist, and Hemingway the
Catholic—positively affirming life through sovereign acts of volition was a manly endeavor, as I
demonstrated in Chapters One and Two of this dissertation. Much to Hemingway’s chagrin, his
father, Clarence Hemingway, was not the master of his domain; he cowered under the iron fist of
a domineering wife, and it seems that, for Ernest, his father’s suicide was the supreme act of
submission.
The poet Dylan Thomas urged the men of Hemingway’s generation to revolt against
death, even in their old age, when he wrote: “Do not go gentle into that good night,/ Old age
should burn and rave at the close of day.”53 Published in 1951, ten years before Hemingway’s
suicide, the poem was addressed to wise men, good men, wild men, and grave men, and though
the designation “man” was often universalized in Hemingway’s era to include all people,
regardless of their gender, the masculine coding of Thomas’s poem is nevertheless obvious: real
52
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men don’t go down without a fight. Like Thomas, Hemingway believed that a man should resist
death, even when it seems inevitable. Readers of For Whom the Bell Tolls will remember that
Robert Jordan, in the throes of his final moments, not only refuses to commit suicide but fights to
remain conscious in order to get off a final round of bullets against the opposition. Like Robert
Jordan, men should revolt against death through positive affirmations of life, or sovereign acts of
volition—a force of will that originates its own legitimacy. Clarence may have been driven to
kill himself by a domineering wife, but suicide was nevertheless a cowardly act in his son’s
perspective.
I quoted a line from Harvey Mansfield earlier in this dissertation that bears repeating:
“Manliness is an assertion of man’s worth because his worth does not go without saying. So too,
because worth needs to be asserted it needs to be proved; in asserting, one must make good the
assertion.”54 The positive affirmation of human life as ontologically valuable rests upon a kind of
masculine presumption—lacking a clear metaphysical basis, human worth can only legitimate
itself (unsuccessfully, I might add) through arrogant self-assertion. Hemingway’s commitment to
sovereign, existential choice would therefore seem to coincide with his masculinity. Bereft of the
imago Dei, Hemingway had to make good on the assertion that mortal existence is worth living,
so he conducted himself with a kind of masculine bravado, practicing autonomy, selfdetermination, and imperious self-insistence. Critics have offered various explanations for
Hemingway’s suicide, which appears to contradict the writer’s masculine values, but, in my
opinion, he very simply lost the will to live. At the time of his suicide, Hemingway was suffering
from depression, dementia, and paranoia. To make matters worse, he could no longer write
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coherent sentences—a lifetime of traumatic head injuries compounded by recent treatments of
electroshock therapy had taken its toll. In short, there remained no more quality life to live.
But as Richard and Rena Sanderson write, suicide “seemed to violate Hemingway’s own
values.”55 During an interview on the way to his funeral, Hemingway's sister Ursula likewise
insisted that “[s]uicide was against all [of her brother’s] convictions and principles. Anyone who
had read his works should know that."56 And yet many readers have tried to preserve
Hemingway’s masculine reputation by casting the suicide as an act of heroism. Among
Hemingway afficionados, in fact, this “reading of the suicide remains popular: Hemingway is
portrayed as so dedicated to his story-telling art, and so personally identified with his own ‘codeheroes,’ that he cancelled his own life story when his control over it began to slip.” 57 Refusing to
give the grim reaper satisfaction, Hemingway took control of his life by ending it. In this sense,
Hemingway’s suicide was itself an act of rebellion, for he chose the inevitable, defiantly, as if to
divest the grave of its power. And yet, if one adopts this view of Hemingway’s suicide, they
must still recognize that Hemingway chose to exit life rather than fight. The masculine writer
may have landed a last-minute sucker punch, but death took home the championship belt. Like
his father, Hemingway throws in the towel and is finally dominated by his opponent.
On the topic of suicide, Hemingway’s fiction reinforces the bonds between existential
choice and masculinity. In particular, both “Indian Camp” and For Whom the Bell Tolls depict
suicide as a masculine failure. In the first story, a young Nick Adams travels late at night with his
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father, a medical doctor, to the Indian camp, where a woman is in desperate need of a cesarean
section. Nick’s father heroically completes the procedure with a jack knife and fishing line,
demonstrating his resourcefulness and unparalleled competence with masculine tools. Oddly, the
doctor invites his prepubescent son to witness the bloody procedure, which is completed without
anesthesia. The doctor refers to Nick as his “interne,” 58 walking his son through a barbaric
performance that Doctor Adams will later boast about, even though Nick continually resists
participation in the event, at one point begging his father to give the woman anesthesia and,
toward the end of the procedure, turning his eyes away in horror. After delivering the baby and
sewing up the woman’s stomach, Doctor Adams attends to the “proud father” only to find that
“his throat had been cut from ear to ear. The blood had flowed down into a pool where his body
sagged the bunk. His head rested on his left arm. The open razor lay, edge up, in the blankets.” 59
Nick asks why the Indian killed himself and Doctor Adams replies: “I don’t know, Nick.
He couldn’t stand things, I guess.”60 Then, when Nick asks if dying is hard, the doctor replies:
“No, I think it’s pretty easy, Nick. It all depends.” 61 The doctor first models masculine heroism
for his son, instructing Nick in medicine, his subject of mastery. After witnessing the suicide, the
doctor draws a contrast between death, which is easy, and life, which can be hard to stand.
Hearing your lover scream out in pain as a jack knife slices across her pregnant belly would
certainly be extremely difficult to endure, but this does not seem like adequate reason to kill
yourself, in the doctor’s opinion. The Indian father could have simply left the room if the
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procedure was too much to witness. Instead, he chose a permanent solution to a temporary
problem.62 This is all part of Nick’s masculine training: suicide, he learns, is for the weak.
Hemingway, of course, was a skilled practitioner of the short story, and much can be
gleaned from “Indian Camp” through an examination of the author’s formal techniques. There
are a number of elements we can attend to on this front. For example, the narrative is structured
around the binary opposition of young and old characters. In the span of just a few pages, the
words “young” and “old” are used a total of ten times to emphasize generational differences, just
as “younger” and “older” are used in “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place” to differentiate between the
young, brash waiter and the older, emotionally defeated waiter, as readers of the story will no
doubt recall. This careful use of repetition draws the reader’s attention to the obvious age
difference between Nick and his father. Readers quickly realize that the story is about a father
mentoring his son, as well as the contrast between adult knowledge and youthful naivete.
But Hemingway complicates this picture by drawing yet another contrast: “Nick lay back
with his father’s arm around him. It was cold on the water. The Indian who was rowing them”—
the older Indian—"was working very hard, but the other boat moved further ahead in the mist all
the time.”63 Nick and his father are compared against the two Indians, the younger of whom
easily outpaces the older Indian, who was nevertheless “working very hard.” 64 The contrast
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suggests that Nick too will eventually catch up to his father and overtake him, just as the younger
Indian has supplanted his generational predecessor, figuratively speaking, as the more capable
and physically dominant male of the tribe; it is not unusual, after all, for maturing children to
rebel against parental authority in the attempt to carve out an autonomous space of their own.
Hemingway uses repetition and imagery, first, to draw our attention to the generational gap
between father and son, and then to complicate it. At this point, adept readers will recall the title
of Hemingway’s short story collection—In Our Time—which similarly emphasizes generational
difference. This is a book about Hemingway’s generation—the lost generation—postwar
survivors whose traumatic experiences make them different from the generations that came
before. The title draws attention to their unique place in history. This is relevant, I think, because
“Indian Camp” is told from the perspective of an omniscient third-person, but the narrative is
very clearly focalized through Nick, Hemingway’s fictional surrogate. If our time belongs to
Hemingway’s generation, as the title implies, then it is Nick’s perspective, not his father’s, that
matters most. Nick will supplant Doctor Adams, just as the younger Indian has supplanted the
older Indian.
When it comes to the generic conventions of the short story, it is generally agreed upon
that a story’s ending will force a reconsideration of everything that went before it, for the
protagonist will usually undergo a final, revelatory experience that recasts the story in a new
light. As a result, readers themselves often experience a kind of epiphany, understanding the
story on a deeper level after having the narrative echoed back to them in reverse from a different
perspective. “Consistent with Poe’s ‘Philosophy of Composition’—in which he emphasized
beginning with the end of a work and then creating a formal pattern that inevitably leads up to
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that end—[B.M.] Ejxenbaum argues that the short story amasses all its weight on its conclusion,”
Charles E. May writes in his discussion of the short story genre; “This emphasis on ‘closure’ in
the short story—also suggested by Chekhov’s intuition that he must focus on the end of a short
story and ‘artfully’ concentrate there an impression of the total work—becomes a central
characteristic of the form.”65 Of course, there are variations on these formal conventions and, as
with any genre, not every work is going to fit the pattern perfectly. When it comes to the formal
conventions of the short story, however, I would say that “Indian Camp” is exemplary.
The final exchange between Nick and his father models the genre exactly. We know from
the beginning of the story that Doctor Adams was trying to teach his son self-mastery and
masculine stoicism. The Indian woman screams in pain, even before the doctor makes an
incision, and Nick begs his father to give the woman anesthesia. “No, I haven’t any anesthetic,”
the doctor replies, “But her screams are not important. I don’t hear them because they are not
important.”66 There is, however, a vital task to perform—Doctor Adams must save two human
lives—and though it is a difficult, emotionally taxing procedure, Nick’s father demonstrates
discipline as a master of his craft, and self-control as the model of masculinity. All seems to be
going according to plan until Doctor Adams discovers the husband’s dead body.
“Take Nick out of the shanty, George,” the doctor said.
There was no need of that. Nick, standing in the door of the kitchen, had a good view of
the upper bunk when his father, the lamp in one hand, tipped the Indian’s head back.
It was just beginning to be daylight when they walked along the logging road
back toward the lake.
“I’m terribly sorry I brought you along, Nickie,” said his father, all his postoperative exhilaration gone. “It was an awful mess to put you through.”
“Do ladies always have such a hard time having babies?” Nick asked.
“No, that was very, very exceptional.”
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“Why did he kill himself, Daddy?”
“I don’t know, Nick. He couldn’t stand things, I guess.”
“Do many men kill themselves, Daddy?”
“Not very many, Nick.”
“Do many women?”
“Hardly ever.”
“Don’t they ever?”
“Oh, yes. They do sometimes.”
“Daddy?”
“Yes.”
“Where did Uncle George go?”
“He’ll turn up all right.”
“Is dying hard, Daddy?”
“No, I think it’s pretty easy, Nick. It all depends.”
They were seated in the boat, Nick in the stern, his father rowing. The sun was
coming up over the hills. A bass jumped, making a circle in the water. Nick trailed his
hand in the water. It felt warm in the sharp chill of the morning.
In the early morning on the lake sitting in the stern of the boat with his father
rowing, he felt quite sure that he would never die. 67
For Nick, the revelatory experience is the Indian’s suicide. Not only do people die, but
sometimes they do so voluntarily. This is shocking to Nick, who is still very young and has not
yet learned about suicide, as the dialogue reveals. In general, this has been an educational
experience for the child: he learned that women endure excruciating pain to bring life into the
world, he learned how to perform a cesarean with a jack knife and fishing line; he learned that
human life is mortal, and he learned that some people end their lives voluntarily. Or at least this
is what readers are led to believe, for, as the final line of the story reveals, Nick felt “quite sure
that he would never die.”
The final sentence forces readers to reconsider how the story has been developed up to
this point, casting their glances backwards. At first, it seems as though a self-promoting father
brings his son to witness something that Nick simply is not ready for. Then, as if the cesarean
were not itself traumatizing enough, Nick is confronted with a brutal suicide, which leaves the
67
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boy in shock. Attempting to pick up the pieces, Doctor Adams explains to Nick that not every
childbirth is so difficult, that suicide is committed by the weak, and that dying will be easy
enough when the time comes, so there is really nothing for Nick to worry about. In short, the
doctor attempts to reassure his distressed son that none of the crushing realities he just witnessed
are really as bad as they appear. But the doctor’s feeble reassurances have most likely fallen on
deaf ears, for Nick just discovered, through indisputable evidence, that human existence begins
with pain, that life is sometimes too much to bear, and that people eventually die, the most
startling truth of all. Until they reach the final sentence, readers assume that Hemingway’s story
is about a child’s first confrontation with death. After reading the final sentence, however,
readers discover that Nick somehow comes away from the experience assured against all reason
that he alone will never die.
So how does Nick reach this inexplicable conclusion? It is worth noting that Nick’s father
never hints at the possibility of immortality, even in the form of a Christian afterlife. He does not
say, for example, that only some people die, excluding himself and Nick from the fold. Nor does
he neutralize death by describing it as a passage from this life to the next, though doing so would
certainly help to comfort a child who just realized, in his great distress, that he and his family
will someday die. By contrast, Doctor Adams tells Nick that dying is easy, and, in making this
rather bold statement, he affirms not only that death is inevitable but that it comes for every one
of us. The only reasonable conclusion, in light of this reading, is that Nick is so terrified by his
father’s response that he represses its dark implications into his unconscious mind and
manufactures in their place a kind of salvation narrative—in particular, the unwarranted belief
that he will live on forever. In keeping with the short story genre, the final line of “Indian Camp”
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enjoins readers to repackage Nick’s epiphany as an outright denial. As a result, the reader’s
developing understanding of Nick is replaced by a more complex understanding that infects the
rest of the narrative. Ultimately, the story is not about a father mentoring his son; it is about a
disquieted boy silently rejecting his father’s wisdom; the story is not about childhood
disillusionment but about the power of illusory thinking. Confronting his readers with this final,
unexpected revelation, Hemingway causes us to look back at the story with a different set of
conclusions in mind.
Three competing perspectives on the value of mortal existence emerge from the narrative
as a direct consequence of this final, epiphanic moment: helping to bring life into the world,
Doctor Adams affirms the value of mortal existence; running a blade across his neck, the Indian
father denies the value of mortal existence; and refusing to accept these two paths as viable
options, Nick denies his own mortality and perhaps the possibility of natural death altogether. To
better understand Nick’s perspective, readers should notice how the first two perspectives are
symbolized by parallel images: the doctor runs his blade across the pregnant woman’s belly just
as the Indian father runs a blade from ear to ear across his neck. Both incisions are undoubtedly
very painful, but one cut brings life into the world while the other brings life to an end.
Moreover, both incisions are equally gruesome in their physical appearance, but Nick looks
directly at the suicide and looks away from the cesarean. One could argue, in light of these
contrasting symbols, that, in looking away, Nick rejects his father’s teaching that mortal
existence is worth living, and that by looking directly at the suicide, Nick accepts the Indian’s
teaching that mortal existence lacks inherent value. For fear of death, however, Nick is unable to
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recognize suicide as a viable option, and, resorting to a kind of survival mode, 68 he denies the
possibility of natural death to preserve the value of life. Not yet ready to become a masculine
hero, who, like his father, affirms the value of mortal existence, Nick takes refuge in a sort of
religious illusion, for he is also not ready to accept death as the inevitable outcome of life.
While the individual stories of the In Our Time collection can be read as autonomous
works, they can also be read in relationship to each other as essential parts of a unified whole.
Readers of “On the Quai at Smyrna,” for example, will hear the screams of the pregnant refugees
echoed in “Indian Camp” and beyond. Take, for instance, the following quote from “Chapter II,”
which directly follows “Indian Camp” and appears just three stories after “On the Quai at
Smyrna”: “There was a woman having a kid with a young girl holding a blanket over her and
crying.”69 The pregnancy motif runs through the first number of stories just as various other
themes and motifs run through the entire collection, threading the stories together into a single,
cohesive unit. Foremost among these themes are the relationship between father and son,
masculinity in the face of death, and suicide as an act of cowardice. But, as I have already
shown, these topics bleed beyond In Our Time to permeate every corner of the Hemingway
project.
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The most overt instance of this can be found in the pages of For Whom the Bell Tolls.
The protagonist, Robert Jordan, is one of Hemingway’s code heroes, though I prefer to use the
term existential hero, as elements of Sartre’s worldview are clearly mirrored in Robert Jordan’s
existential reflections. Indeed, some of Robert Jordan’s lines appear to be taken straight from
Sartre’s short story “The Wall,” which was published one year prior to For Whom the Bell Tolls,
just as certain sections of “The Wall” seem to have been lifted from “Chapter V” of In Our Time,
as we discussed earlier. Whether the authors actually borrowed from each other is ultimately
beside the point, as they clearly shared a lot of the same ideas. Concerning the nature of mortal
human existence, Robert Jordan makes the following observations:
I suppose it is possible to live as full a life in seventy hours as in seventy years; granted
that your life has been full up to the time that the seventy hours start and that you have
reached a certain age. … So if your life trades its seventy years for seventy hours I have
that value now and I am lucky enough to know it. And if there is not any such thing as a
long time, nor the rest of your lives, nor from now on, but there is only now, why then
now is the thing to praise and I am very happy with it.70
He states later while reflecting on his love for Maria:
I would like to have it for my whole life. You will, the other part of him said. You will.
You have it now and that is all your whole life is; now. There is nothing else than now.
There is neither yesterday, certainly, nor is there any tomorrow. How old must you be
before you know that? There is only now, and if now is only two days, then two days is
your life and everything in it will be in proportion. This is how you live a life in two
days. And if you stop complaining and asking for what you never will get, you will have
a good life. A good life is not measured by any biblical span. So now do not worry, take
what you have, and do your work and you will have a long life and a very merry one.” 71
Robert Jordan agrees with Pablo Ibbieta, protagonist of “The Wall,” that “several hours or
several years of waiting is all the same when you have lost the illusion of being eternal.” 72
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According to Christianity, the human soul is immortal, so Christians believe that every person
has lasting, metaphysical value. Past, present, and future all matter for the Christian because
human beings have an essential nature (i.e. the imago Dei) that remains unchanged throughout
the span of their existence, even beyond the grave. When we escape the illusion of immortality,
however, removing God from the picture, death appears as the final frontier and permanently
separates the individual from their essential nature. As a result, the present, existential moment
emerges as a site of radical freedom, an originary choice that sets the standards of its own value
and legitimacy. How an individual responds to the existential moment following the death of
God is the measure of masculinity for Hemingway and Sartre as well. Does the individual revolt
against life’s inherent meaninglessness by boldly embracing a world of their own making, or do
they take the easy exit, trading in their freedom for comforting illusions or even death?
At the novel’s end, Robert Jordan and the other members of his guerilla unit successfully
blow up the bridge, a goal that was set out in the novel’s opening pages. But Robert’s horse
crushes his thigh bone after being shot, and this forces Robert’s comrades to leave their
immobilized friend behind as they flee the scene, for the enemy troops are rapidly approaching
and the remaining guerillas, being fewer in number, will not be able to defend Robert or
themselves against enemy fire. Overwhelmed by the pain, Hemingway’s protagonist
contemplates suicide, but, as I mentioned a few pages back, Robert resists the temptation to kill
himself and prepares to fight as the fascist enemy appears in the distance. “His leg was hurting
very badly now. The pain had started suddenly with the swelling after he had moved and he said,
Maybe I’ll just do it now,” hinting that he might kill himself before the opposition has a chance
to or, worse, before they torture him to death; “I guess I’m not awfully good at pain. Listen, if I
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do that now you wouldn’t misunderstand, would you? Who are you talking to? Nobody, he said.
Grandfather, I guess. No. Nobody.”73 The Catholic Church believes that suicide is a mortal sin,
so it would make sense for a Catholic believer in Robert Jordan’s situation to plead with God for
an exception (he is in excruciating pain and about to be killed anyway), but Robert Jordan does
not plead with God, despite how it sounds, and nor does he plead with the spirit of his dead
grandfather, who looms in Jordan’s imagination as the ideal of masculinity, for God does not
exist and the human soul does not live on after the body dies, according to Robert. Am I talking
to God, he wonders? No. Am I talking to grandfather? No. Robert Jordan knows that he has but
this one life to live.
It would appear, then, that Hemingway’s protagonist is actually addressing himself—
would he excuse himself for the suicidal act? He thinks of his grandfather at this moment only
because the man embodied everything he values—military prowess, a fighting spirit, and heroic
bravery—the “good juice,” as he calls it, that makes a man a man. 74 Reflecting on their shared
qualities, Robert Jordan wonders if “he and his grandfather would be acutely embarrassed by the
presence of his father,” a cowardly man who killed himself. 75 “Anyone has a right to do it, he
thought. But it isn’t a good thing to do. I understand it, but I do not approve of it. Lache was the
word.”76 This French word for coward also means loose, or a lack of control. Robert utters the
word in French because saying it aloud in English is too embarrassing. Again reflecting on his
father’s suicide, Robert Jordan utters the word in Spanish this time:
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I wish Grandfather was here, he thought. For about an hour anyway. Maybe he sent me
what little I have through that other one that misused the gun. Maybe that is the only
communication that we have. But, damn it. Truly damn it, but I wish the time-lag wasn’t
so long so that I could have learned from him what the other one never had to teach me.
… maybe the good juice only came through straight again after passing through that one?
I’ll never forget how sick it made me the first time I knew he was a cobarde. Go on, say
it in English. Coward. It’s easier when you have it said and there is never any point in
referring to a son of a bitch by some foreign term. He wasn’t any son of a bitch, though.
He was just a coward and that was the worst luck any man could have. 77
Suicide is a weak, cowardly act, according to Robert Jordan. That his father killed himself is
truly humiliating. In fact, Robert only seems to mention his father in order to dismiss him,
regarding the man as a kind of genetic anomaly that stands between him and his grandfather. 78
He says that “thinking of his father had thrown him off. He understood his father and he forgave
him everything and he pitied him but he was ashamed of him.” 79 Robert Jordan models an
existential ethic. He disparages the suicidal for their cowardice and admires those who, by
contrast, demonstrate a fighting spirit. Built into the modus operandi exhibited by Robert’s
grandfather and Hemingway’s other code heroes is the proper use of weaponry, which should
never be turned against oneself—as Robert Jordan states above, his father “misused the gun”—
but can and even should be used against others. Put differently, the use of deadly force against
one’s opponent is not only condoned under the Hemingway ethic, it is encouraged. In the
following passage, Robert glorifies deadly weapons and reveals a scandalous truth about his
grandfather’s past:
Remember grandfather’s saber, bright and well oiled in its dented scabbard and
Grandfather showed you how the blade had been thinned from the many times it had
77

Ibid.

78

Perhaps worth noting is that Sartre too idolized his grandfather, Charles Schweitzer, whom he often mistook for
“God the Father” (The Words, 22). By contrast, Sartre’s father, Jean-Baptiste, died when the philosopher was only
two years of age.
79

Ibid., 340.

192
been to the grinder’s. Remember Grandfather’s Smith and Wesson. It was a single action,
officer’s model .32 caliber and there was no trigger guard. It had the softest, sweetest
trigger pull you had ever felt and it was always well oiled and the bore was clean
although the finish was all worn off and the brown metal of the barrel and the cylinder
was worn smooth from the leather of the holster. It was kept in the holster with a U.S. on
the flap in a drawer in the cabinet with its cleaning equipment and two hundred rounds of
cartridges. Their cardboard boxes were wrapped and tied neatly with waxed twine.
You could take the pistol out of the drawer and hold it. “Handle it freely,” was
Grandfather’s expression. But you could not play with it because it was “a serious
weapon.”
You asked Grandfather once if he had ever killed any one with it and he said,
“Yes.”
Then you said, “When, Grandfather?” and he said, “In the War of the Rebellion
and afterwards.”80
The saber and pistol are military weapons used to kill other human beings, not animals, and yet,
for Robert Jordan, they have a sensuous and perhaps even sensual allure. As with many gun
owners, Grandfather Jordan must have relished listing off the firearm’s notable features—singleaction, officer’s model, .32 caliber, no trigger guard—and you can hear his voice echoed in
Robert’s observation that it had the “softest, sweetest trigger pull.” Fetishistically, the gun
represents his grandfather’s military prowess—“he was a hell of a good soldier, everybody
said”81—but the gun almost certainly represents his manhood as well (i.e. his phallus). The
“bright and well oiled” saber is actively cared for, but its “dented scabbard” and “thinned” blade
show that the sword is also well used. The Smith and Wesson is likewise “well oiled and the
bore was clean” but “the finish was all worn off” and “the cylinder was worn smooth from the
leather of the holster.” Robert’s grandfather takes pride in the weapon. He neatly wraps the
cartridges in boxes with waxed twine, and when his grandson asks to handle the deadly firearm,
he encourages Robert to do so, but reminds him of its seriousness. Robert then asks his
grandfather if he has ever killed anyone, and his grandfather answers in the positive: during the
80
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Civil War and afterwards, he states. The implication is that Grandfather Jordan killed someone
(or even multiple people) outside of military warfare, where killing is legally sanctioned. Put
more explicitly, Robert’s grandfather may have committed murder, or at least manslaughter.
When pressed for more information, his grandfather answers: “I do not care to speak about it.” 82
And yet Grandfather Jordan’s silence on the matter is not due to the remorse he feels over
taking a human life. Were the old man ashamed of the killings he would not display the murder
weapons with pride, regularly attending to their maintenance. After all, killing people is not
something you openly talk about, especially to a child. As a matter of fact, Grandfather Jordan is
not required to share this information at all; were he truly ashamed of the actions, he could
simply dismiss the conversation altogether, explaining to Robert that matters of this nature are
not to be discussed with children. Instead, Grandfather Jordan withdraws from the conversation
after already confessing to murder. This allows the old man to observe decorum and, at the same
time, sneak in a boast that will garner his grandson’s admiration. As Hemingway often
emphasized, you spoil a thing by talking about it, 83 so there is something of the masculine ideal
encoded in Grandfather Jordan’s silence. One could say, moreover, that there is something of
Hemingway’s iceberg theory at work in the pages of this scene, for everything left unsaid by
Robert and his grandfather gestures toward a central feature of Hemingway’s thought: namely,
that killing yourself is cowardly and that killing someone else gives meaning to life. What makes
this bizarre equation possible is only ever suggested in the pages of Hemingway’s fiction; for
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this reason, I return to Hemingway’s nonfictional Death in the Afternoon to explain the matter in
detail.
The Faena, or Becoming Like God
In the opening pages of Death in the Afternoon, Hemingway reports the following:
I had just come from the Near East, where the Greeks broke the legs of their baggage and
transport animals and drove and shoved them off the quay into the shallow water when
they abandoned the city of Smyrna, and I remember saying that I did not like the
bullfights because of the poor horses. I was trying to write then and I found the greatest
difficulty, aside from knowing truly what you really felt, rather than what you were
supposed to feel, and had been taught to feel, was to put down what really happened in
action; what the actual things were which produced the emotion that you experienced. In
writing for a newspaper you told what happened and, with one trick and another, you
communicated the emotion aided by the element of timeliness which gives a certain
emotion to any account of something that has happened on that day; but the real thing,
the sequence of motion and fact which made the emotion and which would be as valid in
a year or in ten years or, with luck and if you stated it purely enough, always, was beyond
me and I was working very hard to try to get it. The only place where you could see life
and death, i.e., violent death now that the wars were over, was in the bull ring and I
wanted very much to go to Spain where I could study it. 84
Hemingway wanted to study violent death, which, according to the writer, was at this time only
observable in the bull ring, so he traveled to Spain. There, he met up with Alice Toklas and
Gertrude Stein, who introduced him to the sport (although, for Hemingway, bullfighting would
eventually be seen as less of a sport and more of a ritual practice). A struggling writer at the
time, he remembers how the mules were drowned at Smyrna, and this memory compounds the
sympathy he feels for the horses, which are regularly killed in the bull ring. He comes to
recognize, however, that his sympathy for the horses reflects what “he had been taught to feel,”
rather than what he actually felt, and he knew that, in order to become a great writer, he must
learn to rid himself of ideological presuppositions to obtain a pure view of life itself, as it truly
exists. Representing this deeper-level truth—which is also discussed in A Moveable Feast as
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“one true sentence”85—a writer must capture the emotion produced by a sequence of actions and,
therefore, must also “put down what really happened in action.” What really happened is
difficult to define, of course, but, if we take the quay at Smyrna as an example, Hemingway
perceived in the side-by-side drowning of mules and Greek refugees his own animal nature—a
dissolution of the imago Dei through a radical breakdown of the human/nonhuman distinction.
Hemingway discovered a similar truth in the bull ring, a deeper-level truth that he would
build upon and revise with new insights. Not only would he observe human mortality in the ring,
where man and bull meet each other as existential equals; he would catch glimpses of
immortality in what might be called the re-humanization of mankind, an anthropogenic,
signifying act that reasserts the difference between human and nonhuman lifeforms. Mortality
and immortality, human and animal nature converge in the bull ring during the faena, a series of
passes conducted by the matador that, when performed properly, put his life at serious risk. The
competent matador—a masculine code hero—will lure the bull in very closely as it passes by
him, for the “greatest pass” is “the most dangerous to make and the most beautiful to see.” 86
Hemingway explains:
If the spectators know the matador is capable of executing a complete, consecutive series
of passes with the muleta in which there will be valor, art, understanding and, above all,
beauty and great emotion, they will put up with mediocre work, cowardly work,
disastrous work because they have the hope sooner or later of seeing the complete faena;
the faena that takes a man out of himself and makes him feel immortal while it is
proceeding, that gives him an ecstasy, that is, while momentary, as profound as any
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religious ecstasy; moving all the people in the ring together and increasing in emotional
intensity as it proceeds, carrying the bullfighter with it, he playing on the crowd through
the bull and being moved as it responds in a growing ecstasy of ordered, formal,
passionate, increasing disregard for death that leaves you, when it is over, and the death
administered to the animal that has made it possible, as empty, as changed and as sad as
any major emotion will leave you. 87
This passage embodies the crux of Hemingway’s thought. Without it, the central claims of this
dissertation are much harder to corroborate. In particular, the passage reveals the manner in
which Hemingway secularizes theism as an expression of both masculinity and Sartrean
existentialism. These connections will be fleshed out in due course, but, at the present moment, it
is more important that readers comprehend specific details in the passage itself. Directly quoting
from these lines, we learn that the faena “takes a man out of himself and makes him feel
immortal,” giving him “an ecstasy, that is, while momentary, as profound as any religious
ecstasy.” This momentary, profound, pseudo-religious feeling, in turn, fills the matador with an
“increasing disregard for death” that leaves him, we are told, the moment the bull passes.
Paraphrasing, one could say that, when the bull gallops by the matador, nearly goring him to
death with razor-sharp horns, the matador is as close to death as a person can get without actually
tasting it. Having this level of control over the situation, which is only achieved through a
practiced mastery of the art, the matador experiences the delusion of immortality, for in that
moment, he exerts—what feels like—his power over death. When the matador finally kills the
bull, driving his sword between the bull’s shoulders and into its heart, he symbolically conquers
death, putting an end to that which threatened his life. In short, the matador brings death as close
as possible, exercises control over it, and, during these flashes of ecstasy, he feels eternal. This is
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the religious feeling discussed by Frederic Henry and embodied by a handful of Hemingway
heroes.
The spectator (and especially the aficionado) experiences these feelings of immortality
vicariously but, after the bull is killed, the feelings go away, and, as Hemingway writes, the
spectator feels “as changed and as sad as any major emotion will leave you.” What reappears in
place of the spectator’s vicarious experience of religious ecstasy is the recognition that everyone
of us is mortal, the recognition, in other words, that bullfighting is not a sport, but a “tragic
spectacle,” for certain death comes inevitably for either the bull or his opponent. 88 Just as the
existentialist must pass through nihilism to understand the metaphysical purchase of sovereign
decision making, so too must the bullfighter first recognize his mortality and, with it, his
animality in order to understand the faena and exercise a godlike power over death. Due to the
nature of his profession, the bullfighter is constantly reminded of his own mortality, “living
every day with death,”89 and yet the true artist of bullfighting, whom the author describes as a
messianic figure,90 is also a kind of existential hero who everyday revolts against death by
creating meaning in the face of meaninglessness, accepting death in order to affirm the
momentary value of life, which, being practiced under intense conditions, gives the matador a
feeling of immortality.
“Bullfighting is the only art in which the artist is in danger of death and in which the
degree of brilliance in the performance is left to the fighter’s honor;” 91 for the Spaniards
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especially, “honor is a very real thing. Called pundonor, it means honor, probity, courage, selfrespect and pride in one word. Pride is the strongest characteristic of the race and it is a matter of
pundonor not to show cowardice.” 92 Hemingway felt a natural kinship with the Spaniards, and he
too regarded courage and cowardice as opposite ends of the masculinity spectrum. The cowardly
bullfighter, he says, was shown as little respect as the “suicide,” 93 who accepts the nihilistic reach
of death by failing to seize the existential moment, while the courageous bullfighter is deified for
doing the opposite. Rather than killing himself, as the coward sometimes does, the masculine,
existential hero—i.e. the matador—kills another living being, as Hemingway explains:
The truly great killer must have a sense of honor and a sense of glory far beyond that of
the ordinary bullfighter. In other words he must be a simpler man. Also he must take
pleasure in it, not simply as a trick of wrist, eye, and managing of his left hand that he
does better than other men, which is the simplest form of that pride and which he will
naturally have as a simple man, but he must have a spiritual enjoyment of the moment of
killing. Killing cleanly and in a way which gives you aesthetic pleasure and pride has
always been one of the greatest enjoyments of a part of the human race. Because the
other part, which does not enjoy killing, has always been the more articulate and has
furnished most of the good writers we have had a very few statements of the true
enjoyment of killing. One of its greatest pleasures … is the feeling of rebellion against
death which comes from its administering. Once you accept the rule of death thou shalt
not kill is an easily and naturally obeyed commandment. But when a man is still in
rebellion against death he has pleasure in taking to himself one of the Godlike attributes;
that of giving it. This is one of the most profound feelings in those men who enjoy
killing. These things are done in pride and pride, of course, is a Christian sin, and a pagan
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virtue. But it is pride which makes the bullfight and true enjoyment of killing which
makes the great matador.94
The existentialist accepts death only to rebel against it, positively affirming the present moment
through creative acts of volition. As I demonstrated in Chapter Two of this dissertation,
sovereign, existential choices often have violent consequences because, as Agamben does well to
demonstrate, they are at once divisive and self-authorizing. As Agamben was shown to explain,
the sovereign decision is a “zone of indistinction” where “pure potentiality and pure actuality”
become “indistinguishable,”95 where the absolute freedom of being-for-itself and the absolute
ontology of being-in-itself are combined as being-in-itself-for-itself, to use Sartre’s terminology,
and thus empower the sovereign subject to dictate, at will, the ontic nature of human identity. Put
simply, existential choices are divisive significations of humanity that assume their own
authority. It is not surprising that Hemingway describes morality earlier in the document as a
relative construct,96 for “the great matador”—our masculine, existential hero—assumes divine
authority when administering death. Hemingway even contrasts the matador’s godlike decision
to take someone’s life with the biblical injunction against murder, so readers can safely assume
that morality originates with the individual subject, not with the decalogue, in Hemingway’s
worldview, and that the love of killing, deep within each of us, applies as much to humans as it
does to animals. A person rebels against their mortality by acting like God, taking the life of
another creature—be they human or animal—to make themselves feel immortal.
Historically, the “whole end of the bullfight was the final sword thrust, the actual
encounter between the man and the animal, what the Spanish call the moment of truth, and every
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move in the fight was to prepare the bull for that killing,” 97 so the matador “must love to kill,”
Hemingway explains, for this has always been an essential part of the performance. 98
Commenting on this crucial element, Killinger argues that “the ‘moment of truth’ is the
existential moment of anguish or dread crystallized into ritual … In this sense, the moment of
truth is symbolic, and applies to the facing-death situations of all of Hemingway’s heroes.” 99
Hemingway admires matadors and takes vicarious pleasure in their performances because the
ritualistic killing of bulls, much like religious ritual, enacts and reenacts his core belief that real
men confront death courageously through sovereign acts of volition, constructing meaning out of
the meaningless, and asserting individual value where no inherent value can be found. What
Hemingway fails to notice—or what he does not explicitly write about—is how the act of killing
animalizes the victim at the same time that it humanizes the killer, but, as Chapter Two of this
dissertation demonstrates, this is one of the natural consequences of Sartrean thought. Because
the sovereign individual is a lawmaker who “choos[es] for all men,” their choices are manmaking, according to Sartre, for “in creating the man each of us wills ourselves to be, there is not
a single one of our actions that does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he
ought to be.”100 The act of killing, more than any other sovereign act, divides the human from the
nonhuman, the legally protected citizen from bare life, as Agamben puts it, so it is death that
fuels the anthropological machine. Hemingway, like Sartre, reclaims the imago Dei after first
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denying its existence, humanizing the masculine code hero through the sovereign animalization
of his opponents.
The Masculine, Existential Hero
Foremost among these code heroes, in my opinion, is Francis Macomber, whose short,
happy life captures the same feelings of masculinity, sovereignty, and immortality as the faena.
Published in the Winner Take Nothing collection six years after Hemingway’s Catholic marriage
to Pauline Pfeiffer and seven years before their divorce in 1940, “The Short Happy Life of
Francis Macomber” is about an “existential hero” who “fills meaninglessness with a new
essence,” in the words of Ben Stoltzfus, by courageously hunting dangerous animals. 101 Francis
Macomber, he states, “forges a new identity and, although he dies (his wife, Margot, shoots him
in the head—a Freudian slip of the finger)[, h]e dies happy, knowing that he is a winner.” 102
Turning his attention to Robert Wilson, the Macombers’ hunting guide, Warren Beck observes
the following:
The opening pages, with some centering on Wilson’s consciousness, emphasize his
ambivalent, at times uncertain, and even baffled attitude toward a pair whom he then
repeatedly categorizes as familiar types, the wealthy, soft American sportsman and his
glitteringly hard wife. … He had a word for Margot Macomber, of five letters, and
apparently he made no substitution for it. He had a four-letter word for Francis, but he
dropped that, because Francis had done something that Wilson could understand, had
lived up to the code of physical courage, thereby coming of age, as Hemingway has
Wilson put it.103
Not only is the story at times imbued by Wilson’s consciousness; Wilson is the moral center of
the story. And though Wilson, by conventional standards, is a rather cruel person (as is Margot
Macomber, who cuckolds, verbally abuses, and shames her husband for running from an
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attacking Lion), Wilson is the masculine, existential standard against which Francis is at first
judged as inadequate and eventually declared a code hero. Following Wilson’s example, Francis
puts himself in mortal danger, staring down a charging buffalo in order to exert his power over
death. During these final moments of ecstasy, Francis becomes a real man and thus fulfills the
masculine ideal modelled by his opposite, the testosterone-charged Wilson, undergoing a kind of
“religious conversion” that leaves Francis completely transformed.
Yet again Hemingway presents his readers with contrasting male figures, the coward and
the masculine hero, the latter of whom, in my reading, is a secularized theist. To understand this
conclusion, let us first unpack the differences between Wilson and Francis Macomber. The latter
“was very tall, very well built if you did not mind that length of bone, dark, his hair cropped like
an oarsman, rather thin-lipped, and was considered handsome.” 104 As far as physical appearances
go, Francis seems to be Wilson’s equal, for he “was dressed in the same sort of safari clothes that
Wilson wore except that his were new, he was thirty-five years old, kept himself very fit, was
good at court games, [and] had a number of big-game fishing records.” 105 The difference between
the two men was internal, a matter of personal character, and, as we learn from the opening
pages, Francis “had just shown himself, very publicly, to be a coward.” 106
After injuring a big-game animal, who then retreats into the bush for protection, it is
customary to move in close for a viable shot. Once the hunter is close enough to make a kill, the
animal will charge, and, in this moment of extreme danger, the hunter must quickly shoot it to
death before the animal mauls them, tramples them to death, or stabs them through with its
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horns. This is the big-game hunter’s version of the faena while the final, deadly shot is
comparable to the moment of truth. But when the lion rushes forward, Francis retreats, “running
wildly, in panic,” and it is Wilson who, in the style of a great matador, stands his ground to kill
the beast.107 After this humiliating event, fear follows Francis “like a cold slimy hollow.” 108 He is
not like the great matador who exerts his power over death through fleeting gestures of defiance,
and Macomber’s poorly executed faena does not culminate in the moment of truth, but in a
shameful retreat over the arena wall.
Wilson reflects on Macomber’s cowardice: “It’s that some of them stay little boys so
long, Wilson thought. Sometimes all their lives. Their figures stay boyish when they’re fifty. The
great American boy-men. Damned strange people.” 109 According to Wilson, cowardice in the
face of death is childlike behavior, the mark of someone who has not yet matured into adulthood.
The fully formed man accepts mortality in order to rebel against it, positively affirming their
present existence through sovereign acts of volition, the most potent of which is the act of
killing. Being himself a “professional hunter,” 110 Wilson is the epitome of masculine
development. Remarking on the fundamental difference between Robert Wilson and her
husband, Margot asks: “What importance is there to whether Francis is any good at killing lions?
That’s not his trade. Mr. Wilson is really very impressive killing anything. You do kill anything,
don’t you?” to which Wilson replies: “Oh, anything, … Simply anything.” 111 That Wilson would
kill another human being is implied here, I think, and the story’s bloody ending demonstrates
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that Margot might even have murder in mind when she asks Wilson the question. By taking the
life of another living being, Wilson makes himself like God, a sovereign, existential subject
whose ostensible courage is, for Hemingway and his fictional characters, tied to masculinity.
“[H]e had seen men come of age before and it … was not a matter of their twenty-first birthday,”
the narrator observes; “He’d seen it in the war work the same way. More of a change than any
loss of virginity. Fear gone like an operation. Something else grew in its place. Main thing a man
had. Made him into a man. Women knew it too. No bloody fear.” 112 Before his radical
transformation, Francis is crippled by the fear of death, emasculated by his wife, and
incompetent at killing. Wilson, by contrast, is an expert assassin who, in the act of killing, asserts
his manliness (his superiority over women and emasculated men), his humanity (his superiority
over animals) and, with it, his divinity (the religious feeling of immortality, under discussion
here as the imago Dei).
Sifting through the author’s many works, one notices that Hemingway rejects human
exceptionalism through an ostensible deconstruction of the human/animal divide. Along with
human exceptionalism Hemingway rejects its ideological substructure, the imago Dei, for he
spurns the natural theological proposition that human nature bears evidence of God’s design, as I
showed in my analysis of “A Natural History of the Dead.” It is my belief, however, that after
first rejecting the imago Dei, Hemingway tacitly reinstates it, and that after collapsing the
human/animal divide, Hemingway promotes masculine heroes who assert their superiority over
the nonhuman world through the ritualistic killing of dangerous animals. For it is during the socalled moment of truth—when an individual puts their life at risk to kill another living being—
that humanity experiences the feeling of immortality, the closest we will ever get to divinity or a
112

Ibid., 28.

205
spiritual afterlife. “It’s trying to kill to keep yourself alive,” the protagonist Harry states in “The
Snows of Kilimanjaro,” Hemingway’s much-celebrated short story of 1936.
In Part Two of this dissertation, I examined the theoretical work of Giorgio Agamben to
show that killing—and, to a lesser degree, every other sovereign act—divides humanity from the
nonhuman. I then applied Agamben’s theoretical framework to a study of Sartrean decisionism
to demonstrate, in turn, how this study relates to Hemingway. My discovery, which has been
explicated over the course of many pages now, is that Hemingway replaces a theological account
of human exceptionalism with a pseudo-secular account, supplanting his belief in the imago Dei
with the feeling of immortality. To be clear, I do not claim that Hemingway transitions from one
set of beliefs to another at any particular moment in his writing career, but that both elements—
secular and religious—are ever-present, for just as the existentialist must pass through nihilism to
understand the metaphysical purchase of sovereign choice, Hemingway too must first reject the
imago Dei in order to then resurrect a secularized form of it. Identifying mankind with other
members of the animal kingdom is the first step toward asserting humanity’s superiority over
nonhuman life. The difference, of course, is that human superiority is no longer the result of an
essential, unchanging nature, as Christianity teaches, but the power that each of us has to
demonstrate superiority through absolute freedom or the sheer force of will.
We have already discussed the decentering effect of the lion’s first-person perspective as
a formalistic critique of anthropocentrism. Critical consensus, I demonstrated, is that the lion’s
objectification of the hunters introduces a shift in power which then permits readers to secondguess the heroic representation of Wilson and Francis Macomber. But a closer reading of the
passage shows something else afoot: the interlaying of human and animal perspective:
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The lion still stood looking majestically and coolly toward this object that his eyes only
showed in silhouette, bulking like some super-rhino. There was no man smell carried
toward him and he watched the object, moving his great head a little from side to side.
Then watching the object, not afraid, but hesitating before going down the bank to drink
with such a thing opposite him, he saw a man figure detach itself from it and he turned
his heavy head and swung away toward the cover of the trees as he heard a cracking
crash and felt the small of a .30-06 220-grain solid bullet that bit his flank and ripped in
sudden hot scalding nausea through his stomach. He trotted, heavy, big-footed, swinging
wounded full-bellied, through the trees toward the tall grass and cover, and the crash
came again.113
The passage is told almost entirely from the lion’s perspective, but after the bullet penetrates the
animal’s flesh, suddenly the human perspective reappears. The small piece of metal is described
to readers as a .30-06 220-grain solid, clearly reflecting the perspective of a human hunter, who
recognizes the description as a kind of bullet. Later we read:
That was the story of the lion. Macomber did not know how the lion had felt before he
started his rush, nor during it when the unbelievable smash of the .505 with a muzzle
velocity of two tons had hit him in the mouth, nor what kept him coming after that, when
the second ripping crash had smashed his hind quarters and he had come crawling on
toward the crashing, blasting thing that had destroyed him. Wilson knew something about
it and only expressed it by saying “Damned fine lion,” but Macomber did not know how
Wilson felt about things either.114
Here, the human perspective, which in the previous passage flashed before the reader’s eyes with
a single bullet strike, now competes against the animal’s point of view for the reader’s attention.
Words like “smash” and “crash” represent how the lion perceives gunfire and “blasting thing”
represents how the lion perceives the hunter’s firearm. These phrases are read alongside of the
phrases “.505 with a muzzle velocity of two tons,” “Macomber did not know how the lion had
felt,” and he “did not know how Wilson felt about things either,” all of which reflect
Macomber’s perspective. As the struggle between man and beast intensifies, readers are shuffled
between human and animal perspectives, Francis giving one account of the events and the lion
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giving another. Because the victor lives another day to tell their story, whoever wins the battle
also gains story-telling privileges, as it is ultimately their narrative point of view with which
readers are left. The act of killing all but eliminates the victim’s capacity to tell their story, and
thus insists upon the killer’s narrative point of view. It would appear, in light of this observation,
that Hemingway’s formal techniques complement the story’s themes: sovereign decision making
is sovereign story-telling—or, as Sartre will put it, our every decision is a man-making act of
creation.
But it is not only Francis and the lion who vie for discursive power; it is the lion, the
buffalo, Wilson, and Margot Macomber as well. In fact, the human characters of the story
actively seek to dominate each other. Margot sleeps with Wilson to humiliate Francis, for
example, and she repeatedly underscores his cowardice to gain power over him. Francis,
likewise, refers to Margot as a bitch multiple times, just as Wilson refers to her, and Wilson,
whom I identified earlier as the moral center of the story, treats both Francis and Margot as
predictable American stereotypes. The characters name each other in order to dominate them,
obstructing their rival’s ability to self-identify through sovereign, self-originating acts of their
own. Sartre described this experience of being dominated by your peers as being-for-others, the
sense that our identity has been decided by people who objectify us as fundamentally one way or
another, imposing a stable identity in order to limit our freedom. Breaking loose from these
oppressive chains, Francis discovers his freedom in the buffalo chase and undergoes a radical
transformation:
“By God, that was a chase,” he said. “I’ve never felt any such feeling. Wasn’t it
marvellous, Margot?”
“I hated it.”
“Why?”

208
“I hated it,” she said bitterly. “I loathed it.”
“You know, I don’t think I’d ever be afraid of anything again,” Macomber said to
Wilson. “Something happened in me after we first saw the buff and started after him.
Like a dam bursting. It was pure excitement. … You know, something did happen to
me,” he said. “I feel absolutely different.”
His wife said nothing and eyed him strangely. She was sitting far back in the seat
and Macomber was sitting forward talking to Wilson who turned sideways talking over
the back of the front seat.
“You know, I’d like to try another lion,” Macomber said. “I’m not really afraid of
them now. After all, what can they do to you?”
“That’s it,” said Wilson. “Worst one can do is kill you.” 115
When the charging lion comes after Francis, the coward runs to save his life. But after accepting
death as the inevitable outcome of life—moving, as he does, from cowardice to nihilism and
finally to existentialism—Francis takes ownership over his story-telling powers and embraces
the present, existential moment as the site of absolute freedom. “[C]onsciousness of death
affirms our awareness of life and enhances its intensity,” Stoltzfus writes; “Macomber’s
exhilaration derives from … the knowledge that Margot can no longer influence his choices. He
has passed through the valley of the shadow of death and come out on the other side,
transformed.”116 Moreover, Francis “takes pleasure in shooting animals,” Stoltzfus continues,
“because killing usurps one of God’s prerogatives: the killer experiences a sense of
exaltation”117—a sense that he decides his own identity, originates his own moral values, and is
greater than the animal he just killed. Hemingway’s short story is “a quintessential example of
Sartre’s philosophy in action.”118
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In short, Francis becomes a masculine, existential hero who, like the great matador,
accepts his mortality in order to defy it, inching his way ever closer to death in order to
demonstrate his control over it. After injuring the buffalo, who then retreats into the bush, the
men move in closer for a deadly shot. An attendant investigates the scene and informs Wilson
that the buffalo is dead, but just as Wilson goes to congratulate Francis, the buffalo rushes “out
of the bush sideways, fast as a crab, and the bull coming, nose out, mouth tight closed, blood
dripping, massive head straight out.”119 Francis has the opportunity to redeem himself during this
big-game hunting version of the faena, but this time, instead of running, Francis “st[ands] solid
and sho[ots] for the nose” as the bull gets closer and closer. 120 As the buffalo is about to gore
Francis, Wilson kills the bull, and Margot shoots Francis in the back of the skull; afterwards,
their bodies lay no more than “two yards” apart, thus illustrating Macomber’s willingness to
stand his ground no matter the outcome.121 When writing this scene, Hemingway seems to have
had the comparison to Spanish bullfighting in mind, for he refers to the buffalo eighteen times as
a bull. Indeed, the African Cape buffalo shares striking similarities with the Spanish fighting
bull; both are massive bovines with a dark hide and long, dangerous horns. Of course, neither
Francis nor the bull are able to meet each other in the so-called moment of truth, but Francis
nevertheless captures the feeling of immortality in his version of the faena, and this experience
accounts for the nature of his short, happy life.
The love of killing expressed by Hemingway and his characters reflects a desire to feel
eternal, if only for a moment, while the act of killing, like all sovereign choices, separates subject
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from object, superior from inferior, human from animal. The combination amounts to a form of
human exceptionalism that, at once, secularizes the imago Dei and instills humanity with the
godlike ability to create objective moral values. This secularized theism, as Agamben calls it,
embodies the logic of Sartrean existentialism, and, as I already demonstrated in Chapter Two of
this dissertation, Sartre treats human freedom like the metaphysical source of moral law. These
moral choices, in turn, reflect valuations of human identity, according to Sartre, and human
identity, I have attempted to show, defines itself against various constructions of the nonhuman,
or beings of a lesser metaphysical value. For this reason, all human choices are morality-making,
man-making, and world-making by proxy. When these choices are then conceptualized as selforiginating, the individual lawmaker becomes like God, creating the moral universe ex nihilo.
Ironically, then, annihilation is also the supreme act of creation, for the pinnacle of Hemingway’s
secularized religion is the act of killing. Not surprisingly, we find that this also the case with
Sartre.
Sartre’s 1943 stage adaptation of the Electra myth, “The Flies,” is organized around a
revenge plot. The play’s protagonist, Orestes, returns to the city of Argos to avenge his father
Agamemnon, the former king of Argos, who was killed by his wife, Queen Clytemnestra, and
her adulterous lover, Aegistheus, who subsequently takes the throne. Afraid for his life,
Aegistheus implores Zeus to kill Orestes with a thunderbolt, but the gods are powerless against
individuals who, like Orestes, know that they are free. Afraid that Orestes will awaken the people
of Argos to their own freedom, Zeus commands Aegistheus to kill Orestes, but Aegistheus
regrets his crime against Agamemnon and does not defend himself against Orestes, who murders
both Aegistheus and Clytemnestra in cold blood. Orestes’s sister, Electra, urges him to kill both
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Aegistheus and their mother, but when the act is finally completed, Electra is filled with
crippling guilt and swarmed by the flies, the goddesses of remorse. Orestes, by contrast, does not
experience any guilt for, like so many of Hemingway’s protagonists, he is a masculine,
existential hero, who, in the act of killing, becomes godlike as the origin of moral value.
The tension between human freedom and objective moral value is set out early in the play
during a covert conversation between Zeus and Aegistheus.
ZEUS: Aegistheus, you are a king, and it’s to your sense of kingship I appeal, for
you enjoy wielding the scepter.
AEGISTHEUS: Continue.
ZEUS: You may hate me, but we are akin; I made you in my image. A king is a
god on earth, glorious and terrifying as a god.
AEGISTHEUS: You, terrifying?
ZEUS: Look at me. [A long silence.] I told you you were made in my image. Each
keeps order; you in Argos, I in heaven and on earth—and you and I harbor the same dark
secret in our hearts.
AEGISTHEUS: I have no secret.
ZEUS: You have. The same as mine. The bane of gods and kings. The bitterness
of knowing men are free. Yes, Aegistheus, they are free. But your subjects do not know
it, and you do.
AEGISTHEUS: Why, yes. If they knew it, they’d send my palace up in flames.
For fifteen years I’ve been playing a part to mask their power from them.
ZEUS: So you see we are alike.122
Moral authority as with legal authority is illusory—both lack an objective, metaphysical basis,
and yet both god and king, as administators of the law, exercise power over their subjects.
According to Zeus, this is because people erroneously believe the law is objective, or built into
the nature of being. They think, for example, that morality has eternal, unchanging value as
something created by the gods. Therefore, any contradiction of moral law is not only a sin, but a
violation of nature itself. People subject themselves to gods and kings because they believe there
is no other choice. Were they to become aware of their freedom, as Zeus fears will someday
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happen, the people of Argos would no longer believe in objective morality and, as a direct result,
Zeus would lose his power over them. “If they knew” they were free, Aegistheus echoes, “they’d
send my palace up in flames.” But there is another secret that Zeus has yet to reveal:
ZEUS: Aegistheus, my creature and my mortal brother, in the name of this good
order that we serve, both you and I, I ask you—nay, I command you—to lay hands on
Orestes and his sister.
AEGISTHEUS: Are they so dangerous?
ZEUS: Orestes knows that he is free.
AEGISTHEUS [eagerly]: He knows he’s free? Then, to lay hands on him, to put
him in irons, is not enough. A free man in a city acts like a plague-spot. He will infect my
whole kingdom and bring my work to nothing. Almighty Zeus, why stay your hand? Why
not fell him with a thunderbolt?
ZEUS [slowly]: Fell him with a thunderbolt? [A pause. Then, in a muffled voice]
Aegistheus, the gods have another secret.
AEGISTHEUS: Yes?
ZEUS: Once freedom lights its beacon in a man’s heart, the gods are powerless
against him. It’s a matter between man and man, and it is for other men, and for them
only, to let him go his gait, or to throttle him.123
As before, those who believe in objective moral values do not feel at liberty to violate these
ostensible laws. When they do violate them—performing an action that they believe to be
objectively wrong and thereby committing a “sin”—they experience feelings of remorse and
even guilt, which is thereafter internalized as self-punishment. Those who, like Orestes, have
awakened to their freedom, however, no longer believe in objective moral values, so their
freedom is not obstructed by the gods, as it is with the citizens of Argos, but by other individuals
—those who struggle against them for story-telling privileges, or the rights to sovereignty. Sartre
describes this in his discussion of being-for-others, the process whereby an individual is
objectified by another person. Here, as in Hemingway’s works, the most extreme example of this
is killing, a signifying act that separates the beast from the sovereign, the humanized from the
animalized, and subject from object by locating moral authority with free will, the home of self123
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origination. This is why Zeus describes the battle for freedom as “a matter between man and
man”; you must either submit to your opponent or “throttle him” in the zero-sum struggle over
sovereign power.
“On the individual level, my freedom is such that, through negation, I can choose what I
want to be. But on the social level, my freedom is only one of many freedoms, and my being is
subject to other powers of negation,” writes Kate Kirkpatrick in her examination of being-forothers;124 “But I can only found my freedom if I assimilate the freedom of the Other. … For
Sartre, there is no room for two selves; intersubjective relationality is a ruse. We always
inevitably turn to the human Other to justify our existence, reducing the Other to a means to my
ends.”125 This notion is illustrated from multiple angles in Sartre’s 1944 play “No Exit.” Three
characters—Garcin, Estelle, and Inez—find themselves trapped in hell, a luxurious, moderatelycomfortable drawing room fashioned in the style of the Second Empire. Garcin is surprised that
hell lacks the fire and brimstone depicted in Christian art, but after a short time with his
roommates, Garcin yells out in misery that “Hell is—other people!” 126 On the one hand, Garcin
knows that a “man is what he wills himself to be,” 127 but, as Inez points out, a person’s identity is
also determined by what other people think of them, as she rebuts: “You’re a coward, Garcin,
because I wish it. I wish it—do you hear?—I wish it. And yet, just look at me, see how weak I
am, a mere breath on the air, a gaze observing you, a formless thought that thinks you.” 128 By
simply thinking about another person you assimilate them into your story of the world,
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becoming, in effect, the author of their identity. This person can regain their subjectivity, or the
power to self-determine, either by killing you, which brings an end to your very capacity to
story-tell, or by persuading you of their viewpoint, but this, in turn, leaves you objectified by
them. The characters of Sartre’s play are already dead, of course, so Garcin must persuade Inez
of his viewpoint to regain his subjectivity; murder is not an option. As Inez points out to Garcin:
“You can’t throttle thoughts with hands. So you’ve no choice, you must convince me, and you’re
at my mercy.”129
If hell is other people, or, more specifically, the power that other people have to objectify
an individual as their inferior, then salvation comes in the form of self-insistence, the exercise of
sovereign control over those who wish to objectify the individual in question. Orestes and
Electra model opposite ends of this religious spectrum; Orestes discovers salvation in his ability
to self-determine and comes to regard himself as the man-making origin of moral law; Electra,
by contrast, becomes trapped in her own personal hell and accepts as divinely authorized the
moral laws that she already violated. Zeus threatens to punish Orestes for the bloody murders
that he and Electra orchestrated, but Orestes retorts that “I am no criminal, and you have no
power to make me atone for an act I don’t regard as a crime. … [Electra] is dearer to me than
life. But her suffering comes from within, and only she can rid herself of it. For she is free.” 130
Failing to realize her freedom, Electra is swarmed by the Furies, who crawl over her body with
“thousands of tiny clammy feet,” 131 until she finally repents of her crimes and vows to worship
Zeus.
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Orestes, however, rebels against the gods, discovering a kind of religious salvation in the
act of killing. “Your whole universe is not enough to prove me wrong,” he says to Zeus; “You
are the king of gods, king of stones and stars, king of the waves of the sea. But you are not the
king of man.”132 Orestes appears to deify himself, taking on the moral authority of the gods at the
same time that he profanes divine authority. But this is no different than Sartre, who declares the
end of moral absolutes and at the same time defends the lawmaking procedures of sovereign,
self-originating choice. “I am doomed to have no other law but mine,” Orestes declares; “For I,
Zeus, am a man, and every man must find out his own way.” 133 The tension here between anomie
and nomos, lawlessness and lawmaking choices again marks the difference between nihilism and
existentialism, for nihilists reject divine law through an acceptance of their mortality, while
existentialists rebel against mortality through a kind of delusional self-insistence, assuming the
right, in this ostensible moment of religious ecstasy—the moment of truth—to take another
creature’s life. This love of killing, as Hemingway called it, is the highest expression of
masculine self-determination, the foundation of Hemingway’s and Sartre’s secularized theism.
Finding Religion Without God
In Hemingway’s debut novel of 1926, The Sun Also Rises, the protagonist, Jake Barnes,
is asked by another character about his religious orientation. Jake and Bill Gorton, a friend from
the war, are fishing in Burguete, Spain before they attend the fiesta of San Fermin in Pamplona.
The two exchange quips, and Jake reveals that, prior to the war, he “went to Loyola with Bishop
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Manning.”134 The conversation develops in multiple directions and, after a few drinks, Bill
decides to take a nap. He places a newspaper over his face and mutters the following:
“Listen, Jake … are you really a Catholic?”
“Technically.”
“What does that mean?”
“I don’t know.”
“All right, I’ll go to sleep now.”135
Bill’s question—is Jake really a Catholic?—seems to grow out of skepticism, as though Bill
were surprised to learn this new information about his longtime friend. Moreover, Jake’s
response comes across as somewhat defensive, or at least evasive. Is Jake embarrassed to
identify as a Catholic? If not, why not simply admit to the fact? To call oneself technically a
Catholic is like saying that a fighter technically won a boxing match. In the popular parlance, this
means that he did not actually win, having fought better than his opponent, but was nevertheless
announced the winner by officials on the grounds of a technicality. A surface reading of the
passage suggests that Jake was baptized Catholic, raised in the Church, and still attends Mass
despite the fact that he no longer believes, or some variation of this. We will also discover, after
closer analysis, that Jake values Catholic ritual as something that aids his atheistic pursuit of the
“religious feeling,” what I call secularized theism. It is in this sense that Jake is technically a
Catholic. When Bill presses him for more of an explanation, Jake evades the question, saying “I
don’t know.” Jake, of course, does know what he means by the comment, but it is too difficult to
explain to his friend. Important to note, however, is that Jake does not answer a simple question
with a simple response. To identify himself as an outright Catholic would be inaccurate; Jake is
technically a Catholic.
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H.R. Stoneback disagrees with this reading. In his view, Jake’s response is not evasive,
but meticulously accurate—a highly technical response to a casual question asked in passing. To
answer with this degree of technical accuracy would be somewhat annoying in this context; it is
not in keeping with Jake’s personality or the tone of the conversation, but Stoneback doubles
down. Because “the passage is sometimes read as an indication that Jake is not really a Catholic,
that he doesn’t believe in or truly practice his faith,” Stoneback warns that
Jake’s response must be considered carefully. The word “technically” may have many
meanings, but all of them have to do with technique, with the careful practice of an art or
craft, the execution or performance of something in relation to formal or practical details;
and the older sense of “technical,” with regard to a thing skillfully done, or a person
“skilled in or practically conversant with some particular art of subject” (OED), should
not be overlooked either, especially in a novel so concerned with, say, the technique of
bullfighters, the style or technique of all things, including the chilling and opening of
bottles of champagne. To take Jake’s response—technically—as an indication that he is
some kind of skeptic about his Catholicism is to miss the point entirely. The Catholic
Church places great emphasis on not just the right matter and the right intention but also
the “right form” when it comes to “the technicalities of Sacramental theology” (Cross
1198). In going to confession and Mass, Jake practices the technique, the form of two of
the major sacraments of his church—penance and Eucharist. As the “laying on of hands”
scene with Montoya (131-32) and the swimming scenes in San Sebastian (235-38)
demonstrate, he is also alert to the sacramental overtones of secular activities that serve
as analogues to the sacraments of confirmation and baptism.136
As I have already illustrated, Stoneback’s interpretation fails to account for the context of this
passage. It would be unlike Jake to answer Bill’s question with such a loaded but also tacit
response, which is not in keeping with the tone of the conversation. But I like Stoneback’s
interpretation all the same because it draws readers’ attention to the true character of Jake’s
Catholicism, highlighting an element that supports Stoneback’s view but that ultimately, after
further analysis, undermines Stoneback’s position by exposing Jake as a secularized theist.
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A central difference between Protestantism and Roman Catholicism is that the former
prioritizes the salvific efficacy of personal faith while the latter prioritizes the ritualistic exercise
of divine sacraments. With the same fervor that Protestants emphasize sola fide over against the
sacramental theology of the Roman Catholic Church do those of the Catholic faith emphasize the
salvific quality of the sacraments. It is in the ritual practice of Catholicism, after all, that one is
saved, according to Catholic theology. As Stoneback puts it, “Protestantism, in many of its
manifestations, is most notable for the manner in which it discards technique, form, and
discipline, for its celebration of the individualized gesture over the technique, the form, rooted in
[the Catholic] tradition.”137 But Jake weighs these contrasting approaches equally, placing as
much importance on the individual’s personal beliefs as he does on the technical performance of
religious ritual. Both elements are emphasized in the following passage:
At the end of the street I saw the cathedral and walked up toward it. The first time I ever
saw it I thought the façade was ugly but I liked it now. I went inside. It was dim and dark
and the pillars went high up, and there were people praying, and it smelt of incense, and
there were some wonderful big windows. I knelt and started to pray and prayed for
everybody I thought of, Brett and Mike and Bill and Robert Cohn and myself, and all the
bullfighters, separately for the ones I liked, and lumping all the rest, then I prayed for
myself again, and while I was praying for myself I found I was getting sleepy, so I prayed
that the bullfights would be good, and that it would be a fine fiesta, and that we would get
some fishing. I wondered if there was anything else I might pray for, and I thought I
would like to have some money, so I prayed that I would make a lot of money, and then I
started to think how I would make it, … and as all the time I was kneeling with my
forehead on the wood in front of me, and was thinking of myself as praying, I was a little
ashamed, and regretted that I was such a rotten Catholic, but realized there was nothing I
could do about it, at least for a while, and maybe never, but that anyway it was a grand
religion, and I only wished I felt religious.” 138
Why does Jake feel like a “rotten Catholic”? He dutifully goes to Church, he prays, he kneels
with his forehead pressed against the wooden pew. It would seem that Jake performs the
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technical procedures as they were meant to be practiced. What makes Jake a rotten Catholic,
then, is not his lack of participation in religious ritual but his personal thoughts and feelings,
which, according to Jake himself, do not seem to align with Catholicism. Jake bemoans the fact
that, after praying for his friends, his thoughts become shallow and self-oriented. He dreams of
striking gold, becomes distracted by bullfighting, and nearly falls asleep. The external
performance is up to par, but the internal, subjective experience is lacking; as Jake states, “I only
wished I felt religious.”
In this regard, he is like Santiago, protagonist of The Old Man and the Sea. We learn in
the opening pages of the novel that hanging on the walls of Santiago’s shack are “a picture in
colour of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and another of the Virgin of Cobre.” 139 The presence of these
Catholic emblems on the wall of Santiago’s home suggests that the novel’s protagonist is a
believing Catholic, but, later in the novel, Santiago states very plainly that “I am not religious, …
[b]ut I will say ten Our Fathers and ten Hail Marys that I should catch this fish.” 140 The prayers
are recited in a mechanical way that seems to lack heartfelt sincerity. “He commenced to say his
prayers mechanically. Sometimes he would be so tired that he could not remember the prayer
and then he would say them fast so that they would come out automatically. Hail Marys are
easier to say than Our Fathers, he thought.”141 Like Jake, Santiago lacks genuine belief in the
gospel message—he even identifies as a non-religious person—but he nevertheless performs
Catholic ritual to help him catch the marlin, praying to a God he does not believe in. In this
manner, Santiago resembles the protagonist of Hemingway’s short story “A Clean, Well-Lighted
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Place,” who recites his own renditions of the Lord’s Prayer: “Our nada who art in nada, nada be
thy name,” and the Hail Mary: “Hail nothing full of nothing, nothing is with thee.” 142
Here, the protagonist replaces key words with nada or nothing—reflecting the existential
belief that God’s death gives way to absolute freedom, a negative ontology that, in the Roman
Catholic tradition, derives from God’s absence, the one true source of being. This is Catholicism
emptied of its religious content—a theological system without God—and, as numerous scholars
have demonstrated, it forms the basis of Sartrean existentialism. Comparing Santiago with the
protagonist of “A Clean, Well-Lighted Place” draws attention to the philosophical value of
Catholic ritual, for just as the “older waiter” 143 recites Catholic prayer to confront nothingness, or
God’s nonexistence, so too might Santiago, a self-identified unbeliever, find value in a ritual
practice that reveals nada at the heart of Catholicism, reminding Santiago of his power to selfdetermine. Stoneback seems to agree that unbelievers can benefit from ritual, as well: “On this
subject, one might consult many Christian saints and mystics or, for that matter, Confucius, who
understood very well … the feeling of magical power that emanates from the authentic ritual
gesture.”144 Even a non-Christian like Confucius understood the value of ritual, which Stoneback
sees performed in “the church, the bullfight, and fishing, or even travel and work, as well as the
smaller but no less important ceremonies of dailiness such as wine drinking,” 145 so it is clear that
Hemingway’s use of ritual should not be proof, for Stoneback, that Hemingway also believed in
Catholicism.
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There is no question that Hemingway makes use of Catholic ritual and may, for this
reason, identify as a member of the Catholic Church, just as Jake Barnes identifies as technically
Catholic, but Chapters Three and Four of this dissertation demonstrate that Hemingway did not
believe in God or the Christian afterlife. Like Sartre, Hemingway discovered absence at the heart
of Catholicism, so the ritual performance of Catholic sacraments was a reminder of his own
nothingness, or his capacity for sovereign, self-originating choice—the foundation of
Hemingway’s secularized theism. But he would also discover this capacity and, with it, the
“religious feeling” in secular rituals like bullfighting, big-game hunting, and deep-sea fishing,
which he found to be especially potent.
Hemingway’s first novel, The Sun Also Rises, and the last novel published in his lifetime,
The Old Man and the Sea, mark the span of a quarter century, and yet both titles present their
protagonists as religious pilgrims who march toward death in search of immortality. Jake Barnes
visits cathedrals and other religious sites during his pilgrimage, but the Plaza de Toros is his
ultimate destination. This is because Jake is an “aficionado … one who is passionate about the
bullfight” and understands its “spiritual” value.146 As we have already discussed at length,
Hemingway took refuge in the two-part nature of the fight: the faena, which confronts the
spectator with their mortality and animal nature; and the moment of truth, in which spectators
vicariously reclaim the imago Dei—a symbol of human exceptionalism and immortality.
“Outside the ring, after the bullfight was over, you could not move in the crowd,” Jake recalls;
“We could not make our way through but had to be moved with the whole thing, slowly, as a
glacier, back to town. We had that disturbed emotional feeling that always comes after the
bullfight,” the feeling of mortality, or certain death, “and the feeling of elation that comes after a
146
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good bullfight,” the feeling of immortality, that is, which follows the moment of truth.147 Twentysix years later, Hemingway would write about Santiago’s religious pilgrimage, and yet, in spite
of the considerable time lapse between his first novel and his last, Hemingway’s depiction of the
faena and moment of truth appear nearly identical. Santiago wonders if killing the marlin is a
“sin,” negotiating the boundary between human and animal nature, but the old fisherman
ultimately recognizes that killing the fish is a spiritual duty that, in turn, will finally prove his
own greatness and masculine heroism.148
The old man dropped the line and put his foot on it and lifted the harpoon as high as he
could and drove it down with all his strength, and more strength he had just summoned,
into the fish’s side just behind the great chest fin that rose high in the air to the altitude of
the man’s chest. He felt the iron go in and he leaned on it and drove it further and then
pushed all his weight after it. Then the fish came alive, with his death in him, and rose
high out of the water showing all his great length and width and all his power and his
beauty. He seemed to hang in the air above the old man in the skiff. Then he fell into the
water with a crash that sent spray over the old man and over all of the skiff. The old man
felt faint and sick and he could not see well. But he cleared the harpoon line and let it run
slowly through his raw hands and, when he could see, he saw the fish was on his back
with his silver belly up. The shaft of the harpoon was projecting at an angle from the
fish’s shoulder and the sea was discolouring with the red of the blood from his heart. 149
The marlin comes alive with “death in him,” passing by Santiago in this aquatic version of the
faena, and like the great matador, Santiago sends his blade through the creature’s heart. In this
existential moment of truth, Santiago joins a long line of Hemingway heroes who discover a
“religious feeling” in the sovereign exercise of free will. But this theological expression of
masculine volition is epitomized in the ritualistic killing of animals, a signifying act that
separates man from beast, superior being from inferior being. As the ritual basis of his
secularized theism, this so-called love of killing unites the Oak Park Congregationalism of
147
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Hemingway’s youth, his existential disillusionment after the war, and his conversion to Roman
Catholicism years later by unveiling a nothingness at the heart of existence that must—for the
sake of humanity—be overcome. Were Hemingway to embrace this nothingness rather than fight
against it, accepting God’s death and its logical consequences without reservation, he would
accomplish the stated goal of materialistic atheism and dissolve the humanist fantasy,
transforming himself from a sacred man back into a mortal beast. But this is an outcome that
Hemingway could not bring himself to accept, ultimately, as the writer converted from theist to
atheist and, finally, to secularized theist.
Conclusion: The Death of God, the Death of Man
In my quest to resolve the critical disagreement over Hemingway’s religious orientation,
I have described secularization as a failure. Rather than bar the use of theological dogma to
justify society’s moral, political, and legal procedures, secular society has replaced theological
transcendence with a God-surrogate to carry out the same operations. Namely, human
exceptionalism—or the belief that human beings have self-evident, metaphysical value guarded
by their legal rights—has become nothing less than secular dogma, a sacred standard completely
beyond reproach or reevaluation that is questioned only, human-rights advocates will contend, by
the fascist, the bigot, or some other such anathema. To be anti-humanist in the current political
climate is, ironically, to be inhumane—that is, inhuman; it is to act in a way that disfigures our
higher nature, according to popular discourse. But as historian Stefanos Geroulanos points out,
anti-humanism150 emerged in the inter-war and post-war era as a philosophical response to the
150
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humanist ideologies—be they democratic, communist, or national socialist—that led to global
warfare. This anti-humanism “did not simply ‘overcome’ religion and institute a divine humanity
that dominates this otherwise godless universe”—this describes humanism in the postEnlightenment era, according to Geroulanos—“but instead remained lost in a world [both]
without God” or its secular replacement.151 Among these anti-humanists was Sartre, whose
reconstruction of human identity as ontological nothingness—a veritable non-identity—allowed
people, Geroulanos explains, “to be suspicious of the failures, religious implications, and
violence of any humanism.”152
This, of course, was among the stated goals of Sartrean existentialism, but I have shown
that Sartre too would divinize humanity through his commitment to social justice, falling back—
unwittingly, it seems—into the essentialist paradigms that he sought to overturn. Where justice
refers to an equal administration of the law, and equality to the identical consideration and
treatment of individual persons, there emerges a notion of human identity that universalizes our
shared values and associated morality as objectively true. Lacking metaphysical objectivity, the
system will only acquire universal authority at the hands of powerful leadership or through
population consensus, with hegemonic valuations of human nature being imposed on those who
dissent. For this reason, every attempt at social justice objectifies morality and essentializes
humanity at the expense of those who conceptualize human identity differently. To conceive of
tion of ‘post’ and ‘anti-,’” for posthumanism, Ferrando explains, moved beyond a merely negative critique of anthropocentrism to positive considerations of ecology and animal rights, as reflected in Agamben’s concern with the
human/nonhuman dialectic. In short, anti-humanism and posthumanism share a critique of anthropocentrism. The
latter merely expands its scope of interest to include nonhuman organisms. See Francesca Ferrando, “Posthumanism,
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151

Stefanos Geroulanos, An Atheism That is Not Humanist Emerges in French Thought (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP,
2010), 8.
152

Ibid., 9.

225
humanity, moreover, always pushes the nonhuman beyond the reach of social justice because the
“human being,” no matter how we choose to define it, is meaningful only in relationship to its
conceptual opposites. Therefore, it is no surprise that Sartre’s moral commitments justified his
support of Soviet concentration camps, which stands at the heart of his conflict with Albert
Camus; and, likewise, it is no surprise that Hemingway’s moral valuations were grounded in the
love of killing. Absolute morality authorizes differential representations of humanity which, in
turn, produce dehumanizing violence. In short, the human gives birth to the nonhuman; morality
breeds violent behavior.
In my critique of both Hemingway and Sartre, I leveraged the philosophical insights of
Giorgio Agamben to deauthorize sovereign decisionism, unpacking the contents of their failed
atheism to uncover its latent theological foundation. Agamben provides the antidote to sovereign
decision making, the latter of which Sartre and Hemingway would eventually find themselves
bound through a series of logical missteps, as both writers failed to recognize the implications of
their moral commitments. But I am not certain that Agamben’s philosophical alternative fits the
bill. In The Open: Man and Animal, Agamben calls for a deactivation of the anthropological
machine, what he describes in The Time That Remains (2005) as “the revocation of each and
every concrete factical vocation,” the revocation, in other words, of any concrete identity. 153
Hoping to deauthorize sovereign representations of the human being, Agamben describes its
nature as an impotent potentiality—which is to say, the potential to become an ontological
essence that never succeeds in actualizing. In this sense, human beings are pure potentiality—
what Sartre refers to as nothingness—and, as such, they have no identity; they are, in effect, non-
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identities. By conceptualizing the human being as an impotent potentiality that refuses to selfidentify—suspended, as it were, in a permanent state of undecidability, or pure potentiality—
Agamben renders the sovereign decision inoperative and as therefore incapable of producing
representational violence against the nonhuman. If Sartre believed that existence precedes
essence, then Agamben believes that existence prevents essence, for each of us is an impotent
potentiality that never actualizes into being, a nothingness that renders being-in-itself-for-itself
impossible.
And yet Agamben himself appears committed to social justice, devoting his career to
philosophical arguments against sovereign violence. He mourns the dehumanizing treatment of
concentration camp prisoners in Remnants of Auschwitz (1999), and, in fact, the entire Homo
Sacer series, which consists of nine volumes written over the span of two decades, is geared
toward the redemption of bare life, those individuals separated from humanity and deprived of
their rights by the sovereign powers that be. I wrote earlier that Agamben’s project exceeds the
scope of this dissertation, but readers may wonder, in light of his social justice concerns, whether
Agamben’s defense of marginalized figures translates into an ethical imperative. Can Agamben
prescribe the fair treatment of society’s victims on moral grounds without inciting
representational violence of his own? And if this prescription lacks moral authority, should we
not call it a suggestion rather than a prescription, as something that one can do and not as
something that one should do or ought to do? Put differently, were it not for humanity’s inherent
value, the ethical imperative thou shalt not kill would make little sense to the individual who
wants nothing more than to see their enemy laid to waste. Without the imago Dei or some other
such metaphysical foundation, moral suggestions of any kind would lack their universal appeal.
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“Thou shalt not kill may work for you,” one disaffected voice might ring out, “but it just isn’t
me; I’m more of a get what you want, when you want it kind of guy.” Whether Agamben can
adopt a moral stance himself without reinscribing the sovereign violence he seeks to overcome
appears doubtful to this reader, but I will leave this query to the seasoned scholars of Agamben’s
philosophical project.
The more pressing question, for readers of this dissertation, is whether Hemingway’s
secularized theological views should be condemned as morally wrong. Because I have not
distanced myself from the author’s conclusions, readers might assume that I condone
Hemingway’s defense of sovereign violence. I can say, however, without the slightest
reservation, that sovereign decisionism is a fiction—the slaughter of dangerous animals does not
instill their killer with metaphysical superiority, and, likewise, the sovereign act does not create a
zone of indistinction between potentiality and actuality to achieve being-in-itself-for-itself.
Hemingway’s belief in theological transcendence is delusional. That being said, I will not, in
turn, condemn Hemingway’s defense of violence as morally wrong. Killing might be distasteful,
destructive, traumatizing, and unwanted, but it is not morally wrong. For morality too is a fiction,
based on the exceptional value of human life, and its application is dehumanizing, itself a
justification or defense of sovereign violence against the nonhuman. No, I will have no part in
morality, for I lack the desire to live my life in accordance with violent delusions. Readers of this
dissertation may do the same, opting out of the morality game altogether, or, alternatively, they
may respond to sovereign violence with a counter-violence of their own—i.e. moral conviction
or even outrage. This is ultimately their prerogative. But I, for one, have no moral prescriptions
to make, only observations.
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